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ABSTRACT 
Contributory liability is the liability of a party who is not the direct infringer, but who 
facilitates or contributes to the infringement committed by the direct infringer. With 
respect to trade marks, neither EU law nor national laws of member states (MS) provide 
specific rules to deal with the issue except very limited circumstances. Thus, the question 
of contributory trade mark liability is assessed under tort law rules. In that regard, the law 
seems straightforward. Yet, it is not. This is because, contributory liability now mainly 
arises in a new context: the Internet. Except from the cases of where the occurrence of a 
direct infringement of trade mark is questionable eg selling and buying keywords, Internet 
intermediaries’ liability arise as contributory liability since they are the vehicles to 
facilitate transactions between third parties on the Internet. Here, it should be underlined 
that the thesis’ scope is limited to the cases where it is unquestionable that the direct trade 
mark infringement has taken place, so the intermediaries’ contributory liability is an issue. 
More precisely the cases dealing with selling of counterfeit goods. In those circumstances, 
trade mark owners have been seeking to fix the liability of an intermediary rather than the 
direct infringers themselves since reaching the latter is not always possible as they can 
easily remain anonymous or be located in jurisdictions which are not easily accessible for 
right holders. This is why, intermediaries have been the subject of contributory liability 
cases. As such, how should their liability be examined given that their involvement does 
not go beyond providing a necessary platform and infrastructure? How can their 
involvement be assessed as the Internet’s infrastructure differs from that of the offline 
world?   
 
For these questions that arise from contributory trade mark liability, there are two legal 
instruments applicable within the EU: 1) tort laws of the MSs, and 2) pan-EU immunity 
regime established by the E-Commerce Directive 2000/31. The first is also applicable to 
the offline world while the latter provides a more Internet-specific approach as it 
establishes horizontally applicable safe harbour rules for certain activities of 
intermediaries. According to the Directive, intermediaries which provide mere conduit, 
caching and hosting services can be granted immunity from the liability arising from its 
users’ infringements provided that the conditions stated under each Article are qualified. 
However, the immunity is provided as an additional protection meaning that not 
qualifying for immunity does not automatically result in the liability of an intermediary. 
Thus, whether an intermediary is liable or not is ultimately a subject of tort law of the 
MSs which is not harmonised within the EU.  
Thus, the law of contributory trade mark liability in the EU appears to be incoherent. On 
the one hand, the immunity rules govern when an intermediary would be granted 
immunity from liability and apply horizontally. On the other hand, tort law rules deal with 
the question of contributory liability but differ from one MS to another. Therefore, an 
analysis on existing law appears necessary in order to build the legal framework more 
systematically by demonstrating how it is applied. Yet, this analysis shall be undertaken 
to answer whether the current regime proves to be satisfactory in dealing with ongoing 
and emerging issues that the Internet brings and finally what the remedy would be for the 
issues where the law falls short in dealing them. These are the questions that have been 
neglected by the EU legislators. This thesis therefore undertakes this examination in the 
pursuit of answers to these questions and ultimately the remedy.  
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I. BACKGROUND  
 
‘The Web as I envisaged it, we have not seen it yet. The future is still so 
much bigger than the past.’1 
These words are expressed by the inventor of the World Wide Web (www or Web 1.0), 
Tim Berners Lee, even almost three decades after his invention. There is no doubt that 
the evolution of Internet technologies is fast and difficult to keep up with. When the www 
was invented, the Internet aimed to interconnect computers. However, now it means more 
than that. Users’ activity is no longer limited to browsing web pages and viewing content. 
Especially with the advent of Web 2.02, users can now be more active online. They can 
even contribute to the flow of information throughout the world. User generated content 
(UGC) technologies enable users to create their own online accounts and be part of the 
information society such as by uploading content or commenting on content. However, 
other than the users and these services, there exists another party which maintains the 
Internet infrastructure and connects users and services. These are the Internet 
intermediaries. It is their task to ‘bring together or facilitate transactions between third 
parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and index content, products 
and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide Internet-based services 
                                                 
1 From Tim Berners Lee’s speech on the 18th International World Wide Web Conference in Madrid. 
<http://www.opening-governance.org/sir-tim-berners-lee/>.  
2 The Web 2.0 is basically the technology which allows user interaction online via interactive applications 
and platforms. For detailed analysis Tim O’Reilly ‘What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models 
for the Next Generation of Software’ (2007) Communications & Strategies 65, 17-37. 
5 
 
to third parties3’. They are identified, although not exhaustively, by the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)4 as follows:  
• Internet access and service providers (ISPs),  
• Data processing and web hosting providers, including domain name registrars,  
• Internet search engines and portals, 
• E-commerce intermediaries, where these platforms do not take title to the goods 
being sold,  
• Internet payment systems, and  
• Participative networking platforms, which include Internet publishing and 
broadcasting platforms that do not themselves create or own the content being 
published or broadcast.  
 
In addition to these, new Internet intermediaries have emerged with Web 2.0 
technologies. Some of these are: peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing platforms, social 
networking sites, blogs, cloud services and linking tools. They have become part of our 
social, economic and political life. For instance, it is ISPs which provide the access to 
users such as BT, Sky; Vodafone for mobile access while it is Facebook which provides 
the platform for social networking; Ebay for online shopping; and Visa for online 
payments. They are technically positioned as a medium in between the users and these 
services. As a result, their involvement in the process of information dissemination is 
expected to be passive. However, given the Internet’s complex infrastructure, this is not 
always the case. Indeed, depending upon the type of service offered, an intermediary 
might be involved in or have control over this process to some degree. For example, 
although an ISP would not have any control on the users of the Internet as it simply 
provides Internet access to its subscribers through its infrastructure without becoming 
further involved in the distribution of the content, Ebay as an online marketplace can have 
some degree of control over the content that is uploaded by its users. It can be more 
actively involved in the presentation of the content made available by its users such as 
                                                 
3 The Economic and the Social Role of Internet Intermediaries, April 2010, p.9, 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf>. 
4 This is an organisation aiming to promote the policies which will improve the economic and social well-
being of people around the world. See <http://www.oecd.org/> . 
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enabling them to place sponsor links corresponding to trade mark owners’ product to the 
infringing product.5 
What would happen then if the activities of the users of these services amounted to an 
illegal or harmful activity or an infringement of another’s rights? Should an intermediary 
be liable for the infringing activities of its users? Or should an intermediary be expected 
to act more actively to prevent the presence of such content through their services? These 
questions, unsurprisingly have been at the crux of Internet-related discourse.6  
This is mainly because the delineation of an intermediary’s involvement in the infringing 
activity is not an easy task to define. This can be grounded on two reasons: 1) The fact 
that it is the user, not the intermediary, who commits the infringing activity. 2) 
Intermediaries’ position within the Internet infrastructure together with their abilities in 
terms of enforcement. This complex structure does not appear to bear any similarity with 
the offline world, thus makes the issue unique and challenging. Assessing intermediaries’ 
involvement therefore appears difficult.   
More importantly, the liability question does not have one clear-cut answer as it covers a 
vast array of rights and intermediaries. For example, the infringing activity of a user could 
infringe intellectual property (IP) rights or could amount to defamation, hate speech, data 
breach or may even give rise to criminal liability when, for instance, the activity involves 
content that is harmful to minors or terror-related. These rights have different underlying 
policy considerations and different scopes of protection. In a similar sense, liability of an 
intermediary can arise from different services that intermediaries offer such as hosting, 
accessing or transmitting. What is significant in that regard is that all these activities 
require different levels of involvement by intermediaries which might result in not 
regarded passive. Accordingly, an intermediary may be liable with regard to one of these 
services given while other services may not give rise to liability. The examination of 
intermediaries’ liability should therefore be undertaken according to each type of right 
                                                 
5 This was indeed one of the issues before the English Court and the CJEU in Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA 
and Others v Ebay International AG and Others [2011] ECR I-06011.  
6 Some of the literature concerned these issues are as follows: Maurice Schellekens, ‘Liability of Internet 
Intermediaries: Patrick Van Eecke and Barbara Ooms, ‘ISP Liability and the E-commerce Directive: A 
Growing Trend Toward Greater Responsibility for ISPs’ (2007) Journal of Internet Law 3-9; A Slippery 
Slope?’ (2011) SCRIPTed 8(2) 154-174; Katja Weckstrom, ‘Liability for Trademark Infringement for 
Internet Service Providers’ (2012) Marquette Intellectual Property Law Review (2012) 16(1) 2-50. Andres 
Guadamuz, ‘Developments in Intermediary Liability’ in Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski (eds) Research 
Handbook on EU Internet Law (Edward Elgar 2014) 312-336. 
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and intermediary as underlying policy considerations of the rights differ and 
intermediaries can offer divergent services. 
Given these divergences, unsurprisingly different approaches have been adopted by 
different countries in governing the intermediaries’ liability issue. Laws of United States 
(US) and European Union (EU) represent two major regimes in that respect. Both laws 
chose to deal with the issue by providing immunity rules for certain activities of the 
intermediaries, yet these immunity rules are established on a different basis. Under US 
law, the law of the intermediaries is shaped vertically, whereas horizontal application is 
adopted in the EU. This means that immunity rules of the EU are applicable to every 
substantive right while US law’s rules are right-specific. As an example of the latter, 
S.230(c) of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)7 grants an immunity for interactive 
computer services8 from liability arising from infringements of rights other than IP rights 
while S.512 of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)9 establishes the immunity 
regime only for the copyright-specific issues.  
In contrast, EU’s immunity regime is established horizontally. To that end, the E - 
Commerce Directive 2000/31 (ECD)10 is implemented. This Directive establishes safe 
harbour rules within Arts.12-14 for certain activities of the intermediaries as applicable 
to any types of substantive rights with a small exception for data and privacy 
protection11.12 Within those Articles, the activities of the intermediaries that can qualify 
for immunity are identified and the immunity is depended on different conditions. The 
intermediaries specified in that regard are those which merely transmit the information 
(Art.12 ‘mere conduit’), or provide an automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of 
that information (Art.13‘caching’) and store the information in the capacity of host 
(Art.14 ‘hosting’). Linking providers, ie search engines, are not expressly included in the 
scope of the immunity rules. Hosting intermediaries’ immunity is bounded by the 
                                                 
7 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
8 The Act employs this term and in practice the scope of the terms has been construed broadly.  
9 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
10 Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in 
particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1. (The ECD). 
11 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31; Council Directive 
2006/24/EC of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L 105/54 were applicable until it was repealed by the EU-
wide applicable General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on 25 May 2018. For further detail See 
Chapter 2. 
12 The ECD, art 5(b). 
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requirement of taking appropriate action after obtaining actual knowledge (for criminal 
law matters) or awareness (civil law matters) of the infringing nature of content. As 
notification is the most common way of obtaining such awareness, the ECD reflects and 
encourages the notice and takedown (NTD) principle but does not provide a 
comprehensive mechanism13 to deal with this nor any further insight as to its procedures. 
The conditions and procedures of the notification mechanism are left to the national courts 
to decide. Finally, Art.15 determines the boundaries of intermediaries’ activities in 
general by expressly prohibiting the imposition of a general obligation on the 
intermediaries to monitor stored or transmitted information. This Article, also specifies 
the frame of the hosting intermediaries’ involvement in taking required actions.  
Along with the ECD, there is the Enforcement Directive 2004/48 (ED)14 which regulates 
the enforcement of IP rights online. The third sentence of Art.11 of this Directive 
establishes the injunctions regime as it states ‘[m]ember States shall also ensure that 
rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose 
services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right’. As 
intermediaries are the subject of these injunctions, those mechanisms become significant 
in determining the liability of intermediaries by means of contributory liability. This is 
because injunctions impose a duty to implement and apply the specified injunction on the 
intermediaries. Accordingly, the scope of the injunctions shapes the responsibilities of 
the intermediaries which is ultimately significant in delineating their contributory 
liability. Finally, it must be pointed out that the idea behind enabling right owners to apply 
for an injunction against intermediaries is that intermediaries are best positioned to take 
measures and prevent the infringing activities.  
As demonstrated, immunity rules in general serve the main purpose of protecting a 
passive intermediary from the threat of liability arising from its users’ illicit activities 
while enhancing the free flow of information and innovation. Indeed, Recital 8 of the 
ECD states that the objective is ‘to create a legal framework to ensure the free movement 
of information’15 while in the further Recitals harmonisation in the information society 
and provision of necessary conditions for the innovation are stated as other objectives of 
the Directive. In doing so, the ECD follows an immunity regime based on the type of 
                                                 
13 In contrast, the S.512 of the DMCA establishes comprehensive NTD procedures.  
14 Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] 
OJ L 195/16. (the ED) 
15 The ECD, Recital 8. 
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activity of the intermediaries, regardless of the right at stake, while US legislators chose 
to implement a right-specific approach. The difference in their approaches appears as a 
significant element in the context of trade marks.  
  
II. TRADE MARKS ON THE INTERNET 
 
Given the advantages, convenience and borderless nature of the Internet, it is not 
surprising that e-commerce has become the most commonly used method of trade.16 
Accordingly, it attracts trade mark owners to promote and sell their brands online. As it 
occurs in the offline world, not all online activities appear to be legal in the online world 
either. Counterfeit activities have also been transferred online by the people who seek a 
benefit from these kinds of activities and have become common practice. Counterfeiting 
is officially defined in the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights17, so-called TRIPS Agreement as follows: ‘Counterfeit trademark goods shall 
mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without authorization a trademark which 
is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of such goods, or which cannot 
be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, and which thereby 
infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law of the country 
of importation’.  More remarkably, counterfeiting activities are deemed as ‘one of the 
fastest economic crimes of modern times’ by International Chamber of Commerce.18 
Along with counterfeit selling, Internet-specific infringing activities such as purchasing 
or bidding on the domain names or keywords which correspond to third party’ trade marks 
are also committed. What makes the Internet a popular platform for these kinds of 
activities is the obstacles that it creates for right owners there. Those restrain trade mark 
owners’ ability to reach the offenders of the infringing activity. This is because the online 
world is not bound by the physical realities and borders of the offline world. Thus, it gives 
                                                 
16 Adebola Adeyemi, ‘Liability and exemptions of internet service providers (ISPS): assessing the EU 
electronic commerce legal regime’ (2018) Computer & Telecommunications Law Review 24(1) 6-12, 6. 
(‘the European e-commerce market broke the €500 billion mark in 2016, with the UK accounting for 
around €157 billion’.) This was followed with €534 billion turnover in 2017.  
17 This is the multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights and its enforcement which came into 
force 1 January 1995 and agreed between all the member nations of the World Trade Organisation. See 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm 
18 Cited from Caroline O’Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications 
on ISPs, site owners and IPR owners’ (2016) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 22 (3) 79-
88, 84. 
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infringers an opportunity to act anonymously or under a false account and even act in a 
different country to where the trade mark is registered.  
Under these circumstances, a right owner may not be able to reach the offender at all. 
Even if he reaches and starts proceedings against this individual, enforcement of his rights 
might not be possible if the offender is located outside of the jurisdiction. In fact, even if 
proceedings and enforcement against the offender were successful, in most of the cases, 
this would not be the desired outcome for an owner as it would be limited to one offender. 
A right owner in that case should start another proceeding against another infringer and 
should repeat the process for each infringer in order to ensure the protection of his rights. 
Yet, it is evident that this process would be very time-consuming, costly and 
burdensome.19  
Therefore, changing the focus from individuals to intermediaries would be more sensible 
for right owners.20 This is because what a right owner needs for a more effective 
protection of his right online are the facilities of the intermediaries which will enable him 
to more easily identify and reach the offenders of infringing activities. Moreover, 
intermediaries’ facilities enable them to apply precautionary measures against those 
infringers by mean of preventing an infringement. Accordingly, pursuing an intermediary 
would most likely result in a bigger success in protecting rights as it would also provide 
more cumulative protection. Yet, pursuing an intermediary for its liability is not 
straightforward. This is because intermediary liability does not arise as a direct liability 
in most cases. This matter is bound by the rules of contributory liability on the ground 
that an intermediary is most likely not the party who directly and intentionally commits 
the infringement, namely the offender. In contrast, it is most likely the third party who 
directly commits the infringing activity via the service provided by an intermediary. Thus, 
in that circumstance an intermediary’s liability arises on the grounds of facilitation or 
contribution to the infringement committed by this third party which is its user. This 
                                                 
19 Costs of legal procedures together with some pre-proceeding costs such as costs of tracking down the 
offender and gathering evidences and the time would be spent on are the most indicative examples of this. 
See Maria Mercedes Frabboni, ‘File Sharing and the Role of Intermediaries in the Marketplace: National, 
European Union and International Developments’ in Irini A. Stamatoudi, Copyright Enforcement and the 
Internet (Kluwer Law International 2010) 119-146, 120. 
20 Having said that there still are cases started against individual sellers who sold counterfeits. See The 
Fashion Law Blog ‘Amazon Files Landmark Suit Against Individual Counterfeit Seller’ (The Fashion Law 
Blog, 15 November 2016) <<http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/amazon-files-landmark-suit-against-
individual-counterfeit-sellers>> ; The Fashion Law Blog ‘Alibaba “Breaks New Ground,” Sues Third Party 
Sellers of Counterfeit Goods’ (The Fashion Law Blog, 4 January 2017) 
<http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/alibaba-sues-third-party-sellers-of-counterfeit-goods>.  
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liability is called contributory liability.21 But, what are the elements of this liability? More 
precisely, when and to what extent would an intermediary be held contributorily liable 
for trade mark infringement committed by a third party? These questions are therefore 
the focus of the ongoing online trade mark liability discourse within the EU and the US.  
What is significant with respect to these questions is that neither EU law nor US law 
provides specific statutory rules to govern contributory trade mark liability. Therefore, 
the issues concerning contributory liability that arise from trade mark infringement are 
subject to tort law22 if the infringement gives rise to civil liability. As criminal liability is 
excluded from the scope of the thesis, contributory liability that arises from tortious 
activity is therefore its focus. With respect to tort law, as can be expected, the law of 
contributory liability is divergently established given that the countries have different 
underlying principles behind their tort laws. Moreover, having intermediaries at the core 
of online contributory liability issues makes the matter more complex and rather unique 
given the infrastructural and conceptual differences between the online and the offline 
world.  
Along with tort law principles, the immunity rules stated above are another legal 
instrument in establishing online contributory trade mark liability. That is why the 
approaches adopted in EU and US laws are very important and directly related to trade 
marks. US law does not provide any immunity rules for intermediaries in relation to trade 
marks. Thus, the common tort law rules apply. Within the EU, however, the ECD’s 
immunity regime applies to trade marks. In that respect, mere conduit, caching and 
hosting intermediaries can be granted immunity from liability that arises from their users’ 
infringing activity on their platform. Yet, it is significant that the immunity regime 
regulates the issue by specifying the circumstances when an intermediary would not be 
liable, not the circumstances when it would be. More importantly, this regime is provided 
for intermediaries as an additional protection. What that means is explained by the EU 
Commission as follows: 
                                                 
21 It shall be noted that for the sake of convenience, the term contributory liability is employed within this 
thesis, although in the literature different terms are employed for his type of liability such as secondary 
liability, indirect liability, accessory liability and joint tortfeasance. For the further insight of what the 
contributory liability means in this thesis See Part IV.  
22 As the infringement of a trade mark is a tort. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits 
Guarantee Department [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 (CA), 44. (‘Infringement of a patent or copyright is a 
tort.’)   
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“While the special liability regime constitutes an additional shield for service 
providers, it does not modify each Member States' underlying material law 
governing liability. The only effect of not (or no longer) meeting the criteria 
of article 12, 13 of 14 (e.g., because data is modified during transmission, or 
when access to hosted data is not blocked upon awareness of the 
unlawfulness), will be the loss of the additional protection. Service providers 
will then become subject to the general rules of tortuous or penal liability, 
which may or may not hold the service provider liable, depending on each 
Member State's laws.”23 
Therefore, the question of whether an intermediary is contributorily liable is ultimately a 
subject to the domestic tort law of each member states (MSs) for EU law as well. 
Furthermore, tort law is not harmonised within the EU. It follows that tort laws rules 
governing the issue differ from one MS to another.  
Having said that, why would a lack of harmonisation on EU tort law be an issue given 
that contributory liability is not a new type of liability and it has been the subject of 
traditional tort law rules? Indeed, for example it was the joint tortfeasance doctrine - the 
doctrine that stems from the common law of tort and applies to contributory liability cases 
under English law- which applied to the twenty-first century case of L’Oréal SA and 
Others v eBay International AG and Others24 in deciding whether Ebay was 
contributorily liable for its users’ trade mark infringements on its platform. Thereby, is 
there really a need for rules dealing with online contributory trade mark liability? Or is 
there anything that might require different considerations as to the occurrence of the 
infringement? A delineation of the differences between online and offline world 
infringement is thus important to see whether those have any impact on a consideration 
of the contributory trade mark liability frame. 
 
 
 
III. WHAT ARE THE CHALLENGES THAT THE INTERNET POSES FOR 
CONTRIBUTORY TRADE MARK LIABILITY? 
 
                                                 
23 EU Study on ‘the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society’ (2009), Chapter 6.3.2. 
24 Case C-324/09 [2011] ECR I-06011. (L’Oréal v Ebay). 
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The most significant features of the Internet are its complexity in structure, borderless 
nature and its fast-evolving technologies.25 In some respects these are advantages but they 
are also challenges for Internet regulation.26 Indeed, those are the challenges encountered 
with in determining contributory trade mark liability online and can be best demonstrated 
by considering the Internet intermediaries as they are the parties who are the subject of 
contributory liability cases. As stated, although the conditions might differ, in general, 
the existence of a direct infringing act and contribution to -thus the positive knowledge 
of- this act are the main elements of contributory liability. However, assessment of this 
contribution appears quite challenging if the concerned party is an Internet intermediary. 
This becomes even more challenging when an intermediary is a hosting provider. Because 
a hosting provider would almost necessarily have some degree of involvement in the 
provision of its services.27 Indeed, an online auction site as a hosting provider should 
provide some tools to allow its users to upload, display and categorise the content they 
create. However, when a landlord lets his premises for an auction, his involvement in this 
auction does not go beyond letting his premises. That is why, the hosting intermediaries 
are required to fulfil different conditions than other intermediaries to be granted immunity 
in the ECD. However, traditional tort law rules do not consider this diverging nature of 
intermediaries. Case law of traditional contributory liability is limited to the offline world 
contexts such as manufacturer/ distributor or landlord contexts where the parties are 
restrained by physical realities.28  
                                                 
25 Andres Guadamuz, Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation (Edward Elgar 2011); Rolf H. Weber, 
‘Liability in the Internet of Things’ (2017) Journal of European Consumer and Market Law (5) 207-212 
(He underlines that significantly evolved technologies of the Internet together with its complex 
infrastructure are new challenges for the liability issues.). 
26 ‘…the difficulty in identifying a clear standard is compounded by the fast-changing and diverse nature 
of online intermediaries’ Graeme Dinwoodie, ‘Comparative Analysis of the Secondary Liability of Online 
Service Providers’ in Graeme Dinwoodie (ed.) Secondary Liability of Internet Service Providers (Springer 
International Publishing AG 2017), 19; ‘Technology, and in particular resources through the internet, is 
constantly evolving. Consequently, the means of infringing many online intellectual property rights 
including copyright and trade mark infringement are also progressing.’ Caroline O’Doherty, ‘Online trade 
mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications on ISPs, site owners and IPR owners’ (2016), 
79. 
27 In his opinion in L’Oréal v Ebay, the AG emphasises this in assessing the neutrality test established by 
the CJEU in Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] 
ECR I-02417. See Case C-324/09 L’Oréal SA and Others v Ebay International AG and Others [2011] ECR 
I-06011 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 146. 
28 Especially the US case law provides a further insight on that matter such as Societe Anonyme de la 
Distillerie de la Liqueur Benedictine de L'abbaye de Fecamp v. Western Distilling Co. 42 F. 96 (E.D. Mo. 
1890); Hostetter Co. v Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co. 46 F. 188, 188 (E.D. Mo. 1891); Inwood Labs., 
Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., (1982) 456 U.S. 844, 854; Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v Concession Services 
Inc.,955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir.1992). For EU, English cases have mostly dealt with the issue in the traditional 
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However, intermediaries’ capabilities within the online world are not limited by physical 
realities. As a result, right owners can more easily reach a customer located at the other 
side of world and promote and sell their brand through it with the help of an intermediary. 
Yet, this borderless nature is also a significant obstacle for them in protecting their rights 
against infringing activities. Here again, the infrastructural advantages of the 
intermediaries come to the fore as these have the potential to provide more effective 
enforcement for the right owner than it could have on its own in terms of identifying and 
reaching the infringer and terminating the infringement. At this point, it should be noted 
that even though those enforcement mechanisms undertaken by an intermediary would 
be limited to the jurisdiction,29 those measures would still be more proactive and on a 
bigger scale than a right holder could manage itself given the nature and the infrastructure 
of an intermediary. An intermediary can implement monitoring and filtering technologies 
for the purpose of tackling infringing activity. With those mechanisms, every listing can 
be monitored before the upload or they can be filtered out if it consists of illicit content. 
However, this would accordingly affect their passive position in the provision of services 
and would most likely result in them losing their immunity or being held contributorily, 
or even perhaps directly liable depending upon how active their involvement was.  
On the other hand, the effectiveness of those mechanisms for tackling infringing activities 
online is evident as their capabilities do not depend on physical aspects such as physical 
existence of the good. This reflects the existing dilemma of the intermediaries’ liability 
regime; intermediaries are in the best position to apply the measures and tackle the 
infringing activities whilst they are not actively involved in the infringements. With that 
respect, imposing too much burden with such measures may jeopardise their business or 
may result in them losing their immunity but it may also prove to be a more effective 
means of enforcement and protection for the rights online. However, those infrastructural 
advantages should not be taken for granted since the effectiveness of applying these 
measures has its drawbacks. Indeed, it would not be realistic to expect an intermediary to 
check every listing uploaded. This would also most likely amount to an interference in 
                                                 
context such as CBS Songs Ltd. v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc. [1988] A.C. 1013; The Itria v The 
Koursk [1924] P.140; Fish & Fish Ltd. v Sea Shepherd UK [2015] UKSC 10. 
29 It should be noted here that recently the Canadian Court granted a global injunction order against Google 
which requires Google to de-list the results from its search engine globally. See Google Inc. v Equustek 
Solutions Inc. 2017 SCC 34. Moreover, for general discussion on the jurisdiction See also Eleonora 
Rosati ‘International Jurisdiction in online EU trade mark infringement cases: where is the place of 
infringement located?’ (2016) European Intellectual Property Review 1-21. 
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the fundamental rights of the users. Besides, as aforementioned, the fact that the Internet 
enables its users to be anonymous online and to act anonymously makes reaching the 
infringer and preventing the infringement more challenging in some cases. Moreover, the 
ECD prohibits the imposition of general monitoring activity on the intermediaries.30 In 
fact, determining the extent of the intermediaries’ activities by means of enforcement is 
also part of the contributory liability question as it marks out the extent to which an 
intermediary can become involved in online activities.  
The Internet’s evolution is another challenge for establishing the exact frame of 
contributory liability. Internet technologies are evolving very fast.31 This means new 
types of intermediaries continually emerge along with new types of services.32 It has been 
18 years since the Directive came into existence and this is quite a long time considering 
how fast technologies are evolving. Indeed, there are new types of intermediaries which 
did not exist at the time of the ECD being published such as online market-places, P2P 
file sharing technologies, social networking platforms and search engines. As a result, the 
Directive consists no provisions on these new technologies. Moreover, those technologies 
are rather novel and do not usually have any equivalent in offline trade. What this means 
for trade marks and for the purposes of the thesis is that these challenges are also valid 
for the law of contributory trade mark liability. 
Determining the extent of the intermediaries’ involvement in the provision of services as 
well as their responsibilities by means of enforcement are significant elements to establish 
contributory trade mark liability. A question over intermediaries’ contributory trade mark 
liability can arise from counterfeit selling or purchasing of keywords corresponding to a 
third party’s trade mark. In the first scenario, for example, an online auction site may 
provide a platform for goods to be uploaded and sold. If the goods uploaded are 
counterfeit, then the intermediary’ liability may arise. But, of course, this depends upon 
the extent of its involvement in this activity. Here, the clearly established rules are 
essential as an online auction site may provide different services which might result in it 
being regarded as actively involved and contributorily liable. Indeed, Ebay as an online 
                                                 
30 The ECD, art 15. 
31 Weber, ‘Liability in the Internet of Things’ (2017). 
32 Rapidshare like hosting providers which ‘fostered through own measures the dangerous infringing use 
of services’ as well as providing premium services to its users for enabling them to download content which 
can be protected by copyright is one of the examples of such new type of hosting services. Jan B. 
Nordemann, ‘Liability of Online Service Providers for Copyrighted Content- Regulatory Action Needed?’ 
(2018) EU Parliament In-depth Analysis.  
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auction site not only provides a platform for its users to sell and buy goods but also 
optimises the presentation and the offers of the sales on its platform through its own 
advertisements on the search engine, as well as implements a filtering mechanism which 
detects listings that contain certain words.33 Moreover, the fact that it profits from its 
users’ sales of counterfeit goods might be considered an element affecting its passivity. 
 On the other hand, how can an intermediary decide if the content is counterfeiting? It 
would not be realistic to expect an intermediary to understand the difference between a 
genuine and counterfeit good. This examination requires the expertise of a right owner. 
Furthermore, an intermediary never receives the physical possession of the goods and 
neither does it have the opportunity to physically inspect the goods in contrast to offline 
world cases. Yet, the ECD requires a hosting provider to takedown the good once it 
obtains the awareness of an infringing activity.34 In the case of counterfeit selling it would 
not be realistic to expect an intermediary to detect a counterfeit good. Even if it is possible 
for an intermediary to detect the counterfeit nature of some specific goods, it would be 
almost impossible to detect and identify most of the counterfeits uploaded on its platform 
as there exist millions of brands. Therefore, not having had the physical possession makes 
this process much more challenging and more burdensome for intermediaries. 
Furthermore, what happens if the counterfeiting occurs through websites? In that case, 
the ISP’s activity is limited to providing the access to these websites. Could the ISP be 
held liable for the counterfeiting committed on these websites that it gives access to? 
These questions are specific to the online world. 
However, for the second scenario stated above, ie when a user of an intermediary 
purchases and uses the keywords corresponding to third parties’ trade marks, the issue is 
different. Keywords and keywords selling, and the possible infringement arisen from this 
activity is specific to the Internet and has emerged with online technologies. As stated, 
the immunity regime does not expressly deal with those intermediaries when 
intermediaries’ liability as a search engine is at issue. However, the crux of the issue of 
keyword selling is not the question of the applicability of the immunity rules, it is rather 
the question of whether there is a contributory trade mark infringement. This is because, 
purchasing a keyword corresponding to another’s trade mark does not always give a rise 
to the infringement. More precisely, purchasing a keyword may not constitute an 
                                                 
33 Case C- 324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
34 The ECD, art 14. 
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infringement unless ‘that use is not liable to cause detriment to any of the functions of 
that mark.’35 In other words if the use of a keyword does not have an adverse effect on 
one of the functions of a mark, ie indicating origin, advertising, quality of goods and 
services, then it does not infringe the trade mark of an owner. Existence of an 
infringement therefore depends on the specifics of the case. Hence, it can be concluded 
that with respect to this new type of activity, it is questionable that trade mark 
infringement has taken place. 36  
Why is this important and how is it pertinent to contributory trade mark liability cases, 
then? It is evident that the existence of a contributory liability depends on the existence 
of a direct liability that arises from the direct infringement. More precisely, there cannot 
be a contributory liability without a direct infringement. Thus, if the third party’s purchase 
of a keyword does not amount to a trade mark infringement, then there would not be any 
question of intermediary’s contributory liability from selling a keyword in default of an 
infringement. This would follow that in those cases the contributory trademark liability 
of a service providers depends primarily on the assessment of the direct trade mark 
infringement37 which is bound by different rules.38 
In that respect, the issue of contributory trade mark liability that arises online should be 
considered with respect to the cases in which it is unquestionable that the trade mark 
infringement has taken place ie when the counterfeit goods are offered for sale online. 
The counterfeit selling is therefore should be and is the focus of this thesis.  
From an enforcement aspect, what the Internet poses as challenges in general are also 
valid for trade marks. In online counterfeit selling cases, anonymity is what the infringers 
benefit from as it allows them to hide and continue their activities. They disguise 
                                                 
35 Google France citing from Case C-206/01 Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I- 
10273 para 54 and Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 60.  
36 For general overview on the matter, See Parhun Safari and Anton Van Dellen, ‘Protecting trade marks in 
the era of adwords’ (2018) European Intellectual Property Review 40 (5) 319-327 
37 Dinwoodie at that point underlines that the relationship between direct and contributory infringement is 
of importance especially for the cases considering keyword advertising. He further states ‘as a policy 
matter, a secondary liability standard that is unlikely to be satisfied will cause claimants to push for the 
expansion of the scope of primary liability’ whereas ‘the availability of secondary liability claims might 
moderate the demand to hold intermediaries primarily liable’. Dinwoodie, ‘Comparative Analysis of the 
Secondary Liability of Online Service Providers’ (2017), 11.  
38 The question of whether a direct trade mark infringement is occurred is bound by the rules established 
within the Council Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member 
States relating to trade marks [2015] OJ 336. For the CJEU’s appraisal on the matter See Joined Cases C-
236/06- C-236/08 Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] ECR 0. 
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themselves behind false business addresses or by easily changing their profiles and 
continuing their activities under another name.39  
It is therefore evident that the Internet is a very much complex and multifaceted platform 
in which its characteristics appear as advantages as well as challenges. However, this is 
not the complete picture. The sui generis nature of the Internet requires closer 
examination and the analogical approach is not a comprehensive means of defining it. As 
provided above, it differs from the offline world in various aspects which can all exert an 
influence on the contributory liability principles. Moreover, the above examination 
proves that those elements appear to have a direct impact on the contributory liability that 
arises from trade mark infringements. However, the trick is that the regulation of the 
Internet is not purely a process of legal necessities. Internet regulation is also part of the 
policy considerations of countries given the Internet’s utmost importance in social, 
economic and political life.40 That is why one of the main objectives of establishing the 
EU immunity regime is to protect and assist the development of technologies and 
innovation. This regime is established to be applicable to all types of infringing activities 
but only to certain types of intermediaries. Yet, is this approach appropriate for trade 
marks? This is the main concern of the thesis.  
 
IV. RESEARCH QUESTION AND ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION  
 
The main focus of this thesis is the law of contributory trade mark liability that arises 
online because the current state of the law does not appear to deal effectively with the 
issues that the Internet poses. Henceforth, the thesis will seek after the appropriate 
solution.  
The current EU law does not provide rules that specifically govern contributory trade 
mark liability that arises online. Instead, the rules applicable to the issue appear as a two-
tiered system. First, there is a horizontally applicable pan-EU immunity regime 
                                                 
39 O’ Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications on ISPs, site owners 
and IPR owners’ (2016) 84-85. (‘The speed, ease and anonymity that the internet offers to infringers have 
made the legal enforcement of IPRs incredibly difficult.’) 
40 Weber argues ‘[t]he solution of the manifold liability issues arising in the context of Internet of things 
and new contract forms can neither be resolved through a single legal instrument nor through a technical 
solution…. Rather a combined approach is necessary creating the practical reality on which the law can 
attach.’ Weber, ‘Liability in the Internet of Things’ (2017), 207. 
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established within the ECD which provides immunity from liability for certain 
intermediaries. These rules apply to the issue since Internet intermediaries are at the core 
of contributory liability cases. However, those rules only determine the circumstances 
when an intermediary would not be liable. In other words, the immunity regime does not 
specify when an intermediary should be liable or the conditions of the liability. Moreover, 
those rules are provided as an additional protection for intermediaries meaning that losing 
the immunity does not automatically trigger the liability. The liability issue, thus is 
governed the traditionally established principles of tort law. However, tort law rules are 
not harmonised within the EU. Thus, each national court applies its domestic tort law 
rules when the contributory trade mark liability issue comes before the court.  
Therefore, the issue of contributory trade mark liability that arises online is firstly a 
subject to the examination in the light of the EU’s immunity regime; then the MSs courts 
make their examination under their domestic laws that govern the issue. In that sense, the 
law applicable to the online contributory trade mark liability is two-tiered. Yet, the 
assistance of the immunity rules is limited on the ground that those rules only determine 
the cases where an intermediary would be immune from liability. Therefore, what is 
evident under the existing system is that contributory trade mark liability is in fact decided 
under national tort law rules of the MSs since those are the rules governing the liability.  
Contributory liability is not a new type of liability under tort law. Courts have been 
examining the issue and applying the rules to the offline context over the years, even 
though the principles have been quite divergently established within the national laws of 
the different MSs. Nevertheless, this thesis concerns contributory trade mark liability that 
arises in a new and rather unique context: the Internet. It is evident that the Internet differs 
from the offline context in many aspects. Having Internet intermediaries at the core makes 
the issue trickier given their position within the Internet infrastructure and their 
capabilities in comparison to subjects of offline world cases. Those differences give rise 
to the new and rather unique challenges that are peculiar to the online world which require 
more Internet-specific considerations. It can even be said that the immunity regime which 
establishes Internet-specific rules cannot keep up with the pace of the Internet’s evolution. 
Although it covers most types of Internet intermediaries today, it still fails to to mention 
linking providers. It should also not be ignored that it has been 18 years since it was 
published. This is a considerable period of time in the age of technology.  
20 
 
Thus, it is important to have laws in place that tackle Internet-specific challenges. Given 
the above, it is therefore important to examine whether the existing rules governing 
contributory liability are satisfactory in dealing with contributory liability issues that 
arises online. This is indeed the principal question that the thesis is built on. The focus of 
the thesis is to be on trade marks and the contributory liability question that arises from 
the selling of counterfeits. This is mainly because trade marks are one of the least 
considered IP rights within the EU with respect to online infringing activities.41 Indeed, 
even the latest developments undertaken in pursuit of the Digital Single Market (DSM) 
Strategy42, effective enforcement of rights online, more uniformity and tackling illegal 
content43 mainly consider and expressly mention copyright. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that trade mark rights are less important in comparison to other IP rights, 
and neither is the law of contributory trade mark liability fully working and satisfactory 
to deal with the emerging and existing issues. It rather suggests that trade marks and the 
issues surrounding them have been neglected since there is no reason why the issues that 
arises online (ie ambiguity over the application of the rules, lack of further insight as to 
the rules governing online infringing activities or whether there is a need for right specific 
solutions) would not also be valid and significant for trade marks.  
Moreover, establishing the law of contributory trade mark liability would also provide 
assistance in determining whether the horizontal approach adopted by the EU in dealing 
with online activities is the appropriate approach for trade marks and in general. This is 
because there is no additionally provided rules for trade marks other than the immunity 
                                                 
41 The question of contributory copyright liability that arises online has been mainly examined in the 
academia. Some of the examples of those works are: Lilian Edwards, ‘Role and Responsibility of Internet 
Intermediaries in the Field of Copyrights and Related Rights’ (2011) WIPO Study; Christina 
Angelopoulous ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for Copyright 
Infringement in Europe’ (2013) Intellectual Property Quarterly 3 253-274; Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou, 
‘Intermediaries Liability for Online Copyright Infringement in the EU: Evolutions and Confusions’ (2015) 
31 Computer Law & Security Review 57; Christina Angelopoulos, ‘Sketching the Outline of a Ghost: the 
Fair Balance between Copyright and Fundamental Rights in Intermediary Third Party Liability’ (2015) 
17(6) 72-96  <https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/full/10.1108/info-05-2015-0028>; Christina 
Angelopoulos, ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  A Tort- Based Analysis’ (DPhil thesis, 
University of Amsterdam 2016); Christina Angelopoulos, ‘On Online Platforms and the Commission’s 
New Proposal for a Directive Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (2017) Centre for Intellectual 
Property and Information Law University of Cambridge, 17-31 Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2947800>. 
42 Commission, ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2015) 192 final. 
43Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online Platforms’ 
(Communication) COM (2017) 555 final. 
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regime of ECD and the tort law rules - neither do the developments specifically consider 
trade marks.  
It should again be underlined that the thesis considers and focuses on the contributory 
trade mark liability issues where it is not questionable that the direct trade mark 
infringement has taken place. In that sense, the cases dealing with keywords are not in 
the scope of the thesis.  
On this basis, this thesis asks: ‘To what extent does the current state of the law of 
contributory trade mark liability that governs online issues prove to be satisfactory in 
dealing with the ongoing and emerging issues that the Internet brings?’. Although this is 
the core question, this thesis is founded on three main objectives: 1) establishing the 
current state of online contributory trade mark liability; 2) identifying ongoing and 
emerging issues that arise and reassessing the law in the light of the new initiatives 
undertaken by the EU; and 3) seeking a relief for the issues where the law falls short in 
dealing with them.  
The current state of the law should first be analysed as the law is shaped by both the 
immunity rules and tort law rules of the MSs as there is a lack of specific rules dealing 
with the issue. This assessment will also assist in identifying the issues that arise as well 
as examining whether the existing law satisfactorily provides a framework to deal with 
the issues identified. Accordingly, it will provide the answer to this question. This is a 
very important analysis to undertake and question to answer as it will also demonstrate 
whether the approach undertaken by the EU in pursuit of dealing with online issues is 
indeed the accurate and appropriate approach for the trade mark realm. Finally, a solution 
will be sought for the shortcomings identified. The existing mechanisms which are either 
already implemented and applied (NTD and injunctions) or are not yet implemented but 
considered by the EU legislators (duty of care, voluntary measures) for enhancing the 
protection of rights online and providing further harmonisation are to be examined in that 
regard. Those second type of mechanisms are most commonly considered and mentioned 
in relation to copyright and other rights but not trade mark. Regardless of the lack of trade 
mark consideration, those mechanisms will still be examined to see whether they can also 
work for trade marks. 
In the light of these explanations, the originality of this thesis can therefore be stated to 
have three aspects. Firstly, this thesis considers trade marks as they are least focused on 
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and examined IP right with respect to online infringements. Although the developments 
are considered and have been initiated by the EU legislators pursuant to further 
harmonisation, there is hardly any trade mark specific consideration or actions by the 
legislators to deal with trade mark related issues that arisen online, neither do the actions 
already undertaken expressly mention trade marks. Furthermore, there exists very limited 
case law that considers contributory trade mark liability online which might shed light on 
the ambiguities that arise. In the light of this lack of attention and further insight, the law 
of online contributory liability appears to be incoherent. Thus, the law and its framework 
require systematic assembly with respect to online contributory trade mark liability. This 
thesis will therefore undertake this work.  
Secondly, although there are other academic works that assess trade mark liability online, 
this thesis adopts a narrower approach as it focuses specifically on online contributory 
trade mark liability that arises from counterfeit selling and excludes direct liability cases 
or the cases that is questionable that the direct infringement has taken place. By doing so, 
the merits of the thesis not only lie in a comprehensive analysis of the current state of EU 
law on the subject but also in addressing the issues together with submitting plausible 
remedy to these issues.  
Thirdly, its novelty lies not only with the analysis of how satisfactory the law of online 
contributory trade mark liability is for ongoing and emerging challenges and what can be 
the cure in that regard, but also with seeking to explore the missing parts in the other 
academic works in relation to the latest developments undertaken within the EU with 
respect to the DSM Strategy and Internet regulation. Indeed, these initiatives are 
important for the online world because they seem to focus on different policy than the 
immunity regime of the ECD was built on. Duties and responsibilities of the 
intermediaries in the online world have been the focus of the legislators, not their 
immunities. The concern therefore appears to be what can the intermediaries do, not how 
can the innovation be supported in the online world. The appraisal undertaken in this 
thesis considers this seemingly new approach of the EU as well as the mechanisms 
mentioned in that respect to see how they would fit into the trade mark regime and 
whether they would provide desired solutions. Besides, the analysis provides an overview 
of how the EU immunity regime is applied to rights other than trade marks, ie copyright, 
privacy and the right to be forgotten (RTBF) and fundamental rights since these rights 
have been at the core of the discourse on intermediaries.  
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V. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Within the current chapter, background to 
online contributory trade mark liability is provided together with an explanation of the 
research question and the contribution of the thesis.  
Following this, in Chapter 2, the general debate on Internet intermediaries is given under 
EU law by focusing on three specific rights other than trade marks as they dominate the 
intermediaries’ liability discourse. These are: copyright, privacy and the right to be 
forgotten together with the general examination of the fundamental rights. The 
examination is undertaken in pursuit of answers to the questions: ‘How is the immunity 
regime applied to rights other than trade marks?’ and ‘To what extent would those 
implementations assist in establishing contributory trade mark liability?’ 
Chapter 3 aims to establish the EU’s contributory trade mark liability law applicable to 
online infringements. As the ECD’s immunity regime is the most prominent legal 
instrument on the matter, the chapter focuses on the principles of this regime: how they 
are implemented and applied in practice; what are the issues that arise and need to be 
addressed; and finally, how it is construed by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Moreover, the ED is also examined as the injunctive regime shapes the 
framework of the responsibilities of the intermediaries by means of taking measures 
which would ultimately be significant in delineating the contributory liability of the 
intermediaries. This chapter therefore asks: ‘Is the EU law’s immunity regime the 
appropriate approach to deal with online infringements and establish a contributory 
trade mark liability regime online? More importantly, does this regime have the answers 
to the challenges that the Internet brings or may bring in the future?’ 
However, Chapter 3 would be incomplete without an examination of how the immunity 
regime has been implemented and applied by the courts of the MSs as well as how the 
law of online contributory trade mark liability is established under national tort laws of 
the MSs. As such, Chapter 4 assesses tort laws of the MSs in order to understand the 
bigger picture of the EU contributory liability regime. However, as it would be very 
challenging to examine the laws of all MSs within this work, the chapter assesses two 
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MSs that represent two major legal traditions and which have also influenced other legal 
systems in the EU. Those are the United Kingdom (UK), specifically England, and 
Germany, as England is a common law country while Germany is a civil law country. 
The aim of this to provide the general framework of the domestic applications of the 
doctrine. By undertaking this analysis, this chapter aims to contribute to the examination 
in Chapter 3 by providing an answer to the following questions: ‘How is the immunity 
regime applied at the national level’ and ‘To what extent do these applications contribute 
to the harmonisation?’.  
With respect to what is concluded in Chapter 4 concerning the EU law of the online 
contributory trade mark liability regime, Chapter 5 seeks remedy to the shortcomings 
identified within the work related to online contributory trade mark liability. In doing so, 
it discusses the applicability and the efficacy of the mechanisms which are considered by 
the EU legislators in order to see whether they would prove to assist in this. Those 
mechanisms to be discussed are NTD and injunctions together with the imposition of duty 
of care and the application of voluntary mechanisms. First two mechanisms are the 
existing mechanisms of the intermediaries’ liability law. However, the latter two have not 
yet been implemented within the law but have been considered in terms of the DSM 
Strategy. Chapter 5 therefore asks: ‘Can the remedy be found within current EU law that 
governs online contributory trade mark liability without a radical overhaul of the existing 
regulatory framework?’ 
In the light of the findings of Chapter 5, Chapter 6 proposes a solution for more 
harmonised, clearly established and more satisfactorily working online contributory trade 
mark liability law within the EU.  
At the end of the thesis, Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive summary of the discussions, 
analysis and questions tackled in the previous chapters as well as submitting the solutions 
and views about the main thesis question.  
 
VI. METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY 
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The main approaches employed in this thesis are doctrinal and comparative ones.44 In 
essence, the doctrinal method ‘is concerned with the substantive content of the law, and 
therefore with the analysis of legal materials, primarily cases and statutes, and primarily 
for the kinds of purposes … identification of the legal position; resolution of potential or 
actual questions relating to parties’ rights and liabilities; identification of gaps in the law 
that require reform or features that can be improved’.45  
In general, relevant legislations and case law with their underlying principles and reasons 
will be assessed. Given that the thesis’ main focus is EU law, pan-European law will be 
at the core of the doctrinal approach undertaken. This means that the legal instruments 
provided by the EU legislators at the EU level will be the main focus. In terms of online 
contributory trade mark liability, there are two main Directives applicable to the issue: E 
- Commerce Directive 2000/31 (ECD) and Enforcement Directive 2004/48 (ED). The EU 
directives are binding legal instruments but need to be incorporated into the national laws 
of MSs to have their effect, and the choice of forms and methods on this is left to each 
MS.46 MSs can make amendments on these matters while implementing the directives 
into their national law. Having said that they are also under an obligation to take all 
necessary measures to achieve the result prescribed by a directive.47 The CJEU’s insight 
on the matters dealt with directives, therefore is significant in terms of establishing 
harmonised law. Accordingly, it will be the major and primary source along with the 
above directives.  
In addition, analysis of the domestic laws of the MSs is undertaken to provide a 
comprehensive assessment of the current position of EU law. A comparative approach is 
therefore adopted as domestic laws of the MSs differ from one to another unless 
harmonised rules are provided by the EU by means of binding legal instruments.  The 
comparative approach is ‘the study of the legal systems or legal concepts of different 
countries (or groups of countries) on a systematic basis’.48 Nevertheless, only two MSs 
are chosen for this analysis due to the word limit of the work. Those are the UK and 
                                                 
44 Simon Halliday (ed) An Introduction to the Study of Law (W. Green 2012). 
45 Ibid, 5-6. (Brackets omitted). 
46 Art. 249 (3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01 (TFEU).  
47 Case C- 129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie ASBL v Région Wallonne [1997] ECR I-07411, para 40. 
It is also established by the CJEU that direct effect of a directive can be invoked under some circumstances 
ie when its provisions are unconditional and sufficiently clear. Case C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home 
Office [1974] ECR I-01337. Case C-26/ 62 NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend 
& Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration [1963] ECR 0. 
48 Halliday (ed) An Introduction to the Study of Law, 73. 
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Germany. It should be noted that only English law is to be considered under UK law.49 
The reason behind this selection is that they represent two different major legal traditions, 
ie England is a common law country while Germany is civil law, and they have a strong 
influence on the laws of the other MSs. As such, the UK’s Electronic Commerce (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2002 (the 2002 Regulations)50  and Germany’s Telemedia Act, 
Telemediangesetz (TMG)51 are examined as they are the transposition of the ECD into 
their national laws. Moreover, these countries’ tort law rules governing the issue are also 
assessed since the assessment of online contributory trade mark liability is left to the 
national courts of the MSs and their tort law rules. Thus, the joint tortfeasance liability of 
English law and the general tort law principles provided in the German Civil Code, 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) are other legal instruments considered. Therefore, the 
analysis of their case laws with respect to the application of tort law rules and the 
implementation of the principles of the ECD will be the main approach in order to fulfil 
the aim of the thesis. This comparative approach will assist to mark out the general 
framework of how online contributory trade mark liability is established and applied 
within the EU at national level.  
The comparative approach will also involve comparative analysis of other rights, ie 
copyright, privacy and the right to be forgotten, and fundamental rights in general. In that 
respect, specifically provided EU legal instruments considering these rights are discussed 
where they are relevant. Briefly, those instruments are InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 for 
copyright and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) for the data protection. With 
respect to fundamental rights, a comparative analysis is also undertaken and the matter is 
examined by the European Courts of Human Rights (ECtHR) through the lenses of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)52 as well as by the CJEU under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter)53.  
The same comparative approach is also adopted for the purposes of transnational 
comparisons. More precisely, the applications of US law regarding online contributory 
                                                 
49 It is because English law is a common law while the Scottish law is a representative of mixed jurisdiction 
ie common and civil law.  
50 2002, No.2013. Available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2013/made>. 
51 Telemediengesetz [TMG] Feb. 26, 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGB I] at 179 (Ger), 
available at < http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/ > 
52 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950. 
53 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 212/C 326/02. 
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trade mark liability are mentioned in the thesis for the sake of comparison with EU law 
as they are representatives of two major legal regimes governing intermediaries’ liability.  
Finally, the chosen terminology should be mentioned. For the sake of the convenience 
and clarity, the term contributory liability is chosen and used throughout the thesis to 
describe the liability of the party who is not the direct infringer, but who facilitates or 
contributes to this infringement. It should be reminded that there is no internationally 
accepted term to define this type of liability. It is one that has been divergently established 
under the laws of countries. Thus, there are various terms employed within different laws 
covering this liability such as secondary liability, joint tortfeasance and accessory 
liability. Moreover, those terms do not necessarily correspond each other. Indeed, as 
Dinwoodie states ‘the term secondary infringement has a different (narrow) meaning in 
U.K. trade mark law’.54 The term contributory liability is used in the thesis as an umbrella 
term for the different forms of this liability.  
It should also be stated that the thesis’ scope is limited to the specific type to trade mark 
problem that emerges when counterfeit goods are offered for sale online. This is the case 
where the direct trade mark infringement is taken place unquestionably. This would 
follow that the new Internet-specific type of an infringement cases such as keyword 
selling will only be examined to provide further assistance to tackle the issues that arises 
online if applicable.  
Furthermore, the term Internet intermediary is used interchangeably with intermediary 
and service provider to describe the online subjects which ‘bring together or facilitate 
transactions between third parties on the Internet. They give access to, host, transmit and 
index content, products and services originated by third parties on the Internet or provide 
Internet-based services to third parties’. 55 Thus, they should be understood to cover the 
activities specified in the ECD, ie Internet access providers (ISPs), mere conduit providers 
and hosting providers as well as the new intermediaries, ie search engines, P2P file 
sharing technologies, and linking providers. 
 
                                                 
54 He also points out ‘concept of what Mr. Justice Arnold calls accessory liability approximates to secondary 
infringement in U.S. law’. Graeme Dinwoodie ‘Secondary Liability for Online Trademark Infringement: 
The International Landscape’ (2014) Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 37 463-501, fn. 130. 
55 The Economic and the Social Role of Internet Intermediaries (2010), 9, Available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/44949023.pdf >  
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the following questions have been at the crux 
of the debate on liability: Should an intermediary be liable for its users infringing activity? 
If yes, then to what extent? and Should more responsibility be imposed for effective 
enforcement and protection of rights online? 
The difficulty in answering these questions is that liability has arisen from different 
infringing activities of third parties. This means that third parties’ activity that may create 
liability could be anything from terror crime, an infringement of a right, defamation to 
hosting content harmful to minors. Therefore, the issue has considerably wide scope. 
However, EU law provides the same set of immunity rules for the liability that arises from 
all those activities regardless of whether they are subject to civil or criminal law. Thus, 
providing the framework of the current state of the law of intermediaries’ liability56 as 
applied to the different rights is significant in pursuit of the main aim of this thesis despite 
its wide scope.57 Demonstrating the general stance would assist in the following questions 
although not limited to them: What is the position of intermediaries under the law? How 
do the courts implement and apply the rules provided in the cases dealing with the 
                                                 
56 In general, See Lilian Edwards and Charlotte Waelde (eds) Law and the Internet (Hart Publishing 2009).  
57 It should be reminded that only civil law matters will be examined as the criminal law matter is excluded 
from the scope of the thesis. 
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different rights at stake? Could the case law be useful for trade mark issues, or should 
trade mark related issues be treated differently? In pursuing the answers, the latest cases 
dealing with certain rights, namely copyright, privacy and fundamental rights, will be at 
the centre of the assessment undertaken in this chapter. Ultimately, the chapter seeks an 
answer to the following questions: ‘How is the immunity regime applied to rights other 
than trade marks?’ and ‘To what extent would those implementations assist in 
establishing contributory trade mark liability?’ These rights are chosen because of their 
supremacy within the liability regime and their influence in shaping the perception of the 
intermediaries in general.  
However, before examining these, the existing EU rules governing liability which arise 
online should be briefly provided.  
 
II. OUTLINE OF THE EU’s LIABILITY REGIME  
 
The ECD58 is the most pertinent legal instrument applicable to the issue since it addresses 
the Internet intermediaries’ immunity question by adopting a horizontal approach. That 
means that the immunity rules provided in that Directive are applicable for any type of 
wrongdoing giving rise to the liability except data and privacy protection59.  
The liability regime under the ECD establishes the safe harbours for specified Internet 
intermediaries by precisely defining in what circumstances an intermediary can benefit 
from immunity from liability. Those safe harbours are established in Arts. 12-15. In brief, 
the Directive sets out these liability exemptions for intermediaries which merely transmit 
the information (Art.12 ‘mere conduit’); or which provide an automatic, intermediate and 
temporary storage of that information (Art.13’caching’); and which store the information 
in the capacity of host (Art.14 ‘hosting’). Yet, the scope of these particular intermediaries 
especially the hosting intermediaries, covers a considerably wide range of services in line 
with the development of new technologies, such as online auction sites or social network 
sites while not expressly addressing some such as linking providers. The ECD thus 
establishes an immunity regime rather than a liability regime.  
                                                 
58 Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1.  
59 Ibid, art 5 (b). 
31 
 
The conditions set out in those Articles are aimed at distinguishing active intermediaries 
from passive ones since the immunity is provided for the latter. In that regard, Art.12 
entitles an intermediary to an immunity if its activity consists of the mere transmission of 
the information without any involvement60 while providing its service. In a similar sense, 
Art.13 states the conditions61 for immunity from liability for an intermediary which 
provides a temporary and intermediate storage for the information (caching). These 
conditions also specify the circumstances when an intermediary cannot be regarded as 
passive. For example, when it modifies the information or intervenes in the lawful use of 
the information. 
 Art.14, however, goes further and provides safe harbour for hosting intermediaries even 
when their operations are not completely passive. Under Art.14, a hosting intermediary 
may still be exempted from liability if it acts instantly to remove or disable access to the 
allegedly infringing content after obtaining the knowledge or awareness as to its 
infringing nature. Awareness is the threshold condition set for civil law matters while 
knowledge is the threshold for criminal law matters.62 Furthermore, in the words of the 
CJEU itself, Art.14 ‘reflects the principle of notice-and-take-down system’.63 Hence, 
involvement from an intermediary is required to a certain extent. A hosting intermediary 
should takedown the infringing content or block the access when it obtains the awareness 
about this content which most commonly happens with a receipt of a notice.  
In that respect, at first sight the stance of the EU on the intermediaries’ liability and the 
idea behind these immunity rules can be summarised as follows; intermediaries are 
significant vehicles in boosting e-commerce online so should be protected while 
providing legal security. That is why, there are immunity rules. The main objectives of 
                                                 
60 Those involvements are specified as following in the Article; ‘(a) does not initiate the transmission; (b) 
does not select the receiver of the transmission; and (c) does not select or modify the information contained 
in the transmission.’ 
61 ‘(a) the provider does not modify the information; (b) the provider complies with conditions on access to 
the information; (c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified 
in a manner widely recognised and used by industry; (d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use 
of technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and 
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon 
obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has 
been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative 
authority has ordered such removal or disablement.’ 
62 Although this is not fully accepted in the academia and the actual knowledge is still mentioned for civil 
law matter, the author of the thesis supports the idea that awareness is the threshold for civil law matters, 
so is for IP matters. This has also been confirmed by the CJEU in Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay. For 
through examination See Chapter 3. 
63 Case C- 324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 155. 
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the ECD are to foster innovation and provide a harmonisation and the free flow of 
information within the information society. Moreover, these immunities are provided 
according to the nature of the service at stake. Hence, hosting intermediaries cannot be 
expected to remain wholly passive as it is expected from the mere conduit and caching 
intermediaries.   
Finally, Art.15 of the ECD specifies the boundaries of intermediaries’ activities as well 
as hosting intermediaries’ involvement under the NTD mechanism by prohibiting the 
imposition on the intermediaries of a general obligation to monitor stored or transmitted 
information. This principle was maintained by the CJEU.64 More significantly, it has been 
considered in injunction cases to determine the scope of the injunctions and has been for 
balancing the fundamental rights which can be at stake in those cases. Injunctions as a 
relief are provided and regulated in the ED65 for the enforcement of IP rights -except 
copyright- online and offline. Injunctions establish responsibility on intermediaries to 
implement and apply the type of injunction granted by a court regardless of their liability 
or immunity from third parties infringing activities on their platform. The idea behind 
enabling right owners to seek such injunctions against the intermediaries is that the 
intermediaries are in the best position to prevent and terminate the infringements online. 
Thus, this mechanism has become one of the most preferred mechanisms of right owners 
in tackling such infringements. Although the applicability of an injunction is not related 
to the question of liability, the application of the injunction in practice defines the borders 
of the responsibilities that can be imposed on the intermediaries despite being immune 
from the liability. In that sense, the injunctions are still germane to the liability issue. 
Besides those general rules, some specific rules which are applicable to copyright and 
privacy should also be outlined since those rights will be at the centre of the assessment 
of this chapter. For copyright matters, the ECD applies to the issues dealing with the 
intermediaries’ immunity from liability that arises from copyright infringement 
committed by its users. Moreover, the InfoSoc Directive 2001/2966, which was provided 
for a general, flexible and EU level legal framework for copyright in the information 
                                                 
64 In cases such Joined Cases C-236/06- C-236/08 Google France SARL v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA [2010] 
ECR 0, para 143 and Case C- 324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 181. 
65 Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] 
OJ L 195/16. 
66 Council Directive 2001/29/ EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society [2001] OJ167/10.  
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society, enables right owners to apply for an injunction against an intermediary just as the 
third sentence of Art.11 of the ED provides for the owners of the other IP rights67.68 
For data and privacy protection, the Data Protection 1995/4669 was applicable to the 
issues, since this matter is excluded from the scope of the ECD.70 However, the Data 
Protection Directive (DPD) is now repealed with the EU-wide applicable General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR)71. As it can be understood from its name, the GDPR is not 
a Directive but a Regulation which means that it is binding and applicable from the day 
it came into effect which was 25 May 2018 without any further action72 needed by the 
MSs in their national laws. The Regulation aims to provide uniform rules for data 
protection of all EU residents. In that regard, it provides rules and duties for the data 
controllers and processors in protecting and processing the data. What is most important 
with respect to this thesis is Art.2(4) of the GDPR which states ‘[t]his Regulation shall 
be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2000/31/EC, in particular of the 
liability rules of intermediary service providers in Articles 12 to 15 of that Directive’73, 
although the questions relating to the DPD is excluded from the scope of the ECD as 
stated before. Therefore, the interplay between these legislations remains to be seen.  
In the light of a brief examination of the legal instruments applicable, it is evident that the 
immunity regime aims to distinguish an active intermediary from a passive one, and 
accordingly grant immunity to the latter. Nevertheless, determining intermediaries’ 
                                                 
67 The Infosoc Directive, art 8(3). 
68 The answer of the question of why the EU legislator chose to enact a Directive specifically designed and 
deals with the one of the IP rights, copyrights can be found in the Recital 2 of the Directive which states: 
‘Copyright and related rights play an important role in this context as they protect and stimulate the 
development and marketing of new products and services and the creation and exploitation of their creative 
content.’ 
69 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
70 Stalla-Bourdillon considers this exclusion as one of the reason of the weaknesses of the harmonisation 
approach embodied in the ECD. Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon, ‘Internet Intermediaries as Responsible Actors? 
Why It Is Time to Rethink the E-Commerce Directive as Well’ in Mariarosaria Taddeo and Luciana Floridi 
The Responsibilities of Online Service Providers (Springer International 2017) 275-293, 284-286.  
71 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
[2016] OJ L-119. (General Data Protection Regulation). This regulation came into force on 25 May 2018.  
72 TFEU, Art. 249(2). Not any national legislation is required to make the Regulation effective in the 
national laws of the MSs. However, it should be noted that this does not necessarily mean that a regulation 
always has direct effect. In Case C-41/74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR I-01337, the CJEU 
established that a provision must contain a clear and unconditional prohibition which doesn’t require MS 
legislative intervention. 
73 Unfortunately, Recital 21 of GDPR does not provide more clarity on the matter. For general analysis See 
Daphne Keller, ‘The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the 2016 General Data 
Protection Regulation’ (2017) Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2914684>. 
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activity -whether active or passive- is not always straightforward in practice given the 
infrastructure of internet intermediaries. Furthermore, as it will be examined in detail, the 
policies behind the scope of protection of the rights differ. Accordingly, the rules can be 
applied in a different way even if there is one specific immunity regime provided for the 
types of wrongdoings. The main dilemma of the intermediaries’ discourse -which is 
whether the intermediaries should be imposed on an active role by means of preventing 
and terminating the infringements committed on their platforms despite that their activity 
is passive and they are most likely exempted from the liability- is indeed present for all 
the types of intermediaries but it is evident that intermediaries cannot be expected to act 
in a similar way and to the same level against the infringements that arise from different 
rights. There is no doubt that the social and cumulative benefit of preventing a crime 
related to children or terrorism is bigger than preventing an IP infringement. Thus, this 
chapter focuses on the debate over Internet intermediaries’ liability in relation to the 
approach of different rights other than trade marks.  
 
III. COPYRIGHT 
 
In providing the general framework of the intermediaries’ liability regime, copyright 
should be the first to be examined considering the EU legislators’ priority of the subject. 
Indeed, besides the ongoing general debate regarding the liability regime, developments 
undertaken by the EU legislators to create a more harmonised framework and tackle 
illegal content appear to have mostly focused on copyright matters.74 
Intermediaries’ immunity from liability that arises from copyright infringements 
committed by its users is also dealt with in Arts.12-15 of ECD as those rules apply 
horizontally. However, the issue of whether an intermediary is directly liable for a 
copyright infringement is regulated in the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29. Although the 
application of the InfoSoc Directive is not in the scope of the thesis, its Art.8(3) should 
be mentioned. This Article contains the same right provided in the third sentence of Art.11 
of ED but for a copyright owner: an injunctive relief. A copyright owner here is explicitly 
                                                 
74 Such as Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of 
Online Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555; Commission ‘Proposal for a Directive of the EU Parliament and of 
the Council on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ COMM (2016) 593 final. (Proposal of ‘a Directive 
on copyright in the Digital Single Market’) (CD).   
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enabled to apply for an injunction against an intermediary for an effective enforcement 
of his right. In fact, this Article has been at the centre of the copyright debate75 at EU 
level. The CJEU has mostly dealt with the referrals related to injunctions, not immunity 
rules. The popularity of injunctive relief within the copyright realm is however not 
surprising given that pursuing such relief for the purposes of preventing and protecting 
copyright online appears to be more convenient, more affordable and more effective way 
for copyright owners as it would be for trade mark owners.  
On the other hand, injunction orders have been shaping the liability regime for copyright 
to some extent despite the fact that the application of injunctive relief is not germane to 
the liability question.76 This is because injunction orders granted against an intermediary 
also mean that the burden of the implementation and application of the injunction order77 
is for the intermediaries to bear. This is pertinent to the liability regime given the fact that 
constant application of injunctive relief may create a new responsibility for an 
intermediary. Constant application, however, does not mean the application of a certain 
injunction by a certain intermediary numerous times. What is meant is the employment 
of an injunctive relief measure by right owners as a weapon against the intermediaries in 
tackling infringing activities online rather than using it as an auxiliary mechanism for an 
effective enforcement as it is meant by the EU legislators.  
However, at first glance the current state of EU law and the CJEU’s case law on 
injunctions appears to be in line with the idea behind the injunction regime as well as the 
principles of liability regime. First, the EU acquis establishes the legal framework for the 
application of injunction orders by stating the minimum standards in order not to give rise 
to unreasonable and disproportionate burdens being imposed on the intermediaries. With 
respect to Art.3(1) of the ED, those measures applied to the intermediaries ‘shall be fair 
and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail 
unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delay’. Moreover, as stated by Art. 3(2), those 
measures ‘shall also be effective, proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in 
such a manner as to avoid the criterion of barrier to legitimate trade and to provide for 
                                                 
75 Having said that, the density of the cases dealing with the direct liability of the intermediaries from the 
copyright infringements cannot be ignored. Yet the direct liability is excluded from the scope of the thesis. 
Hence the injunction cases are the most pertinent to the secondary liability regime. 
76 Nordemann states that injunctions are one of the limited Pan-EU rules under the EU immunity regime. 
Nordemann, ‘Liability of Online Service Providers for Copyrighted Content- Regulatory Action Needed?’ 
(2018), 19.  
77 It was a blocking injunction in most of the cases. 
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safeguards as against their abuse’.78 These principles, however, are not limitedly stated. 
The designation of the precise scope of an injunction relief in terms of conditions and 
procedures is left to the national laws of MSs. Given that the InfoSoc Directive also 
mentions that the injunctions shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive in Art.8, 
there is nothing to prevent the courts from applying the other standards stated in the ED 
for copyright issues as well.  
The CJEU’s case law dealing with injunctions in relation to copyright infringement 
provides more guidance in that sense while making the injunctive regime more aligned 
with the liability regime. Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM)79 was the first case before the CJEU considered an injunction 
and it focused on the general monitoring prohibition stated in Art.15 of the ECD.80 The 
issue before the CJEU was the applicability of an injunction against an ISP (Scarlet) under 
the ECD, ED, InfoSoc Directive, DPD and the fundamental rights enshrined under the 
Charter. This was because the injunction concerned81 was a blocking injunction requiring 
an intermediary to implement a filtering system -as a preventive measure- which would 
be applicable to all its customers and to all electronic communications passing via its 
services, in particular those involving the use of P2P software. The CJEU’s appraisal was 
focused on the extensiveness of the injunction and it was assessed taking all the applicable 
Directives into consideration. It was then decided that such a filtering system would 
oblige the ISP to actively monitor all the data to prevent possible infringements. This 
would amount to general monitoring which is prohibited under Art.15 of the ECD.82  
Furthermore, the court’s assessment of the applicability of such an extensive application 
focused on the balance between the fundamental rights of the parties who would be 
affected by the application of the concerned blocking injunction.83 With that respect, the 
                                                 
78 For proportionality in injunction cases, See Tobby Headdon ‘Beyond Liability: on the availability and 
the scope of injunctions against online intermediaries after L’oreal v Ebay’ (2012) European Intellectual 
Property Review 34 (3) 137-144, 139-141; Pekka Savola, ‘Proportionality of Website Blocking: Internet 
Connectivity Providers as Copyright Enforcers’ (2014) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information, 
Technology and E-Commerce Law 5 116- 138. 
79 Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2011] ECR I-11959. (Scarlet v SABAM) 
80 For detailed analysis See Francesco Rizzuto, ‘Injunctions against intermediate online service providers’ 
(2012) Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 18(3) 69-73. 
81 This injunction was sought after by copyright owners (SABAM) on the ground that their rights was 
infringed when their copyright protected musical works were shared without an authorisation accordingly 
the infringements being committed through the use of the ISP’s services.  
82 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959, paras 29-40. 
83 Ibid, paras 44-44. The importance of striking a balance has been pointed and stated as a principle to be 
considered in CJEU’s earlier decision in Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) 
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court identified the fundamental rights that could be affected by the application of the 
concerned blocking injunction in the case. These are: the right to IP (Art. 17(2) of the 
Charter) of copyright holders,84 the right to freedom to conduct business of ISPs85 (Art16 
of the Charter), the right to protection of personal data and the freedom of information of 
the users of the service86 (Art. 8 and 11 of the Charter).87 In the light of these, the CJEU 
concludes that the concerned injunction would also harm the balance between these 
fundamental rights identified.88   
Later, in the case of Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
v Netlog,89 the CJEU dealt with the injunction request by following the same line of 
thought. The same kind of injunction order was at issue but, this time the injunction was 
requested against a social networking platform (Netlog) on the ground of copyright 
infringements committed on this platform. The injunction required the employment of a 
filtering system for the information stored on the concerned ISP’s servers and it would be 
applicable to all those users for an unlimited period.90 The referred questions before the 
CJEU were the same as in Scarlet v SABAM in relation to the applicability of the 
concerned injunction. However, before that the CJEU was asked to decide whether the 
online social networking platform could be considered as a hosting service provider under 
Art.14 of the ECD. Considering this issue, the CJEU held  
“the owner of an online social networking platform- such as Netlog- stores 
information provided by the users of that platform, relating to their profile, 
on its servers, and that it is thus a hosting service provider within the meaning 
of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31.”91  
This is important, because, by way of analogy, it can be concluded that an online social 
networking platform can be exempted from liability under Art.14 provided that its activity 
fulfils the conditions stated in this Article. However, the liability of this platform was not 
                                                 
v Telefónica de España SAU. [2008] ECR I-271, para 68. According to that  ‘when implementing the 
measures transposing those directives, the authorities and courts of the Member States must not only 
interpret their national law in a manner consistent with those directives but also make sure that they do not 
rely on an interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or with the other 
general principles of Community law, such as the principle of proportionality.’  
84 Ibid, para 45. 
85 Ibid, para 46. 
86 Ibid, para 50. 
87 Ibid, paras 41-54. 
88 Ibid, para 53. 
89 C-360/10 Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) v Netlog (CJEU 16 
February 2012). (SABAM v Netlog) 
90 Ibid, para 26. 
91 Ibid, para 27. 
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even a question before the CJEU. It was only asked whether the intermediary at stake was 
a hosting provider in relation to the injunction order. Nevertheless, this assessment can 
still be employed for further issues regarding online social networking platforms and even 
for trade marks by way of analogy. 
For the applicability of the injunction, the court followed the same method as it applied 
in Scarlet v SABAM. Accordingly, it was established, by way of analogy, that the 
injunction imposed on Netlog would be contrary to Art.15 of the ECD since it would 
constitute general monitoring.92 With respect to the assessment of striking the balance 
between the fundamental rights, it was decided that such an injunction would also be not 
respecting the concerned rights on the same grounds as in Scarlet v SABAM.93  
These two cases appear to be consistent with the liability regime as a general monitoring 
obligation was regarded and followed as a principle for the assessment of the applicability 
of an injunction. This also proves that there is the interaction between the application of 
an injunction order and the liability regime to some extent. What is also important was 
the court’s consideration of the fundamental rights. It can now be said that striking a 
balance between the fundamental rights of the parties was established as another criterion 
for an injunction to be granted against an intermediary. 
In UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleigh GmbH, Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft GmbH,94 the questions before the CJEU were rather 
different to the aforementioned cases. The facts of the case shared similarities with Scarlet 
v SABAM,95 but it was different to others because of the type of injunction requested. The 
issue before the CJEU was the applicability of a generic order meaning that an injunction 
is granted without determining the type of measure to be applied as this selection is left 
to the intermediary to choose. 96 It should be noted that this case was the referral from the 
Austrian Supreme Court so that the application of a generic order is permitted under 
Austrian law.  
                                                 
92 Ibid, para 38. 
93 Ibid, paras 39-51. 
94 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleigh GmbH, Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft GmbH (27 March 2014). (UPC Telekabel) 
95 The injunction order was pursuit by film companies (Constantin and Wega Film) as a copyright owner 
against an ISP (UPC) on the ground that some websites offered the unauthorised copies of their 
cinematographic works and those were accessible by using the services of the ISP at stake. 
96 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014), paras 7-16. 
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In the national proceedings, the UPC first required to implement and apply a blocking 
injunction which would block the access of its customers to concerned infringing 
websites. However, at the appeal, the Austrian High Court partially reversed this decision 
on the ground that the national law stipulates that the ISPs could only be required to take 
an appropriate measure and the discretion to select this measure should be left to them. 
This decision was also appealed by the ISP on two points: first, it argued that its services 
could not be considered to be used to infringe a copyright given that it did not have any 
business relationship with the operators of the website at issue; second, even if those 
websites infringing activities could be regarded as use of the services of UPC, such an 
order should not be granted on the ground that more clarity was required from the appeal 
court on the measures that must be taken with regard to the appropriate type of injunction 
order. It was also argued that the blocking injunction would not be the best measure as it 
could easily be circumvented. The Austrian Supreme Court then stayed the proceedings 
and referred the questions to the CJEU.97  
The CJEU first examined the question of whether the act of a person who makes the 
protected content available to the public on a website without the agreement of the right 
holder must be interpreting as using the services of the ISP which is to be regarded as an 
intermediary under Art.8(3) of InfoSoc Directive.98 It was established that the term 
intermediary ‘covers any person who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected 
work or other subject- matter in a network’.99 In that sense, given that ISP is an inevitable 
actor in any transmission of an infringement over the Internet, ‘an ISP, such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, which allows its customers to access protected subject-
matter made available to the public on the internet by a third party is an intermediary 
whose services are used to infringe a copyright or related right within the meaning of 
Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29’.100 More significantly, the court underlined that this 
cannot be construed as demonstration of contractual or specific relationship between the 
person who is infringing copyright and the ISP is required. It was held that there is nothing 
indicating such a requirement in the InfoSoc Directive.101   
                                                 
97 Ibid, para 17.  
98 Art.8(3): ‘Member States shall ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe a copyright or related right.’ 
99 C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014), para 30. 
100 Ibis, para 32. 
101 Ibid, paras 34-36. 
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The Court, then turned to the question of the applicability of a generic injunction under 
EU law and the fundamental rights enshrined under the Charter since such an order 
enables ISPs to decide on the appropriate measure to prevent the infringement and allows 
them to avoid the possible liability that arises from the breach of an injunction order by 
showing that all reasonable measures were taken.102 The CJEU’s appraisal in that respect 
focused on the fundamental rights since the referral court asked whether the fundamental 
rights must be considered as precluding the order of a generic injunction.   The CJEU 
identified the following three rights as the rights that might be affected by such an order: 
1) protection of copyright; 2) intermediary’s right to conduct a business; and 3) 
the freedom of information of Internet users. It stated that the fair balance between them 
should be struck by the application of an injunction. As far as ISP’s freedom to conduct 
a business was concerned, it was stated that this right of the ISP was restricted since the 
implementation of this injunction could require difficult technical solutions with a 
significant cost. Yet, it was eventually established that this restriction did not amount to 
an infringement of the very substance of the ISP’s freedom since the determination of the 
appropriate measures was left to the ISP. The CJEU, then went on to say that this 
injunction chosen however should not be required from an ISP to make unbearable 
sacrifices while it should provide the anticipated result103 and respect the fundamental 
rights of the users.104 It was thus concluded that the fundamental rights must be 
interpreting as not precluding a court to order generic injunction as long as the chosen 
measures ‘do not unnecessarily deprive internet users of the possibility of unlawfully 
assessing the information available and that those measures have the effect of preventing 
unauthorised access to the protected subject-matter or, at least, of making it difficult to 
achieve and of seriously discouraging internet users who are using the services of the 
addressee…’105 Thus, the imposition of such injunction was compatible with EU law.   
What was significant here is that the assessment of whether the chosen measure infringes 
the fundamental rights of its users was left for the intermediary to undertake. It is evident 
that the court took the fair balance test at the centre of its appraisal. Given that it was a 
                                                 
102 Ibid, para 10. 
103 This means that the proscribed result must be the bringing the infringement to an end. Yet this is not 
necessarily the test for its effectiveness. In terms of effectiveness, the measure implemented must have the 
effect of preventing unauthorised access to the illegal content, or at least of making it difficult to achieve 
and of seriously discouraging. Ibid, para 62. 
104 Ibid, paras 53-64. 
105 Ibid, para 64. 
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generic injunction, this is not surprising. However, it cannot be concluded that those rights 
were thoroughly considered. The right to conduct a business of ISPs was considered and 
indeed it was limited by the users’ right to freedom of information. Yet, the trick is the 
protection of Internet users’ right to freedom of information was left to the ISPs to 
consider. In that sense, the judgment appears to give crucial discretion to the ISPs without 
specifying its boundaries. This discretion hardly strikes the required balance as leaving 
such an assessment to an intermediary as a private company appears to threaten the 
protection of the fundamental rights.106 This may also not be desirable for the 
intermediaries considering that transparency is also required by them. Indeed, the ISP in 
the case claimed that there to be a lack of transparency in the generic orders. This lack of 
transparency may also result in ambiguous applications.  
On the other hand, it must be underlined that the concerned injunction was specific to the 
Austrian law since it was Austrian national law which allowed the courts to impose an 
injunction without specifying the measures. Bearing this in mind, the impacts of this case 
might remain limited to the EU level.  
Along with injunction cases, the latest CJEU cases concerning Internet links that give 
access to copyright protected works should be briefly mentioned as these cases have been 
seen as part of the harmonisation movement of contributory copyright liability.107 In Nils 
Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB108, the question before the CJEU was 
whether making clickable links to protected works available on another website without 
an authorisation by an owner constitutes an act of ‘communication to the public’ under 
Art.3(1) of the Infosoc Directive. In a very similar way, GS Media BV v Sonama Media 
Netherlands BV,109 concerned setting a hyperlink of a protected work which was made 
available in another website. The CJEU was asked to decide whether this constituted an 
act of ‘communication to the public’, as well. Before going on to the CJEU’s judgment, 
                                                 
106 For detailed examination on intermediaries as private entities becoming cyber-regulators or cyber-
polices See Luca Belli and Christiana Sappa, ‘The Intermediary Conundrum Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-
Police or Both?’ (2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Information Technology and E-commerce Law (8) 
183-198. 
107 Nordemann, ‘Liability of Online Service Providers for Copyrighted Content- Regulatory Action 
Needed?’ (2018); Neville Cordell and Beverly Potts ‘Communication to the public or accessory liability: 
Is the CJEU using communication to the public to harmonise accessory liability across the EU?’ (2018) 
European Intellectual Property Review 40 (5) 289-294. 
108 Case C- 466/12 Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB (13 February 2014). (Svensson) 
109 Case C- 160/15 GS Media BV v Sonama Media Netherlands BV (8 September 2016). (GS Media) 
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‘communication to the public’ under Art.3(1) of the Infosoc Directive should be 
explained. This Article gives a copyright owner an exclusive right: 
“to authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by 
wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public of their 
works in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them.”  
 
Therefore, communication to the public consists of two elements. It must be 1) an act of 
communication; 2) made available to the public (indeterminate and fairly large number 
of recipients).110 It follows that if a third party’s unauthorised use of a protected work 
satisfies these conditions then direct liability arises. It is left to determine, how these two 
cases are pertinent to the contributory liability issue. 
In Svensson, the CJEU held that the linking activity in the case did not constitute a 
communication to the public. It was stated that the public element in the Article should 
be construed as being a new public meaning users who did not have access to the work 
before.111 Henceforth, it was concluded that the ‘new public’ criterion112 was not satisfied 
in the case as the work was already made available by the owners in another website for 
its users. In GS Media, however the Court took different criteria into account in examining 
whether there was communication to the public. In that respect, if ‘1) the person knew or 
ought to have known that the hyperlink he posted provided access to a work illegally 
placed on the internet; or 2) the link circumvented access restrictions’113 then 
communication to the public is to be deemed satisfied. Moreover, it was held that the 
person who made the work available should not act in pursuit of financial benefit.114 
Cordell and Potts argue ‘the CJEU appears to have downgraded a primary copyright 
infringement into something more akin to unfair competition or tortious practice, where 
the defendant is only liable if it knowingly acted wrongly’ as the InfoSoc Directive does 
                                                 
110 Case C -306/05 Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA [2006] 
ECR I-11519, para 37-38; C-607/11 ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TV CatchUp Ltd (7 March 2013), 
para 32. 
111 Case C- 466/12 Svensson (13 February 2014), paras 23-31. 
112 Cordell and Potts argued that this criterion may result in exhaustion of the right to communication to the 
public once the work made available without restrictions by an owner. It is because, there will be no new 
public in that case. (Cordell and Potts ‘Communication to the public or accessory liability: Is the CJEU 
using communication to the public to harmonise accessory liability across the EU?’ (2018), 291.) 
113 Ibid.  
114 Case C- 160/15 GS Media (8 September 2016). 
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not mention such requirements.115 It is therefore stated that those standards make the issue 
closer to accessory liability than strict copyright infringement.116 Nordemann, however, 
argues that those new standards were set out by the CJEU to deal with cases in which not 
all the  requirements of communication to the public stated within Art.3(1) are fulfilled 
by the person, such as the cases that concern Internet intermediaries when they do not 
make the content available to the public themselves.117  
These arguments, however, meet on one common ground which is that these cases should 
be read as part of the harmonisation movement of contributory copyright liability law 
through direct liability cases. In the presence of national divergences in MSs’ laws 
governing contributory copyright liability, the impacts of these essentially judge-made 
principles at national law level appears significant in terms of their application in the 
national laws and more precisely whether they can provide the harmonisation. This 
should also assist in trade mark issues by way of analogy, although the right to 
communication to the public is copyright-specific. Therefore, further developments on 
that matter are keenly awaited.  
Finally, the latest developments concerning copyright should also be mentioned. The 
DSM Strategy118 which was published in 2015 is the first of these initiatives undertaken 
for the purposes of creating a more uniform and ‘fit-for purpose regulatory environment 
for platforms and intermediaries’. This has been followed by the publications of new 
communications119 which identified the key issues of online platforms and set out the EU 
policy in dealing with those issues. The draft of the new Copyright Directive (CD)120 is 
also proposed as part of copyright reform under the DSM Strategy. Besides, another 
communication entitled Tackling Illegal Content Online121 which indicates the 
responsibilities of intermediaries in tackling illegal content is published. Although these 
                                                 
115 Cordell and Potts ‘Communication to the public or accessory liability: Is the CJEU using communication 
to the public to harmonise accessory liability across the EU?’ (2018), 291. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Nordemann, ‘Liability of Online Service Providers for Copyrighted Content- Regulatory Action 
Needed?’ (2018), 22. 
118 Communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COMM (2015) 192. 
119 Commission ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM (2016) 288 final; EU Commissions press release on ‘Digital Single Market: 
Commissions calls for swift adoption of key proposals and maps out challenges ahead’ IP/17/1232 (2017). 
120 Commission ‘Proposal for a Directive of the EU Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the 
Digital Single Market’ COMM (2016) 593 final. (Proposal of ‘a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market’).   
121 Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555. 
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developments will be examined in detail in relation to trade mark, it should be stated here 
that what all these developments have in common for the liability regime is that they 
focus on the intermediaries’ responsibilities rather than their liability. What is more 
remarkable in relation to copyright is that as part of the DMS Strategy, a special interest 
has been paid to the copyright realm to provide a more uniform legal framework. The 
draft Art. 13 of the CD, as part of the EU developments, appears to be the one which will 
have the most impact on the liability regime if it is to be accepted as it is, despite all the 
concerns and criticisms raised in academia.122 It should however be pointed out that the 
proposal has now been voted in the Parliament and has sent back for the review.  
 
This will be examined in detail later123 but briefly the proposed Article 13 places greater 
responsibility on an intermediary which provides storage and access to the public to large 
amounts of copyright-protected works. According to that Article, an intermediary who 
fulfils this condition is under a duty to implement ‘effective content recognition 
technologies’ by means of an appropriate measure to prevent the availability of the illegal 
content. Leaving a comprehensive discussion on the Article aside,124 there are two main 
concerns raised and these are relevant to the liability regime as well as this chapter. These 
are basically about the Article’s compatibility with Arts. 14 and 15 of the ECD. With 
respect to Art.14 of the ECD, the proposed Article appears to create ambiguity as it is not 
clear how it will fit into the immunity regime since a hosting provider’s immunity 
depends on awareness in civil law cases and its duty is triggered after having obtained 
this awareness. Secondly, the duty proposed in the Article may result in a breach of the 
general monitoring prohibition stated in Art.15 ECD which prohibits the implementation 
of effective content recognition technologies involves monitoring. 
                                                 
122 For detailed analysis with respect to the criticism raised See Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., Open Letter 
to the European Commission- On the Importance of Preserving the Consistency and Integrity of the EU 
Acquis Relating to Content Monitoring within the Information Society.  
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2850483>. Christina Angelopoulos ‘Study On 
Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market’ (2017); Tito Rendas, ‘Form and Substance in the Value Gap Proposal’, Panel  Debates “Better 
Regulation for Copyright” (2017) European Parliament Brussels. 
123 See Chapter 5. 
124 For more through discussion See Giancarlo Frosio, ‘To Filter, Or Not to Filter? That is the Question in 
EU Copyright Reform’ (2017) Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058680>; Matthias Leitsner and Axel Metzger ‘the 
EU Copyright Package: a way out of the dilemma in two stages’ (2017) International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 48 (4) 381-384. 
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What these outcomes indicate is a potential change in the EU’s policy on intermediaries’ 
liability regime. It can be concluded for copyright that the centre of attention is now on 
intermediaries’ position in dealing with the illegality online as part of their responsibilities 
rather than the immunities that should be granted to them. Yet, the main question in 
relation to the liability regime in general is; whether that would undermine the safe 
harbour rules and whether there would be a need for new or revised immunity rules. These 
questions are significant for trade marks, as well.  
 
 
IV. PRIVACY and the so-called RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN (RTBF) 
 
A. Data on the Internet 
 
Privacy is the one of the most discussed rights in the debate around intermediaries since 
‘[p]ersonal data has become the currency on the Internet. It is collected, stored and used 
in ever-increasing variety of ways by a countless amount of different users…’.125 This 
fact makes the data important for the online world and especially for intermediaries. 
Intermediaries obtain, store and even track the data of its users, thus becoming either 
controllers126 or processors127 of this data. Bernal describes this as a symbiotic web or as 
Web 2.5 where ‘individuals and commercial enterprises are becoming mutually 
dependent: enterprises have business models reliant on the currency of personal data, 
while individuals depend on ‘free’ access to many services…’. 128 This reality has made 
individuals to think and even become concerned about their privacy more than they used 
to. This is because on the Internet, protection of privacy and intimacy may represent a 
                                                 
125 Jef Ausloos ‘‘The Right to be Forgotten’ – Worth remembering?’ (2012) 28 Computer Law & Security 
Review 143-152, 143. 
126 In Art 4(7) of GDPR controller is defined as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or 
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data; where the purposes and means of such processing are determined by Union or Member 
State law, the controller or the specific criteria for its nomination may be provided for by Union or 
Member State law’ 
127 Processing is defined in Art 4(2) as; ‘any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal 
data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, 
organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by 
transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure 
or destruction’ and Processor ‘a natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which 
processes personal data on behalf of the controller’ in the Art 4(8). 
128 Paul Bernal ‘Web 2.5: the symbiotic web’ (2010) International Review of Law, Computers and 
Technology 24(1) 25-37. 
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challenge for individuals as when their data becomes available on the Internet, it may 
spread around and stay there forever. As such, the protection of privacy and intimacy as 
well as having control over the data is crucial.129 In order to provide the necessary 
protection, the European social-democratic model of government imposes on 
governments an affirmative duty to protect fundamental rights through the positive 
operation of the law.130 
EU law thus provides rules specifically designed to deal with issues related to the data 
protection. The GDPR now applies (from 25 May 2018) to enshrine the protection over 
individuals’ data and privacy in the online and offline worlds as it replaced the DPD.131 
What is important in pursuit of the aim of this thesis is basically the duties that the GDPR 
imposes on an intermediary when it acts as controller or processor of the data.132 This is 
because when the DPD was enacted the Internet and its technologies were not developed 
as they are today. Hence the DPD had been ineffective as its scope had been too narrow.133 
In essence, what can be said with regard to the GDPR is that it imposes rather more and 
stricter duties by means of placing responsibility on data processors134 in addition to the 
duties stated in the DPD such as the principles required in processing the data.135 Briefly, 
consent from the data subject for data processing is still required136 but the threshold has 
now been increased to a statement or a clear affirmative action.137 Besides, the controller 
and the processor are now under a duty to undertake a data protection impact assessment 
to identify the risks to the rights and freedoms of data subjects while processing data in 
order to foster the protection of data.138 Consultation with a national supervisory authority 
is also required prior to the assessment. Another duty which is significant in relation to 
the intermediaries’ regime is that the data processors are also required to notify the data 
                                                 
129 For general discussion See Serge Gutwirth, Ronald Leenes and Paul De Hart (eds) Reloading Data 
Protection Multidisciplinary Insights and Contemporary Challenges (Springer 2014), Part 4; Paul Bernal 
Internet Privacy Rights (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
130 Richard J. Peltz-Steele ‘The Pond Betwixt: Differences in the US –EU Data Protection/ Safe Harbor 
Negotiation’ (2015) Journal of Internet Law 19(1), 20.  
131 Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31. 
132 The data processors are imposed more strict duties under the GDPR.  
133 Lilian Mitrou, ‘The General Data Protection Regulation: A Law for the Digital Age?’ in Tatiana- Eleni 
Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, Christiana Markau and Thalia Prastitou, EU Internet Law (Springer 2017), 
19-57. 
134 Mostly intermediaries.  
135 Those principles are mainly stated in Articles 5 and 6 and can be outlined as; the data must be processed 
lawfully, must be adequate and collected for specified, legitimate purposes etc. 
136 the GDPR, art 7. 
137 Ibid, art 4. 
138 Ibid, arts 35-36. 
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subject about a data breach once they become aware of it. Finally, the Regulation sets out 
the rights of the data subjects139 such as transparency and right to access. More 
importantly, the right to erasure, the so-called RTBF140 is exclusively provided in the 
GDPR.141 This right enables data subjects to control their data online142 while imposing 
duties on the data processors. Before examining this right, what can be deduced from the 
described scope of the GDPR is that intermediaries will have more duties imposed on 
them when they act as data controllers or processors than in relation to copyright or trade 
mark related matters.  
The CJEU’s decision in Google Spain v Mario Costeja González143(Google Spain) is an 
appropriate candidate to demonstrate this along with Google France v Louis Vuitton 
(Google France)144. These two cases concerned the same intermediary: Google, as a 
search engine. However, different rights were at issue. As Google France145 will be 
examined in detail later, it will be sufficient to state the case briefly here. The Google’s 
liability under the ECD was one of the questions before the Court as it was claimed that 
Google should be liable for the sale of keywords under its AdWords service which 
enables advertisers to purchase keywords corresponding to the trade marks of another. It 
should be noted here that search engines were not expressly mentioned in the ECD.146 
The CJEU held as follows ‘…an internet referencing service provider in the case where 
that service provider has not played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge 
of, or control over, the data stored. If it has not played such a role, that service provider 
                                                 
139 Chapter 3 of the GDPR. For a detailed analysis See Andres Guadamuz, ‘Developing a Right to be 
Forgotten’ in Tatiana- Eleni Synodinou, Philippe Jougleux, Christiana Markau and Thalia Prastitou, EU 
Internet Law (Springer 2017) 59-76. 
140 the GDPR, art 17.  
141 In contrast, US law does not have explicitly provided RTBF. See Muge Fazlioglu, ‘Forget me not: the 
clash of the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression on the Internet’ (2013) International Data 
Privacy Law 3 (1) 149-157; Paul Bernal, ‘The EU, the US and Right to be Forgotten’ in Serge Gutwirth, 
Ronald Leenes and Paul De Hart (eds) Reloading Data Protection Multidisciplinary Insights and 
Contemporary Challenges (Springer 2014), 61-77. 
142 Fazlioglu, ‘Forget me not: the clash of the right to be forgotten and freedom of expression on the Internet’ 
(2013), 149. 
143 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD) 
and Mario Costeja González (13 May 2014).  
144 Joined Cases C-236/08 to C-238/08 Google France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Mallettier 
SA (C-236/08) and Google France SARL v Viaticum SA and Lutecial SARL (C-237/08) and Google France 
SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations humanies (CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-238/08) [2010] 
ECR I-02417. (Google France). 
145 Ibid. 
146 For a discussion on search engine’s immunity question, See Edwards, ‘Role and Responsibility of 
Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related Rights’ (2011); Francesco Rizzuto, ‘The 
liability of online intermediary service providers for infringements of intellectual property rights’ (2012) 
Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 18(1) 4-15, 6-8. 
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cannot be held liable for the data which it has stored at the request of an advertiser’ 
unless it either obtains an actual knowledge regarding the infringement or acts 
expeditiously to remove the illegal material upon obtaining such knowledge.147 Although 
the assessment was left to national courts to undertake, the CJEU’s guidance stipulates 
that the search engine provider may benefit from immunity if it does not get actively 
involved in the service it offers. In Google Spain, however, Google’s operation as search 
engine was examined under the DPD which is to be examined below in detail.  
 
B. Google Spain and the Right to be Forgotten 
 
In the main proceedings, Mr. González lodged a complaint with the Spanish Data 
Protection Agency (AEPD) against a daily newspaper (LaVanguardia) along with Google 
Spain and Google Inc. on the ground that his name appeared in the top results of Google 
search associated with a newspaper article about a real estate auction for the recovery of 
social security debts that he had owed 16 years ago. He requested removal or alteration 
of those pages from the newspaper’s website and the links from Google for the protection 
of his privacy. The applicant’s request against a newspaper was rejected by the AEPD on 
the ground that publication of the concerned information was lawful. However, the 
removal request directed to Google Spain and Google Inc. was upheld on the ground that 
the search engines’ activity was subject to the data legislation as it is a medium for 
dissemination of data. Accordingly, the obligation to erase the data should be on them 
regardless of whether that data remained in place on any other website.148 Google Spain 
and Google Inc. then appealed the decision to the Spanish High Court which stayed the 
proceedings and referred preliminary questions related to the application of DPD to the 
CJEU as this was the Directive in application at the time. As stated, the DPD does not 
exclusively provide a RTBF, but it does state that the data subject can ask for erasure or 
block the processing if it does not comply with the principles established in the 
Directive149. Briefly, the referred question in relation to this chapter was whether the 
search engine at issue could be classified as a processor or controller of the data or both 
and ‘what obligations are owed by operators of search engines to protect personal data 
                                                 
147 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417, para 120. 
148 Case C-131/12 Google Spain (13 May 2014), paras 16-17. 
149 the DPD, art 12(b). 
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of persons concerned who do not wish that certain information, which is published on 
third parties’ websites and contains personal data relating to them that enable that 
information to be linked to them, be located, indexed and made available to internet users 
indefinitely.’150 
After the examination, the CJEU set out three points of relevance to this thesis: 
1. The search engine was classified as ‘processor of personal data’ under Art.2(b) 151 as 
well as controller under the Art.2(d) given that it was the one who determined the 
purposes and means of the data processing.152 
2. It was held that it is search engines’ obligation to ‘remove from the list of results 
displayed following a search made on the basis of a person’s name links to web pages, 
published by third parties and containing information relating to that person, also in a 
case where that name or information is not erased beforehand or simultaneously from 
those web pages, and even, as the case may be, when its publication in itself on those 
pages is lawful.’153  
3. The request regarding the removal of such results that consist of personal data must be 
assessed in relation to the fundamental rights of the data subject and the interests of the 
public. Accordingly, a balance must be struck on a case-by-case basis.154  
What should be highlighted from these is that the obligation to remove the data from the 
search results was held to be the search engine’s obligation when the data is inadequate, 
irrelevant or no longer relevant or excessive. This is the RTBF which is exclusively 
provided in Art.17 of the GDPR. A search engine, therefore is under a duty to remove the 
concerned data from the search results and with regard to Art.17 of GDPR it should act 
without undue delay. However, if it is otherwise stated, a search engine, as an 
intermediary, appears to have the discretionary power in to assess request for removal. 
                                                 
150 Case C-131/12 Google Spain (13 May 2014), para 19. 
151 Ibid, para 41. as its operation ‘consists in finding published or placed on the Internet by third parties, 
indexing it automatically, storing it temporarily, and finally making it available to the Internet users 
according to the particular order of preference.’ 
152 Ibid, para 41. It was also held that ‘If the operator of a search engine has branch or subsidiary in a 
member state to promote and sell advertising space offered by that engine, then this operation must be 
regarded as an establishment of the controller by virtue of the Art.4(1)(a)’ in the paras 55-60. 
153 Ibid, para 88. 
154 Ibid, para 99. 
50 
 
This points to the same challenging issue that underlies the intermediaries’ liability 
regime - that of striking a delicate balance between the parties. 
It is evident that this case was not related to the liability of Google as was in Google 
France. Instead, Google’s duty as a data controller/processor was the question before the 
Court. Nevertheless, these two cases are relevant to the liability regime discussion as both 
considered the same intermediary: Google. On the one hand, Google can benefit from the 
immunity for its AdWords service if it is not actively involved in the provision of the 
service. On the other hand, it is under a duty to remove the data which is inadequate, 
irrelevant etc. when its activity as a search engine amounts to be a data controller. Why 
this is important for the liability regime is because as the GDPR has the provision that 
states that the GDPR applies without prejudice to the immunity rules provided in Arts.12-
15 of the ECD, the interaction between those two legislations might have an impact on 
the liability regime in general. Obligations imposed on the intermediaries under the 
GDPR may affect an assessment undertaken under the immunity regime. This is because 
the immunity is provided for intermediaries whose involvement in the provision of the 
service remain passive. However, the GDPR imposes duties on the data processors and 
controllers which may put the passivity of that intermediary in jeopardy or may amount 
to general monitoring duties prohibited in Art.15 ECD. Although it can be argued that the 
assessment of active/ passive and processor/ controller are different, the fact that the 
intermediaries’ liability or obligations would be both content based and arise from their 
users’ activity regardless of being active/ passive or data controller/ processor.  
It is also evident that an intermediary is under a duty to take down the content both under 
the GDPR and ECD. In that respect, the question is should this duty be governed under 
by the same rules regardless of intermediaries’ position. Unfortunately, the Regulation 
does not provide further clarity on the interaction between the GDPR and the ECD. This 
lack of clarity, therefore, appears to be a new challenge for the liability regime.   
Ultimately, some aspects of the CJEU’s holding in Google Spain should be underlined in 
terms of fundamental rights. The discretion given to Google in assessing the removal 
request raises concerns, especially as to the users’ right to freedom of expression. It is for 
Google to assess and strike the right balance. Given that Google is a private business, the 
transparency in its assessment has raised concerns in academia. Academics from all 
around the world wrote an open letter directed against Google 2015 seeking more 
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transparency from Google especially on the points of reasons for denial or grant delisting 
as the Transparency Report published by Google was considered lack of the required 
transparency on these points.155 Those appear to be another challenge in achieving the 
goal of striking a delicate balance.  
In conclusion, the long-term impacts and reflections of this decision over the national 
courts and search engines remain to be seen in terms of understanding the issue in more 
detail, especially from the immunity rules aspect. Yet, the most significant point in respect 
of the subsequent chapter is the varying obligations imposed on the intermediaries for the 
purposes of the protection of data online when they are data processors and controllers. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to state that there is a uniform intermediary regime under 
EU. This, however, should not be understood as the liability regime established within 
the ECD. What is meant here is the intermediaries’ position and how the rules have been 
shaped from the different rights’ aspect. It is evident that the intermediaries and their 
responsibilities are shaped rather differently when the issue comes to data protection.  
 
 
 
V. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
A. How Are These Rights Pertinent to the Liability Regime? 
 
Governing intermediaries’ liability over the Internet is, not surprisingly, of importance 
from a fundamental rights’ aspect as well.156 As examined previously, fundamental rights 
have been extensively considered by the courts even they were not the principal matter 
before them.157 Striking the fair balance between the fundamental rights has become the 
                                                 
155 Google’s Transparency Report Available at 
<http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en> Open Letter is Available at 
<https://medium.com/@ellgood/open-letter-to-google-from-80-internet-scholars-release-rtbf-compliance-
data-cbfc6d59f1bd >  
156 It must be reminded that, in a wider scope, the right to freedom of expression debate derives from the 
state level enforcements where the states impose some duties such as blocking on the intermediaries. 
However, this debate falls outside the scope of this paper.  
157 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959; C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012). 
Also See Sophie Stalla- Bourdillion, ‘The flip side of ISP’s liability regimes : The ambiguous protection of 
fundamental rights and liberties in private digital spaces’ (2010)  Computer Law & Security Review 26(5) 
492-501. 
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test in the CJEU’s case law, especially in the injunction cases. Accordingly, the national 
courts have a duty imposed on them to make a proportionality assessment and strike the 
fair balance between the conflicting rights in the cases dealing with an intermediary 
liability and issues related to this.  
In contributory liability cases, there is a triadic relationship with respect to the 
fundamental rights at stake. Although the infringing act principally affects the right 
owners when the enforcement measures are implemented by means of preventing and 
terminating such activities, the fundamental rights of service providers as well as the 
rights of the users who benefit from these services will be at stake, as it happens in the 
injunction cases. In those circumstances, the fundamental rights that would be at stake 
can be identified as follows:  
1) Right holders’ right to protection of property, specifically IP rights in IP cases 
and right to access to justice such as right to fair trial and effective remedy; 
2) Service providers’ right to conduct business and right to freedom of 
expression; and  
3) The users of the services’ (including content providers) right to freedom of 
expression and information, right to protection of personal data and privacy 
and right to fair trial.    
These rights are enshrined under the Charter158, and the CJEU had first underlined the 
necessity of the balancing test in Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v 
Telefónica de España SAU 159  by stating ‘the Member States must … take care to rely on 
an interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between 
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order’.160 After that the 
court considered the fair balance between the fundamental rights of the parties, 
accordingly undertook the balancing act in its case law.161 Considering the case law, it is 
arguable whether the CJEU was successful in striking the fair balance in those cases. In 
Scarlet v SABAM and SABAM v Netlog, the courts’ appraisal focused on the balancing act 
                                                 
158 Art 7 Respect for private and family life; Art 8 Protection of personal data; Art 11 Freedom of expression 
and information; Art 16 Freedom to conduct a business; Art 17 Right to property; Art 47 Right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial.  
159 Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU [2008] 
ECR I-271. (Promusicae v Telefónica). 
160 Ibid, para 68.  
161 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959; Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 
2012); Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). 
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and the decisions were grounded on this test. However, this assessment appeared as 
lacking the consideration of the procedural rights of the parties. Art. 47 of the Charter 
enshrines the right to an effective remedy and the right to a fair trial.162 However, the 
CJEU did not mention these rights in relation to the applicability of an injunction orders 
sought on those cases, although it has been argued in the academia that those rights should 
be considered in injunction cases, especially in the cases that consider blocking 
injunction.163 
On the other hand, in UPC Telekabel,164 the act of balancing was left to an intermediary 
when choosing and implementing the appropriate injunctive relief. In a similar sense, in 
Google Spain,165 Google was left to the duty of assessment of fundamental rights when 
it was taking down the content with respect to the RTBF. As leaving such discretion to 
intermediaries which are private entities appears controversial, all those cases more 
importantly demonstrate the significance of striking a balance. It is because, striking the 
fair balance would not only ensure the proportionality of the measure implemented, it 
would perhaps bring the injunction orders in line with the aim of the legislator and provide 
the maximum benefit to the immunity regime. This test cannot also be ignored in the 
search of new enforcement mechanisms within the intermediaries’ liability regime as this 
would provide and ensure the effectiveness as well as the protection of the rights of the 
parties. Thus, it is significant for the purposes of the thesis, as well.  
The issue of intermediaries’ liability and striking the fair balance between the 
fundamental rights in these cases has another aspect. The CJEU is not the only court who 
has dealt with the question of the fair balance in the cases concerning intermediaries. As 
a court which deals with the cases brought by the signatories of the ECHR with respect 
to the violation of the rights enshrined in the ECHR,166 the ECtHR has also been 
                                                 
162 Art 47 of the Charter 212/C 326/02 reads as: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the 
conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack 
sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” 
163 See Martin Husovec ‘Injunctions Against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking’ (2012) 
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper no. 13-14, 116-128, 
123-124; Saulius Lukas Kaleda, ‘The role of principle effective judicial protection and website blocking 
injunctions’ (2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Information Technology and E-commerce Law (8) 216-
225.  
164 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014).  
165 Ibid. 
166 The ECHR, Section II. 
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challenged to address the fundamental rights violation in the cases concerning 
intermediaries and their liability. Although the ECtHR is not the court of the EU and its 
decisions are not legally binding on national courts, ECtHR’s stance on the issue cannot 
be ignored. This is because the Convention and the Treaty of European Union,167 whom 
the MSs are the signatories, mentions the ECHR and underlines that the rights guaranteed 
by this Convention shall constitute of general principles of the Union’s law.168 Moreover, 
as it was pointed by the CJEU in Promusicae v Telefónica169 fundamental rights that are 
enshrined under the Charter reproduce the rights enshrined under the ECHR. Thus, the 
stance of the ECtHR on the intermediaries’ liability conundrum should also provide some 
insight on the issue. There are two ECtHR cases that should be considered with that 
regard: Delfi AS v Estonia170 and Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete (MTE)and 
Index.hu Zrt. v Hungary171. These cases will be useful to demonstrate the stance of the 
ECtHR when dealing with the fundamental rights in the cases concerning intermediaries. 
 
B. Delfi AS. v Estonia 
 
This case concerned the freedom of expression of an Estonian Internet news portal, Delfi. 
Delfi publishes daily articles and enables readers to comment on those articles. Those 
comments are uploaded automatically and are not subject to editing. However, they might 
be subject to either automatic deletion or NTD if the concerned comment is marked by 
other readers as insulting or as hatred by other readers. This case was one of its kind 
which concerned the offensive comments directed against an individual, L. Through this 
means L requested from Delfi to remove these offensive and sometimes threatening 
comments and pay compensation for the damage was caused. Delfi removed the 
comments but refused to pay compensation. Then, L started proceedings before the 
Estonian courts claiming damages from Delfi. Following this, Delfi claimed to be held 
immune from liability with respect to the Estonian Information Society Services Act 
                                                 
167 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union Official Journal C 326 2012. 
168 Ibid, art 6. In Case C-130/75 Vivien Prais v Council of the European Communities [1975] ECR I-01589, 
para 8, it is stated ‘[s]ince the European Convention has been ratified by all the member states the rights 
enshrined in it are (….) to be regarded as included in the fundamental rights to be protected by community 
law…’. 
169 Case C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefónica [2008] ECR I-27, para 64. 
170 Delfi AS v Estonia, App. no. 64569/09 (ECHR, 16 June 2015). (Delfi) 
171 Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete (MTE) and Index.hu Zrt v Hungary, App. No 22947/13 
(ECHR, 2 February 2016). (MTE v Hungary). 
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which is the transposition of the ECD into Estonian Law. However, the Estonian court 
refused to apply this Act on the ground that the comments section of the portal was 
different from the portal’s journalistic area. Subsequently, Delfi was held liable under the 
Estonian Obligations Act for the offending comments about L written by its readers. 
Later, this decision was upheld by the Estonian Supreme Court when it concluded that 
the news portal’s activity was not merely technical and passive in nature.172  
Subsequently, Delfi brought the matter before the ECtHR alleging ‘…its freedom of 
expression had been violated, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, by the fact that 
it had been held liable for the third-party comments posted on its Internet news portal’.173 
The Grand Chamber upheld the Chamber’s finding, albeit not unanimously, that there 
was no violation of freedom of expression. More precisely, the ECtHR actually accepted 
the existence of interference to the freedom of expression of Delfi’s, yet there was no 
violation of freedom of expression since this interference was justified under Art.10.174 
By virtue of the Article, the right to freedom of expression can only be restricted if such 
a restriction is prescribed by the law and if it is necessary in a democratic society, and 
finally if it is done with the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of 
others.175  
The Court’s assessment on Delfi’s activity, however, needs further attention since it might 
have an impact on intermediaries’ liability, even though Delfi was not classified as an 
intermediary in the domestic proceedings.176 The ECtHR appeared to have considered the 
issue in a way that cannot be thought as comprising the EU’s general policy on 
intermediaries.  It overlooked the fact that the ‘… user-generated expressive activity on 
the Internet provides an unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of 
expression’177 despite its assessment started with this sentence. 
In its appraisal, the Court grounded its assessment of proportionality on four aspects:178 
1) The context of the comments, 
                                                 
172 Delfi ECHR App. no. 64569/09, para 31. 
173 Ibid, para 3. 
174 Ibid, paras 118-119. 
175 Ibid, paras 120-139. 
176 It must be reminded that, it is not ECtHR’s task to determine the appropriate legislature on the issue as 
whether it was the Information Society Services Act or Obligations Act. The Court cannot decide the issue 
by substituting the domestic courts.  
177 Delfi ECHR App. no. 64569/09, para 110. 
178 Ibid, para 142. 
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2) The measures applied by the applicant in order to prevent or remove defamatory 
comments, 
3) The liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the 
applicant company’s liability, 
4) The consequences of the domestic proceedings for the applicant company. 
What was important with respect to these is that the court held that the measures taken, 
such as NTD and filtering systems were as inadequate, as was the removal of the 
comments right after receiving a notification from L. The Court stated that in such a case 
third-party user comments should be removed without delay, and more precisely, ‘… even 
without notice from the alleged victim or third parties’.179 
In that sense, the decision appears to suggest Internet news portals to implement pre-
monitoring measurements in order to avoid being held liable. Yet, this would put the right 
to freedom of expression of all third-party users who wishing to comment on the articles 
be at stake. Indeed, in the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Sajó and Tsotsoria, this was 
considered an ‘invitation to self-censorship at its worst’.180  
From that point, the ECtHR decision appears to conflict with the EU policy since the 
decision encourages the news portals to initiate their own pre-monitoring system and held 
that the NTD system was insufficient to tackle the concerned comments in the case. This 
would most likely have a chilling effect on the freedom of expression of third-party users. 
In that way, the judgment appears to be in conflict with the EU policy. It can be said that 
the judgment may well have an influence on the intermediaries despite that Delfi not 
being classified as one. Although the ECtHR was only asked to decide whether there was 
a violation of right to freedom of expression for monetary compensation,181 a different 
question can be said to reasonably arise, if Delfi was held to be an intermediary which 
could have been under the corresponding rules of the ECD,182 would the ECtHR have 
taken the same approach? If yes, this would quite possibly be in conflict with the EU 
policy. On the other hand, the assessment of the court demonstrated that the ECtHR’s 
                                                 
179 Ibid, para 159. 
180 Ibid, para 1. 
181 This is important because as Angelopoulos and Smet stated ‘this confirms that fair balance is relevant 
to claims that go beyond the realm to which EU case law has so far confined in’. Christina Angelopoulos 
and Stijn Smet ‘Notice-and-fair-balance: how to reach a compromise between fundamental rights in 
European intermediary liability’ (2016) Journal of Media Law 8:2 266-301, 274. 
182 Of course, this would be possible if the issue came before the ECtHR.  
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approach in balancing act was rather more systematic as the court had established the 
criterion that should be applied.  
C. MTE v Hungary 
 
Applicants in this case were the self-regulatory body of Internet content providers (MTE) 
and one of Hungary’s major online news platforms (Index).183 Both platforms enabled 
their users to comment on the publications that appeared on these platforms. Yet, those 
comments were not subject to editing before their upload. However, in order to prevent 
the appearance of unlawful comments, both platforms implemented an NTD system and 
stated in their user terms that such comments could not be uploaded, and they would be 
deleted if uploaded. Thus, these platforms’ operations were very similar to Delfi’s. The 
present case was about an opinion published on both sites which attracted many 
comments including defamatory ones. As a result, an individual who was the subject and 
target of the comments started proceedings before the Hungarian Courts claiming that 
these comments had infringed his right to good reputation.  
The first degree court found that the plaintiffs’ right to good reputation was indeed 
infringed by defamatory comments published on these platforms.184 Moreover, those 
platforms’ claims that they were intermediaries, and so their liability was limited to 
removing the content, were rejected on the ground that the publication of those comments 
was dependent on an editorial decision as was the case with readers’ letters. At the appeal, 
the decision was upheld but the reasoning of the first court’s decision was amended.185 It 
was held that comments cannot be deemed to be the same as readers’ letters. They were 
not dependent on an editorial decision but were solely the opinions of the commentators. 
More significantly, the Appeal Court held that the Hungarian Act of E-Commerce, which 
is the transposition of the ECD was not applicable to the case as this Act was only 
applicable to electronic services of a commercial nature. The concerned comments, 
however, were private statements.  
As a result of being held liable for the defamatory comments uploaded on their platforms, 
these platforms brought the issue before the ECtHR claiming that this decision amounted 
to an unjustified restriction on their freedom of expression. Henceforth, the ECtHR 
                                                 
183 MTE v Hungary ECHR App. No 22947/13. 
184 Ibid, para 17. 
185 Ibid, paras 19-20. 
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examined whether this alleged restriction was prescribed by law, whether it had a 
legitimate interest and whether it was necessary in a democratic society.186  
In its appraisal the Court considered the same four criteria laid out in Delfi, with one more 
additional criterion: the consequences of the comments for the victim.187 Applying these, 
it was found that there had been a violation of freedom of expression of these platforms.188  
One of the criteria applied was the assessment of the preventive measures applied by the 
platforms in order to prevent or remove the comments.189 As aforementioned, in Delfi the 
ECtHR held that the NTD system implemented by the news portal was inadequate to 
prevent the comments appearing on Delfi’s news portal.190 This was one of the reasonings 
of the Court to hold that there was no violation on Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. 
It is therefore necessary to determine exactly how the Court reached a different verdict in 
MTE v Hungary in the presence of very similar facts. 
In MTE v Hungary, the ECtHR emphasised many times that these two cases differed in 
the nature of the comments that were left on the platforms. More precisely, the Court held 
that the comments at issue in MTE v Hungary did not amount to hate speech or incitement 
to violence.191 They were defamatory comments. Thus, the preventive measure -NTD 
system- implemented and applied by these platforms was held to be adequate while it was 
held to be insufficient in Delfi. This was because the comments concerned in the Delfi 
case were found to amount to hate speech or incitement to violence. Therefore, when the 
two cases are read together what can be concluded is that the ECtHR’s balancing 
approach was mainly depended on the nature of the comments concerned. If the 
comments are in merely offensive in nature, the NTD system may be deemed sufficient, 
while for hate speech or incitement to violence news portals would be expected to 
implement more pro-active measures to tackle them. Although this might seem a 
straightforward test, in practice, examining whether the comment is merely offensive in 
nature or amounts to hate speech would be a very challenging task for an intermediary to 
do.192 
                                                 
186 the ECHR, Art. 10.  
187 MTE v Hungary ECHR App. No 22947/13, para 69. 
188 Ibid, paras 45-88. 
189 Ibid, para 69. 
190 Delfi ECHR App. no. 64569/09, paras 155-159. 
191 Ibid, para 64. 
192 Christina Angelopoulos, ‘MTE v Hungary: A new ECtHR judgment on intermediary liability and 
freedom of expression’ (2016) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 11 (8) 582-584, 584. 
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 Moreover, even if an intermediary is able to distinguish the nature of the comments, how 
would it know which type of measures would be regarded as adequate? In Delfi, the Court 
stated that Delfi should have acted quicker to takedown the comments so, the NTD system 
was held to be insufficient. Thus, monitoring and filtering may be considered by such 
platforms as an option to avoid having their freedom of expression restricted. Yet, it is 
evident that if this measure amounts to general monitoring, then it would be contrary to 
Art.15 of the ECD if the same intermediaries’ liability question arises within the scope of 
the ECD. In the light of this, it would be difficult to conclude that the ECtHR’s decision 
in MTE v Hungary had resolved the inconsistencies with the ECD’s liability regime that 
the Delfi decision created, although these two cases were distinguished.  
Overall, it would not be wrong to conclude that the stances of the CJEU and the ECtHR 
on intermediaries’ regime appears different and perhaps conflicting at some points. These 
cases demonstrated the existence of the different approaches adopted by these courts for 
the purpose of striking the fair balance.   
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The assessment undertaken above first and foremost proves that the courts have struggled 
to balance the duties and immunities of the parties. When the intermediaries are 
considered, the Courts have encountered a familiar conundrum; intermediaries are best 
placed to prevent unlawful content being uploaded by its users but they are not the 
wrongdoers. The chapter also demonstrates that in dealing with this dilemma, either the 
courts or the EU legislators took seemingly different positions depending on the rights at 
stake in order to find a compromise. When the applicability of a certain injunctive 
measure is the issue, the EU policy provides minimum standards to be applied to the 
matter,193 and the CJEU appears to provide further insight for courts in striking the 
delicate balance that an injunction may affect. The CJEU’s focus in that regard, however, 
was more on the compatibility of injunction orders with the other Directives applicable 
and the fundamental rights, namely the ECD and the Charter. In Scarlet v SABAM194 and 
                                                 
193 Art. 3(1) of ED: ‘shall be fair and equitable and shall not be unnecessarily complicated or costly, or 
entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delay”. Art. 3(2) of ED: “shall also be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the criterion of barrier to 
legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards as against their abuse’. 
194 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959. 
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SABAM v Netlog,195 the employment of a filtering system was considered under the ECD 
and was found to be inconsistent with it as it would amount to general monitoring which 
is prohibited within Art.15 of ECD.  
Besides, the doctrine of fair balance was laid out as an applicable test for injunction 
requests. Under this test, a fair balance between the fundamental rights that would be 
affected by an implementation of an injunction must be struck by the courts. Yet, the case 
law of the CJEU appears to show that the Court has failed to pay adequate attention to 
strike the balance to some extent, especially in UPC Telekabel as the selection of the 
appropriate measure in preventing copyright infringements was left to the intermediary 
along with the obligation of ensuring the freedom of expression of users. Moreover, this 
holding can be interpreted as giving a discretionary power to the intermediary which may 
harm the balance.  
The very same concern was raised from the CJEUs holding in Google Spain but with 
respect to another right, privacy. In this case, the assessment of the removal request was 
left to Google as a search engine. As stated, this right is known as RTBF and it is explicitly 
provided in the GDPR. Although the concerned discretion can be criticised on the grounds 
of lack of transparency and fundamental rights, it appears consistent with the EU’s data 
protection policy. Under this policy, intermediaries are considered rather differently than 
they are considered under the liability regime. The GDPR establishes a different 
framework for intermediaries according to their duties and responsibilities and imposes 
many more duties and stricter ones on them. Whereas under the liability regime, 
intermediaries’ duties appear more limited. This proves that intermediaries’ regime has 
actually been divergently shaped within the EU.  
Moreover, the assessment demonstrates that striking the fair balance is a significant part 
of the intermediary liability cases. The balancing approach can even be regarded as the 
way of dealing with the dilemma mentioned above. The CJEU focused on the 
fundamental rights in the injunction cases to reach a compromise. In a similar sense, the 
balancing act has also been the test before the ECtHR when dealing with the fundamental 
rights of the intermediaries. The ECtHR considered this in the cases considering 
intermediaries and applied the test more systematically. Yet, more significantly, the 
examination undertaken with that respect demonstrated that the fair balance test is of great 
                                                 
195 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012).  
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importance for the purposed of the thesis as this test would provide and ensure the 
effectiveness of the measures implemented as well as the protection of the parties.  
More remarkably, divergences in the approaches adopted are also significant for the 
liability regime in general despite the heavy focus on the responsibilities of intermediaries 
rather than their liability. This is because EU law does not provide clarity or further 
insight into the interplay between the different Directives. Moreover, with the new 
developments such as Art.13 of the draft CD, this problem seems to have become more 
significant. This Article proposes the imposition of a greater duty on certain 
intermediaries but does not address the issue of the compatibility of this Article with the 
ECD. Neither does it provide any guidance. The GDPR also appears to lack of answers 
on the vagueness caused by Art.2(4) which states that the Regulation shall be applied 
without prejudice to Arts. 12-15 ECD. Finally, the ECtHR’s approaches in Delfi v Estonia 
and MTE v Hungary appear pertinent to the liability regime in general, although it did not 
consider an intermediary. This is significant because the Court seems to suggest the 
implementation of pre-monitoring systems while not approving the efficaciousness of an 
NTD mechanism in dealing with illicit comments online. This, therefore may encourage 
an intermediary to employ such a mechanism which may result in losing its immunity 
when its liability is assessed under the ECD.  
Ultimately, what this chapter suggests for the trade mark realm can be stated as follows: 
although the safe harbour rules are provided horizontally as being applicable to the 
different rights, intermediaries’ liability regime appears to have been considered in a more 
policy-oriented manner. Accordingly, the developments have been shaped to be more 
sector-specific. Yet, unfortunately a trade mark is one of the least considered rights in 
terms of taking further action. Therefore, in pursuit of a solution for trade marks, these 
current approaches should be considered with the existing case law, yet their influence 
would appear to be limited given the differences in the scope of the protection of the 
rights and the policy. Having said that, copyright offers the most effective assistance 
since, as it will be examined, the analogy in between copyright and trade mark has been 
mostly employed by the courts for the liability issue. In that sense, copyright would be a 
good representative for trade marks as the EU policy offers more insight and 
developments for copyright.  
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In the light of these, trade mark specific rules should be pursued where the policy of trade 
marks requires such specific rules. The focus will now turn to the current law on online 
contributory trade mark liability.  
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
After providing an overview about how intermediaries’ liability is shaped when different 
rights are at stake, the focus now turns to trade marks. In the pursuit of answering the 
research question, the first issue to consider is the current state of the EU’s contributory 
trade mark liability law applicable to online issues. As stated before, EU law establishes 
the immunity regime in the ECD for certain activities of intermediaries, ie mere conduit, 
caching and hosting services. In that way, EU law deals with the matter by specifying the 
conditions where an intermediary can be regarded as immune instead of setting out rules 
to define the circumstances when an intermediary is contributorily liable.196 Moreover, 
this immunity regime is established as an additional protection for the intermediaries. As 
such, losing immunity does not automatically trigger liability. In that case, the national 
laws of the EU MSs apply to the matter.  
                                                 
196 Dinwoodie describes this as a negative approach in contrast to the positive approach where the liability 
rules are specified. See Dinwoodie, ‘Comparative Analysis of the Secondary Liability of Online Service 
Providers’ (2017), 1-72. 
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In that way, the ECD’s immunity regime together with the domestic tort law rules become 
the main legal instruments which apply and shape the contributory trade mark liability. 
The ECD should be the first aspect to examine as it is the nucleus of the immunity regime. 
The ED will also be assessed. As aforementioned, this Directive provides general rules 
for the enforcement of IP rights including trade marks. Most importantly, the third 
sentence of Art.11 of the Directive enables the right owners ‘to apply for an injunction 
against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual 
property right…’.  This Article, as examined in the second chapter, has been the one to 
have received the greatest attention of the courts. Although it is an enforcement 
mechanism and its application does not depend on liability, the injunctions proved to be 
pertinent for the liability regime as the application of this mechanism has had an impact 
on delineating the scope of the intermediaries’ activities and perhaps their 
responsibilities.197 Furthermore, it can be said that to some extent this Article establishes 
harmonised rules. It also imposes a duty to implement and apply the granted injunction 
on the intermediaries, although it is not clear what will happen if an intermediary does 
not act on these.  
By undertaking this assessment, this chapter aims to establish the current state of the 
immunity rules applicable to contributory trade mark issues in order to provide an answer 
to the following questions; ‘Is the EU law’s immunity regime the appropriate approach 
to deal with online infringements and establish a contributory trade mark liability regime 
online? More importantly, does this regime have the answers to the challenges that the 
Internet brings or may bring in the future?’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 This was demonstrated in the Chapter 2. Although the examination focused on the copyrights, it is 
directly related to the copyrights by way of an analogy. See Chapter 2. 
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II. THE IMMUNITY REGIME  
 
A. The E-Commerce Directive 2000/31(ECD)  
 
1. Scope of the Directive  
 
The first thing to examine is the scope of the Directive. Although the Directive’s 
horizontal application provides civil and criminal liability exemption from monetary 
compensation for almost all types of the substantive law rights,198 its application is limited 
to the matters related to information society service providers (ISSPs).  What is the ISSPs, 
then?  
Recital 17 and Art.2 of the ECD define the ISSPs as covering, by referring to Art.1(2) of 
Directive 98/48/EC,199 ‘any service normally provided for remuneration, at a distance, 
by means of electronic equipment for the processing (including digital compression) and 
storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a services’. The recipient 
of the service is also explained as including ‘any natural or legal person who, for 
professional ends or otherwise, uses an information society service, in particular 
purposes of seeking information or making it accessible’ in Art.2(d).200 The Directive 
therefore covers a broad range of online services. Some of those activities are given in 
Recital 18 as follows: selling goods online and offering online information or search tools. 
Yet, television and radio broadcasting are explicitly excluded from the scope as ‘they are 
not provided at individual request’.  
Recital 18 also states that free services can fall within the scope of the ISSPs’ if the service 
represents an economic activity. This rule is actually a reflection of the principle stated in 
Art.57 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)201 as the Article 
focuses on the economic nature of the activity in assessing the type of service.  It was also 
established by case law that the economic nature standard should be considered 
                                                 
198 Except data and privacy protection with respect to the Art.5(b) of the Directive. For further explanation, 
See Chapter 2.  
199 Council Directive (EC) 98/48 amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision 
of information in the field of technical standards and regulations [1998] OJ L 217/21.  
200 For detailed assessment, See EU Study on the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information 
Society (2009) Chapter 6.4.1. 
201 the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01. 
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broadly.202 That interpretation was analogically applied to the ISSPs by the CJEU in 
Sotiris Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd and Others203 and so it was 
confirmed. In brief, it was held that a service provider should not necessarily be paid 
directly by those who benefited from its services. The economic activity standard can still 
be met if the service provider is financed by advertisements on its website. This 
clarification is very important in terms of the latest technologies developed such as 
streaming websites. 
Later, in another case, the CJEU was asked to decide ‘whether a professional person who, 
in the course of business, operates a free Wi-Fi204 network, is to be regarded of a service 
consisting in provision of access to a communication network, within the meaning of 
Article 12(1) of Directive 2000/31’.205 For the first part of the question, the CJEU held 
that provision of free Wi-Fi ‘constitutes an “information society service” … where the 
activity is performed by the service provider in question for the purposes of advertising 
the goods sold or services supplied by that service provider’.206 In that sense, it can be 
concluded that a broad range of economic activities would satisfy the remuneration 
requirement under Art.2(a) although this would be subject to a case-by-case analysis.   
However, what is significant is that the Directive does not make an exclusive referral to 
any Web 2.0 user-generated technology providers such as auction sites, blogs, video 
sharing sites, paid referencing system and linking providers. Accordingly, it does not 
establish whether they are the ISSPs under the Directive. This is not particularly 
surprising given that the Directive was enacted before those technologies were developed. 
Fortunately, the CJEU’s case law sheds light on the issue for some Web 2.0 technologies. 
In Google France207 one of the questions before the CJEU was whether the paid 
referencing system,208 AdWords offered by Google was an ISSP under the ECD. It was 
                                                 
202Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (CJEU 16 March 2016), 
Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 38.  
203 Case C-291/13 Sotiris Papasavvas v O Fileleftheros Dimosia Etairia Ltd and Others (CJEU 11 
September 2014).  
204 ‘Wi-Fi or WiFi is a technology that allows electronic devices to connect to a wireless LAN (WLAN) 
network..’ see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wi-Fi>  
205 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (CJEU 16 March 2016), 
Opinion of AG Szpunar, para 34. 
206 C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (CJEU 15 September 2016), 
paras 34-43.  
207 Joined Cases C-236/06 -C-236/08 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417, para 120.  
208 Ibid, para 23, ‘That service enables any economic operator, by means of the reservation of one or more 
keywords, to obtain the placing, in the event of a correspondence between one or more of those words and 
that/those entered as a request in the search engine by an internet user, of an advertising link to its site. 
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decided that the paid referencing service at stake, which enabled users to purchase 
keywords provided by the system, was an ISSP as it qualified under the standards stated 
under Art.2(a).209 Following this, in L’Oréal v Ebay,210 an online auction site, which 
provided a platform to third parties to upload listings for selling and buying211 and in 
SABAM v Netlog212 an online social networking platform, were both held to be ISSPs. 
Considering these, then the ISSP notion appears to embrace the new Web 2.0 services 
bearing in mind there is still ambiguity over some types of services offered by 
intermediaries such as search engines. Edwards argued that even Google France decision 
on keywords ‘(…)does conclusively not settle the matter of whether Google in its role as 
a cot-free provider of search links qualifies as an ISSP’. 213  
To conclude, the ECD considers a wide range of online actors as ISSPs provided that the 
activities at issue qualify under the standards stated in Art.2(a) and underlines that the 
‘normally provided for remuneration’ and ‘by electronic means’ are the key standards. It 
should be mentioned that the ECD employs the term ISP interchangeably with the ISSPs, 
especially in the further provisions, such as under Section 4. Finally, it must be reminded 
that within this thesis the term Internet intermediaries is employed instead of the terms 
used in the ECD.  
 
 
 
                                                 
That advertising link appears under the heading ‘sponsored links’, which is displayed either on the right-
hand side of the screen, to the right of the natural results, or on the upper part of the screen, above the 
natural results.’ 
209 Ibid, para 110. 
210  Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para. 88. 
211 In the case, this main service of Ebay was differed from the Ebay’s selection of the keywords for the 
advertisement of the listings. It was also decided that this selection of the keywords was also different from 
the Google’s Adwords service since ‘ebay is not offering itself the goods for sale.’ Case C-324/09 L’Oréal 
v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 89. 
212 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012), para 27 ‘the owner of an online social networking 
platform- such as Netlog- stores information provided by the users of that platform, relating to their profile, 
on its servers, and that it is thus a hosting service provider within the meaning of Article 14 of Directive 
2000/31.’ 
213 Edwards, ‘Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyrights and Related 
Rights’ (2011), 9. In contrast Peguera, more generally, argued that the hosting intermediary immunity 
provision is applicable for the new generation technologies that were not anticipated when the rules enacted. 
See Miquel Peguera, ‘The DMCA Safe Harbours and their European Counterparts: A Comparative 
Analysis of some Common Problems’ (2009) 32 Columbia Journal of Law& Arts 481, 512. 
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2. The Liability of Internet Intermediaries  
 
The rules governing liability are set out under Section 4 within the Arts.12-15. Under 
those rules, the immunity is provided for only certain activities of the intermediaries upon 
meeting the conditions stated for each type of activities. These activities are mere conduit 
(Art.12), caching (Art.13) and hosting (Art.14). Although the Directive sets out different 
requirements for each intermediary to be granted immunity from liability, it provides 
some general principles for the Internet intermediaries’ liability regime. These can be 
identified as follows: 
First, Recital 42 describes the general principle underlying the safe harbour rules. It states 
that the immunity rules solely cover activities of a ‘merely technical, automatic and 
passive nature, which implies that the service provider has neither knowledge of nor 
control over the information that is transmitted or stored.’ On that point, the AG argued 
in its opinion in L’Oréal v Ebay that the neutrality stated in this Recital should be 
understood as covering only mere conduit and caching services, but not hosting services 
on the ground that being neutral would be impossible for the hosting intermediaries as 
they would necessarily have some degree of involvement in process of their services. 214 
Even the Recital is construed as the way that the AG argued, it is still evident that the 
immunity regime is grounded on a general principle that separating passive intermediary 
from the one which actively involves in the provision of the services.  
Second and more remarkably, the scope and the nature of the protection given by these 
rules is explained by the EU Commission in a report.215 It states:   
“While the special liability regime constitutes an additional shield for service 
providers, it does not modify each Member States' underlying material law 
governing liability. The only effect of not (or no longer) meeting the criteria 
of article 12, 13 of 14 (e.g., because data is modified during transmission, or 
when access to hosted data is not blocked upon awareness of the 
unlawfulness), will be the loss of the additional protection. Service providers 
will then become subject to the general rules of tortuous or penal liability, 
which may or may not hold the service provider liable, depending on each 
Member State's laws.”216 
                                                 
214 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 146.  
215 EU Study on ‘the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society’ (2009). 
216 Ibid, Chapter 6.3.2. 
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It follows that the national laws of MSs which are applicable to the issue are still of utmost 
importance for establishing a contributory trade mark liability regime. This is significant 
because, as it will be demonstrated later, the exact framework of the contributory liability 
regime is in fact being shaped and defined by the domestic applications of the MSs’ courts 
even though it is EU law that provides the safe harbour rules.  
Third, Recital 45 states another general principle for the liability regime which is related 
to injunctions: 
“The limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers established 
in this Directive do not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds; 
such injunctions can in particular consist of orders by courts or administrative 
authorities requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, 
including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it.”  
This principle is also restated for each type of activity within the last subsections of each 
Article namely, Arts.12(3), 13(2) and 14(3).  
Finally, Art.15 provides another general principle applicable to all three types of 
activities. According to this Article, MSs are prohibited from imposing a general 
obligation that amounts to either monitoring of information which they transmit or store 
or to actively seeking facts or circumstances that indicate illegal activity. As stated before, 
this is an important rule of the liability regime.  
Beside those general principles, the ECD establishes the specific principles for each type 
of activity mere conduit, caching and hosting which will be examined respectively.  
 
a) Mere Conduit 
 
Article 12(1) and (2) states: 
‘1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a 
recipient of the service, or the provision of access to a communication 
network, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for 
the information transmitted, on condition that the provider: 
(a) does not initiate the transmission; 
(b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and 
(c) does not select or modify the information contained in the transmission. 
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2. The acts of transmission and of provision of access referred to in paragraph 
1 include the automatic, intermediate and transient storage of the information 
transmitted in so far as this takes place for the sole purpose of carrying out 
the transmission in the communication network, and provided that the 
information is not stored for any period longer than is reasonably necessary 
for the transmission.’ 
 
This article provides immunity for activities that amount to mere conduit which, as 
explained in the first subsection, covers network access services and network 
transmission services. Those services are the traditional ones offered by Internet access 
providers217 and backbone operators218.  
 
As the Article does not cover the current technologies, in Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music 
Entertainment Germany GmbH its applicability to a Wi-Fi service arose as an issue before 
the CJEU.219 As previously discussed, the CJEU held that someone offering a Wi-Fi 
service qualifies as ISSP under the ECD. The CJEU was also asked ‘whether a 
professional person who, in the course of business, operates a free Wi-Fi network, is to 
be regarded of a service consisting in provision of access to a communication network, 
within the meaning of Article 12(1) of Directive 2000/31’.220 It was accordingly decided 
that the Wi-Fi service also qualifies as mere conduit under Art.12(1).221  
 
However, qualifying under Art.12(1) is not sufficient for mere conduit service providers 
to benefit from immunity unless the requirements stated in subsections (a), (b), and (c) 
are fulfilled. 222 Those conditions basically assess the intermediaries’ involvement in the 
transmission of data. Indeed, Recital 43 clearly states for both Arts.12 and 13 exemptions 
that the service provider can benefit from these exemptions ‘when he is in no way involved 
with the information transmitted’. It is further explained that  
“…this requires among other things that he (the service provider)223 does not 
modify the information that he transmits; this requirement does not cover of 
                                                 
217‘which connect their subscribers to the Internet using dial-up modems, xDSL modems, cable connections 
or fixed lines’. Ibid, Chapter 6.3.1. 
218 ‘which interconnect various subparts of the Internet’.  
219 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (15 September 2016) 
(Mc Fadden v Sony Music) This was a copyright case.  
220 Opinion of the AG in C-484/14, para. 34. 
221 Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden v Sony Music (15 September 2016), Opinion of AG Szpunar, paras 34- 54.  
222 The CJEU in this case underlined that there are no further conditions must be met other than the 
conditions stated in the Article to be exempted from the liability. Ibid, para 54. 
223 Brackets added.  
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a technical nature which take place in the course of the transmission as they 
do not alter the integrity of the information contained in the transmission.”  
 
More importantly, Art.12(3) restates the general principle of the immunity regime which 
is that the immunity provided in the Article does not cover immunity for the possible 
preventive measures application against them. This means that an intermediary can still 
be subject to injunctions regardless of its immunity from the liability under the ECD. 
Those injunctions, however, are subject to the general monitoring obligation rule stated 
under Art.15 of the Directive. The framework of these preventive measures will be 
examined later in the chapter.  
The Article seems to have offered an unambiguous framework on liability for existing 
mere conduit activities when the ECD was published by clearly stating what a mere 
conduit intermediary should not do while providing access. Indeed, this Article has been 
hardly referred to the CJEU. However, this does not necessarily mean that its applicability 
covers new technologies. It has been 18 years since the ECD was published Indeed, in 
the EU Commission’s legal analysis from 2009,224 it was stated that it is not clear whether 
the operators of new technologies such as chat networks, instant messaging and P2P 
networks are mere conduits on the ground that they provide access to a communications 
network.225 Moreover, operators of streaming websites can be added to this list. In any 
case, considering the good number of years that have passed since the ECD was 
published, the Article could not be expected to expressly mention those new technologies. 
Thus, in assessing the Article’s applicability and effectiveness, it should be asked whether 
the principles established in it are sufficient to assess these new technologies. This 
question applies to all types of immunity rules when their applicability to a new 
technology is considered. For Art.12, it can be concluded that it appears satisfactory in 
determining the applicability of the rules to these new technologies given that what a mere 
conduit provider can do is limited to providing an access in contrast to other providers 
 
 
b) Caching 
 
Art.13(1) states: 
                                                 
224 EU Study on ‘the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society’ (2009). 
225 Ibid, Chapter 6.4.2.  
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 “Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
transmission in a communication network of information provided by a 
recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider 
is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that 
information, performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the 
information's onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon 
their request, on condition that: 
(a) the provider does not modify the information; 
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the information; 
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, 
specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry; 
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely 
recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; 
and 
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the 
information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from 
the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an 
administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement.” 
 
Caching is a form of information storage used to limit the need for the retransmission of 
information from its point of origin. It accordingly differs from the mere conduit services 
in that regard. Both services consist of the transmission of information in a 
communication network but differ in the length of time of storage as caching activities 
offer longer periods of storage time for information whereas the sole purpose of mere 
conduit providers is the transfer of information.226 The immunity in Art.13 is provided 
for an automatic, intermediate and a temporary storage of the information performed for 
the sole purpose of making the information's onward transmission more efficient to other 
recipients of the service upon their request. Proxy-servers, ‘which store[s] local copies 
of websites to speed up the subsequent consultation of this website by other customers’ 
are the best instances of caching intermediaries. 227  These were in fact the specific type 
of intermediaries that the legislators had in mind for the protection provided in Art.13.228  
Five conditions are set out for qualifying the immunity pertaining to the intermediaries’ 
caching activities. As stated, the immunity conditions serve the purpose of distinguishing 
                                                 
226 Citing from Angelopoulos, ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  A Tort- Based Analysis’, 
(2016), fn.330. 
227 Patrick Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’, (2011) 
Common Market Law Review 48 1455-1502, 1462. 
228 EU Study on ‘the Legal Analysis of a Single Market for the Information Society’ (2009), 6.4.3. 
73 
 
a passive intermediary from an active one. With respect to the conditions stated under 
Art.13, different levels of passivity are presented for caching activities than the levels 
set out for mere conduit intermediaries. Indeed, especially Art.13(1)(e) leads 
intermediaries to be more involved in their services as it requires an intermediary to 
‘act[s] expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information it has stored upon 
obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the 
transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or 
that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement’. 
Thus, intermediary must act accordingly whenever these conditions occur its 
involvement in the storage of the information is justified to some extent.  
Finally, the Article restates the general principle of the immunity regime which stipulates 
that immunity from liability does not prevent the application of injunctive relief.  
Overall, in terms of the explicitness of the Article, it would be difficult to offer any 
conclusive statement for further clarification on its application to different and new 
generation technologies since the Article is rarely brought before the CJEU. Its 
applicability on Usenet newsgroups type of services had been questioned but has not 
brought before the court as legal issue.229 Moreover, these intermediaries seem to have 
lost their practical importance against hosting intermediaries.  
 
 
 
 
c) Hosting  
 
 
Art.14(1) and (2) reads: 
 “1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States 
shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored 
at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that: 
                                                 
229 This has been arisen as a concern in the EU study but other than this, it does not seem to have been 
questioned. See Ibid, Chapter 6.4.3. 
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(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or 
information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or 
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts 
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information. 
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting 
under the authority or the control of the provider.” 
 
As it is evident from the title of the Article, this provision deals with the hosting activities 
of intermediaries. The ‘hosting’ notion was described in the proposal of the Directive230 
as ‘the activity of storage of information provided by recipients of the service and at their 
request’ with the examples of the provision of server space for a company's or an 
individual's web site, a BBS231, a news group etc. The storage of the data is here provided 
for an unlimited amount of time.232 Article describes the hosting as a service which 
‘consists of’ the storage of information. Although the intention was to distinguish mere 
hosting providers from content providers, which are involves in the creation of the 
content, this phrase actually leads to issues in application with the arrival of the new 
generation technologies: Web 2.0 and cloud computing.233 This is because these new 
technologies’ services go beyond the storage: Web 2.0 technologies depend on mass 
collaboration and user participation234 while cloud computing offers storage but in a 
different to the traditional way235. Thus, the delineation of the exact borders of ‘consist 
                                                 
230 Commission, ‘Proposal on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market, COM 
(1998) 586 final, p.29. 
231 ‘Bulletin board system, or BBS, is a computer server running software that allows users to connect to 
the system using a terminal program. Once logged in, the user can perform functions such 
as uploading and downloading software and data, reading news and bulletins, and exchanging messages 
with other users through email, public message boards, and sometimes via direct chatting.’ Wikipedia, 
<<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulletin_board_system>>. 
232 This is where the hosting providers differs from the other service providers in the ECD. Indeed, it should 
be noted that, the activities of caching provide a kind of storage for the data but for a very limited time in 
conjunction with the main purpose of the transmission of the data.  
233 ‘a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (eg networks, servers, storages, applications, and services) that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.’ American 
National Institute of Standard and Technology Available at < http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/Cloud-
computing/>. Also See Georg Haibach, ‘Cloud Computing and EU Private International Law’ (2015) 
Journal of Private International Law 11(2) 252-266, 252-255. For general analysis See Christopher Millard 
Cloud Computing Law (Oxford University Press 2013). 
234 Such as blogs, wikis, user review websites, video/photo sharing websites, etc. Van Eecke, ‘Online 
Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’ (2011), 1474; Adeyemi, ‘Liability and 
exemptions of internet service providers (ISPS): assessing the EU electronic commerce legal regime’ 
(2018), 10. 
235 ‘In a cloud computing data model, users minimize the amount of data they store on their own computers, 
and instead rely on the storage and processing power of service providers.’ Van Eecke, ‘Online Service 
Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’ (2011), 1474. 
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of’ notion becomes important in assessing the application of the immunity to the new 
technologies which offer different services. Therefore, the question must be: ‘to what 
extent does a service have to ‘consist of” storage?’236 
 
 
 
(1) ‘Consist of’ 
 
Fortunately, the CJEU was asked to answer ‘to what extent does a service have to ‘consist 
of” storage?’. Google France237 was the first referral to the CJEU which considered this, 
although it was also previously an issue before some national courts. With regard to these 
domestic proceedings, however, there were divergent outcomes on the matter, even when 
pertaining to the same service provider, namely Ebay. In those cases, the national courts 
assessed the immunity of Ebay either only considering the service at stake or Ebay as 
general ie taking all auction-related services given by Ebay such as rating systems, 
payment facilities and advertisement tools. 
 
 In 2008, a French court decided that Ebay could not benefit from the hosting immunity 
provided under Art.14 on the ground that activities offered by Ebay were not limited to 
mere hosting activities.238 The same assessment was applied in another French case 
brought against Ebay,239 as well. In contrast, a Belgian court240 assessed the immunity 
provision by only considering the activity at stake. Accordingly, immunity was granted 
to Ebay with respect to the provision of an appropriate platform to sellers and buyers. It 
                                                 
236 Walden considers this as a key boundary issue of immunity regime. See Ian Walden, ‘Mine host is 
searching for a ‘neutrality’ principle!’ (2010) Computer Law & Security Review 26 203-209, 204. 
237 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417.. 
238 Société Hermes International v SA eBay France, Troyes, June 4, 2008, Case No. 06/02604, Slip Op. 
(Fr.) (Citing from Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’ 
(2011), 1471.) 
239 Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v eBay Inc, Unreported June 30, 2008 (Trib Comm (Paris)) citing from Ellie 
Mercado, ‘As Long As “It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay Liable for Secondary Trademark 
Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany Inc.’ (2010-2011) 28 Cardazo Arts& Entertainment Law 
Journal, 115-129 and Andreas Rühmkorf,’The Liability of Online Auction Portals: Toward a Uniform 
Approach’ (2010) Journal of Internet Law 14(4), 3-10 5. 
240 Lancome Parfums et Beatue &Cie v eBay International AG, eBay Europe SARL (Belgium, Comm. 
Bruxelles) May 28, 2008 citing from and Rühmkorf,’The Liability of Online Auction Portals: Toward a 
Uniform Approach’ (2010), 5 and from Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a 
Balanced Approach’, (2011), 1471. 
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was stated that the listings were uploaded by the sellers so Ebay performed a mere hosting 
activity in this service, although several types of activities were also offered by Ebay. In 
the same vein, a German court241 held that the provider should benefit from immunity 
unless ‘the third-party content appears to be the provider’s own content’242 when 
considering an Ebay-like online auction provider operating in Germany.  
 
Given the diversity of the interpretation on the consist of standard, the CJEU’s appraisal 
in Google France was expected to bring clarification on the issue. Specifically, the CJEU 
was asked whether the paid referencing service, Adwords offered by Google could be 
regarded as a hosting activity under Art.14. This service basically enabled users to 
purchase keywords provided by the system and these keywords are displayed in the 
results in response to an appropriate search query. Therefore, this service covers various 
activities as ‘the automated generation of suggested keywords; the commercial 
communication and site links prepared by the advertiser for storage by Google, and the 
subsequent display of the advert in response to the search query, which involves a 
transmission of data’.243 
 
The AG, in his assessment, agreed with the idea that the liability rules should be assessed 
considering the specific activity at issue since the intermediaries’ activities would rarely 
appear as merely technical.244 In that sense, he stated that Adwords nominally meets the 
standard of ‘consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service’ 
of Art.14.245 Nevertheless, he eventually concluded that advertising activity involved in 
Adwords system did not qualify under the conditions of being a hosting activity on the 
ground that this service ‘is no longer a neutral information vehicle: Google has a direct 
interest in internet users clicking on the ads’ links…’.246  
The CJEU, however, left these assessments to national courts to make but provided the 
following test for the assessment of intermediaries’ involvement: ‘whether the role played 
by that service provider is neutral, in the sense that its conduct is merely technical, 
                                                 
241 I ZR 304/01, 11 March 2004 (Internet- Versteigerung I) (Ger), 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng).  
242Rühmkorf,’The Liability of Online Auction Portals: Toward a Uniform Approach’ (2010); Van Eecke, 
‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’, (2011), 1470. 
243 Walden, ‘Mine host is searching for a ‘neutrality’ principle!’ (2010), 206. 
244 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417, Opinion of AG Poiares 
Maduro, para 140. 
245 Ibid, para 138. 
246 Ibid, paras 144-146. The AG reached that conclusion by comparing two different elements performed 
by Google; search engine and paid referencing system, AdWords.  
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automatic and passive, pointing to a lack of knowledge or control of the data which it 
stores.’247 It also underlined that keywords are content-neutral systems and they are 
lawful and legitimate as search engines. 248  
 
In that respect, the CJEU established the test for assessment of immunity but it failed to 
provide further clarification on how ‘consist of’ should be construed when an 
intermediary’s activity appears to be more than storage. As such, this question remains a 
boundary issue for Internet intermediaries. On the other hand, the AG’s opinion 
suggesting that the specific activity at issue should be considered in the examination of 
consist of appears sensible.  
 
 
(2) Prerequisites of Hosting Exemption 
 
Art.14 is where the debate is focused, not only because of the emergence of new 
technologies that mostly offer hosting services but also because of the existing 
ambiguities over the application of the requirements which have already resulted in the 
struggle to apply the rules to these complex technologies.  
 
In short, Art.14 requires from the provider not to have an actual knowledge or awareness 
as to the illegal activity or information, or to act immediately to remove or disable access 
to information if it obtains such knowledge or awareness in order to qualify for the 
immunity. Hence, the immunity is possible on two grounds: 1) the hosting provider 
should not have knowledge or awareness as to the infringing content, 2) or even if it has 
it should act expeditiously and accordingly to remove or block access to the infringing 
content.  
 
These requirements aim to distinguish actively involved hosting providers from others as 
the immunity is provided to intermediaries whose operations remain passive in the 
provision of the service. Art.14, however, establishes a different threshold for hosting 
providers than for operators of mere conduit or caching activities in order to be granted 
                                                 
247 Ibid, paras 109-120. 
248 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417, para 110. 
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immunity. More precisely, subsection (b) stipulates that a hosting intermediary can 
benefit from immunity even if it obtains actual knowledge or awareness provided that it 
acts instantly to remove or disable the access to illegal activity or information. 
Considering hosting intermediaries’ operations, permitting their involvement in their 
services to a certain degree does not mean giving them the opportunity to become actively 
involved in their users’ activities. Rather, it gives them the ability to provide their services 
properly as the hosting intermediaries’ way of working requires involvement to some 
extent. This is also why the knowledge threshold is determined as a requirement for 
immunity.   
 
Nevertheless, application of these standards has appeared as an issue in terms of the exact 
boundaries of the requirements, especially the knowledge standard. As such, it has not 
been clearly determined by the legislators when the duty to act is triggered. Furthermore, 
assessing the knowledge of an intermediary is rather challenging given the Internet’s 
infrastructure. These all put the Article at the centre of the doctrinal discussion. L’Oréal 
v Ebay249 was the first case the CJEU was confronted with on this matter. This case also 
has significance in the trade mark realm as it dealt with trade mark infringement.   
 
This case was a referral from the English High Court. To recap the related facts of the 
case, Loreal as an owner of trade marks claimed Ebay’s contributory liability for the 
infringements that its users committed by selling counterfeit products bearing the Loreal 
trade mark. It should be stated here that this was not the only question before the court. 
Loreal also claimed Ebay’s primary liability from the selling of unauthorised Loreal 
products, selling of the products were not intended to sale in the EU and selling of the 
products did not have its packaging. Moreover, it was claimed that Ebay was also directly 
liable from the use of the keywords corresponding Loreal’s trade marks in the listings of 
the infringing products as it enabled its users to optimise the presentation of their listings 
and to use such keywords. However, it was held that such use did not amount to a use 
within the meaning of the applicable Directives.250  
 
                                                 
249 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
250 Trade Mark Directive 89/104 and the Trade Mark Regulation 40/94. For the analysis of the CJEU, See 
Ibid, paras 98-105. 
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With regard to the application of the requirements of Art.14, the High Court referred the 
following questions to the CJEU for further guidance: Does the service provided by an 
operator of an online marketplace fall within the meaning of hosting, and, if so, under 
what circumstances can an online marketplace be regarded as having an awareness of the 
illegality?251  
 
For the first part of the referred question, the CJEU held that online auction providers are 
ISSPs under Art.2(a) of the ECD and therefore are in the scope of the Directive. In 
assessing whether Ebay was hosting provider, however, the Court stated that Ebay’s 
service ‘includes the storage of information transmitted to it by its customer-sellers is not 
in itself a sufficient ground for concluding that that service falls, in all situations, within 
the scope of Article 14(1) of Directive 2000/31’.252 It was further stated that a hosting 
intermediary cannot benefit from the immunity provided in Art.14, where this 
intermediary ‘instead of confining itself to providing that service neutrally by a merely 
technical and automatic processing of the data provided by its customers, plays an active 
role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or control over, those data’.253 Reading in 
reverse, the CJEU indicates that a hosting intermediary qualifies for the immunity 
provided in Art.14 if it does not play an active role which would give the control of the 
data stored or result in having knowledge. After underlining that, the Court stated that the 
assessment of whether the intermediary in question plays such an active or passive role 
in relation to the service at stake is left for the national courts to undertake.254 Specifically, 
on the case, the CJEU pointed out that the English Court should consider every different 
service of Ebay separately (ie providing a platform for sales on its server and providing 
assistance in the promotion of offers with sponsored links) in applying the above test.  
                                                 
251 Those questions were specified as follows in the judgment: ‘(a) does such use consist of or include the 
storage of information provided by a recipient of the service" within the meaning of Art.14(1) of the E-
Commerce Directive? (b) if the use does not consist exclusively of activities falling within the scope of 
Art.14(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, but includes such activities, is the operator of the online 
marketplace exempted from liability to the extent that the use consists of such activities and if so may 
damages or other financial remedies be granted in respect of such use to the extent that it is not exempted 
from liability? (c) in circumstances where the operator of the online marketplace has knowledge that goods 
have been advertised, offered for sale and sold on its website in infringement of registered trade marks, 
and that infringements of such registered trade marks are likely to continue to occur through the 
advertisement, offer for sale and sale of the same or similar goods by the same or different users of the 
website, does this constitute “actual knowledge" or “awareness" within the meaning of Art.14(1) of the E-
Commerce Directive'?’. 
252 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, paras 109-117. 
253 Ibid, para 113. 
254 Ibid, para 117. 
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In the light of this, attention should be paid to the rather new test stated in this case. This, 
however should be assessed together with the CJEU’s previous holding in Google 
France255 as this was the case where the Court firstly set out the applicable test which 
was basis on the neutrality of an intermediary.  
 
In L’Oréal v Ebay, the CJEU did not discuss the neutrality standard as applied in Google 
France. However, the AG Jääskinen discussed the neutrality test in his opinion in L’Oréal 
v Ebay. Accordingly, he refused to apply this standard by arguing that it would not be 
quite the right test for the hosting intermediaries given that hosting intermediaries would 
almost necessarily have some degree of involvement in the provision of their services.256 
As such, according to the AG, expecting the hosting intermediary to be neutral would not 
be realistic in practice given their way of working. The AG astutely pinpointed the 
wording of the Recital 42 as the basis of the problem. In its opinion, he stated that the 
neutral role of the intermediary specified in Recital 42 should be understood as covering 
only mere conduit and caching services but not hosting services. Indeed, as previously 
stated, Art.14 permits a hosting provider to be more actively involved to be exempted 
from liability if it acts under its duty to remove the illegal content after obtaining the 
actual knowledge or awareness. This arguably justifies the opinion of the AG presented 
in L’Oréal v Ebay. Unfortunately, the CJEU in L’Oréal v Ebay did not discuss the 
neutrality standard it set out in Google France. In that respect, this new additional 
standard of an active role, as was plausibly stated by Van Eecke,257 can be considered as 
the conversion of the neutrality standard into the knowledge standard. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the neutrality of the hosting service providers should not be understood 
and interpreted as being completely passive in performing the services provided.  
 
Along with this test, the CJEU also examined the requirements of actual knowledge and 
awareness. However, before providing its appraisal on that matter, one point should be 
clarified. Art.14(1)(a) states ‘the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal 
                                                 
255 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417, Opinion of AG Poiares 
Maduro,  para 146. 
256 ‘For example, when offering a website on which users can upload and store their personal photos or 
videos, the website operator must make available some tools to allow users to upload, categorize and 
display the information.’ (Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced 
Approach’ (2011),1483.)  
257 Ibid, 1483.  
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activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent’. The Article 
clearly mentions both actual knowledge and awareness as a required knowledge standard. 
However, actual knowledge and awareness indicates a different level of understanding. 
Yet, the Directive does not provide the required clarification about which is the 
appropriate test for which type of liability. Therefore, light should be cast on the issue. It 
appears from its wording that awareness would be the appropriate level of knowledge for 
civil liability whereas actual knowledge appears appropriate for criminal liability. Indeed, 
even though the ECD provides rules for monetary relief for both civil and criminal 
liability of the intermediaries, the wording of the Art.14(1)(a) suggests that, regarding 
claims for damages, awareness is the appropriate test to be applied. 258  In fact, this was 
confirmed by the CJEU in L’Oréal v Ebay as the Court considered the awareness as 
threshold.259 Therefore, for civil liability the knowledge standard is established at a lower 
standard: awareness. Thus, for trade mark issues, awareness is the required level of 
knowledge for an intermediary to act in order to benefit from immunity unless it amounts 
to a criminal activity. The application of the awareness standard is therefore significant 
for the intermediaries in practice. This is because it specifies the time that an intermediary 
would be under a duty to act. After obtaining awareness, an intermediary would be under 
a duty to act expeditiously. An intermediary may immediately takedown the content 
which it is alleged to be infringing even if it is not convinced of the infringing nature of 
the content. Otherwise, it may lose the immunity if the claim is valid. Obtaining 
awareness is thus key for the immunity, but how should it be assessed? 
 
The awareness standard is mostly used interchangeably with constructive knowledge in 
the doctrine. Briefly, constructive knowledge is a tort law criterion for the assessment of 
negligence in a fault liability. The question of whether the defendant obtains constructive 
knowledge mainly depends upon the ‘reasonable person’ test, although the underlying 
principles of tort law are fragmented amongst national laws of the MSs. This test basically 
                                                 
258 This was also explained in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and 
Council Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market COM (1998) 586 
final, 18 November 1998. (‘The exemption from liability, as regards claims for damages, cannot be granted 
if the service provider is aware of facts and circumstances from which the illegal activity is apparent.’). 
See also Peguera, ‘The DMCA Safe Harbours and their European Counterparts: A Comparative Analysis 
of some Common Problems’ (2009), 488. (‘The E-Commerce Directive, however, exempts providers from 
both civil and criminal liability, and sets forth two different knowledge requirements, one applicable to the 
criminal liability and the other to claims for damages.’).  
259 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 119. 
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asks the question: What would a reasonable person of ordinary prudence have done under 
the same or similar circumstances?260 However, it should be borne in mind that, this test 
was traditionally established in tort law for wrongdoings occurring in the offline world, 
thus it might not necessarily provide answers for infringing activities committed online.  
 
At EU level, the CJEU fortunately offered guidance in L’Oréal v Ebay for the assessment 
of awareness. It was held that the question as to whether the intermediary is aware of facts 
or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent should be 
evaluated on the basis of ‘a diligent economic operator should have identified the 
illegality in question and acted in accordance with Article 14 (1) (b)…’261 with respect to 
‘every situation in which the provider concerned becomes aware, in one way or another, 
of such facts or circumstances’262. Along with this test, the CJEU indicated some 
circumstances that should be considered when applying it. These situations were stated 
as covering those ‘in which the operator of an online marketplace uncovers, as the result 
of an investigation undertaken on its own initiative, an illegal activity or illegal 
information, as well as a situation in which the operator is notified of the existence of 
such an activity or such information’.263 For the second part of the sentence, more 
explanation was provided. It was stated that the notification element should be taken into 
consideration by the courts in the assessment of the possession of awareness. However, 
it was noted that the notification does not necessarily mean that the intermediary is 
automatically precluded from immunity as it can be ‘insufficiently precise or 
inadequately substantiated’.264 Therefore, as Angelopoulos265 observes, the CJEU 
seemed to refuse to apply the strict interpretation of the awareness standard which 
suggests that the required level of knowledge can only be possessed through a court 
order.266 This also underlines the necessity of having a clearly and exclusively established 
                                                 
260 Beatrice Martinet Ferano, ‘Internet Intermediaries’ Liability for Copyright and Trademark Infringement: 
Reconciling the EU and US Approaches’ (2012) TTLF Working Paper No:14, 45. 
261 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 120. 
262 Ibid, para 121. 
263 Ibid, para 122. 
264 Ibid. 
265 Angelopoulos, ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  A Tort- Based Analysis’ (2016), 52-54. 
266 In the doctrine, ‘there are three interpretations that are given on how actual knowledge can be obtained: 
1. An intermediary can only obtain actual knowledge through a court order; 2.An intermediary can only 
obtain actual knowledge through a notice (ranging from an 'informal' notice from a user, such as a red flag 
under a video, to a court order); 3. An intermediary can obtain knowledge even in the absence of a notice 
if it, for instance, has a "general awareness" that its site hosts illegal information.’ See Commission Staff 
Working Document, Online Services, Including e- Commerce, in the Single Market Accompanying the 
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notice system perhaps as established in the US’s DMCA. However, this will be examined 
later.  
 
Ultimately, it can be said that, despite the further guidance provided on the awareness 
standard in this case, the judgment still appears to have failed to offer the required 
uniformity for the MSs as to the application of the standard. The diligent economic 
operator standard in fact remains open to the different interpretations since the test 
appears to amount to the reasonable person test which most likely evolved differently in 
the national tort laws of the MSs. This may lead to fragmented applications in defining 
the notion of the diligence within the different MSs.267 Moreover, the CJEU’s acceptance 
of the intermediaries’ own investigation pertaining to illegal material may also result in 
unharmonious applications. Permitting their own investigations could also legitimise 
intermediaries’ discretionary power. This might also result in unpredictable and different 
applications and jeopardise the fair balance between the fundamental rights.  
 
Besides, how can an awareness be assessed when the infringing activity gives rise to a 
trade mark infringement? Furthermore, how can the diligent economic operator standard 
be applied to trade marks? Taking Ebay and counterfeit selling on this platform as an 
example, application of the diligent economic operator standard appears to be somewhat 
deficient for assessing Ebay’s awareness. This is because the identification of a 
counterfeit good requires some level of expertise as to the brand. Indeed, unless the users 
choose the words which expressly explains the counterfeit nature of the good such as 
replica or unless the infringing nature is obvious, it would be very challenging for Ebay 
to identify the goods’ genuineness since it does not have the expertise to make this 
assessment, nor does it have the physical possession. In those, circumstances how much 
diligence should be expected from Ebay? Thus, what should be understood by diligent 
economic operator requires further guidance from the Court with respect to trade marks.  
 
Even if the uniform application of the awareness standard occurs, the Article remains 
unclear as to the second requirement. As stated Art.14(1)(b) requires the intermediary to 
                                                 
document Communication on ‘A coherent framework to boost confidence in the Digital Single Market of 
e-commerce and other online services’ SEC (2011) 1641 final, p 33. 
267 Synodinou states that the not having a uniform understanding of the term diligence would most likely 
bring non-harmonised interpretations within the EU. Synodinou, ‘Intermediaries Liability for Online 
Copyright Infringement in the EU: Evolutions and Confusions’ (2015), 66. 
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act instantly to eliminate the illegality of the content as soon as it obtains the awareness 
of this illegality in order to qualify for immunity from liability. This requirement is also 
stated for caching activities of service providers under Art. 13(1)(e),268 but this must be 
distinguished from the act of take down required within Art.14.The difference lies at the 
time of the take down obligation. A caching intermediary takes down a material which is 
already removed from its original source whereas hosting intermediaries removes the 
content which is available in its platform. Nevertheless, neither Art.13, nor Art.14 
provides further understanding on the application of this notice or NTD system in general. 
Moreover, with Recital 46, the principles and requirements for the application of the NTD 
system are left to the MSs to establish269 without providing any guidance on the 
significant elements of the system such as the conditions and time frame.270 It is only 
stated that the fundamental rights at stake should be considered in the application. In that 
regard, the divergent approaches amongst the MSs are not only unavoidable but also a 
significant obstacle for the DSM. 
 
Moreover, delineation of expeditiousness would also be significant for trade marks when 
an intermediary receives a notice for the infringing content and it appears that the trade 
mark specific consideration is required. This is because expeditiousness is not only 
related to the harmonisation issue, but also pertinent to the protection of the fundamental 
rights. If a reasonable time is not given to an intermediary to act, under the pressure of 
losing its immunity the intermediary would most likely act immediately without assessing 
the genuineness of the notice or the infringing nature of the content. If the content taken 
down is not infringing, then liability for such false takedown would give rise to 
intermediaries’ liability as well as a violation on the right to freedom of information of 
content provider. Thus, defining the time by means of expeditiousness would mean 
                                                 
268 It is required to act ‘upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source 
of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court 
or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement’. 
269 Recital 40 ‘…this Directive should constitute the appropriate basis for the development of rapid and 
reliable procedures for removing and disabling access to illegal information; such mechanisms could be 
developed on the basis of voluntary agreements between all parties concerned and should be encouraged 
by Member States; it is in the interest of all parties involved in the provision of information society services 
to adopt and implement such procedures…’. 
270 Those existing issues are stated as following in the Commission Staff Working Paper: ‘the requirements 
for notice; the possibility of a defence for providers of information; the timeframe; liability for providing 
wrongful notices or for taking down or blocking legal content; private operators assessing the legality of 
information ;the need for NTD procedures to complement other policies’. See Commission Staff Working 
Paper on ‘Online Services, Including E-Commerce, in the Single Market’ SEC (2011) 1641 final, p 43-46. 
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further harmonisation as well as further protection of rights online. Yet, for trade marks 
this would be done by paying specific attention to the occurrence and the specifics of the 
trade marks as the identification of a trade mark infringement requires expertise to some 
extent.  
 
 
3. Article 15: The Prohibition of General Monitoring Obligation 
 
Last but not least, the ECD with Art.15 sets an important general principle applicable to 
the immunity regime. According to this Article, MSs are explicitly prohibited from 
‘impos[ing] a general obligation on providers, when providing services covered by 
Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a 
general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity’. 
Recital 47 further states ‘monitoring obligations in a specific case, and in particular … 
the orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation’ do not amount 
a general monitoring under Art.15. Hence, intermediaries can have monitoring 
obligations imposed on them concerning a specific case while general monitoring 
obligations are prohibited. 
 
With respect to its wording, the Article seems straightforward. However, in practice, 
application of this Article appears challenging since the scope of this principle, especially 
the question of what exactly a specific monitoring obligation could be, is not explicitly 
addressed in the Directive. Indeed, the foremost issue underlying this provision is the 
vagueness of the terms general and specific monitoring.     
 
For further clarification of ‘specific monitoring obligation’, the Explanatory 
Memorandum hardly sheds any light on the meaning of the term. It only states that the 
order issued by a court or law enforcement consisting of ‘monitor obligation of a specific 
site during a given period of time, in order to prevent or fighting specific illegal 
activity’271 would not prejudice Art.15. However, this attempt to provide further guidance 
remains hypothetical as the issue is case specific. Angelopoulos272 exemplifies this with 
                                                 
271 Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain 
legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal market COM (1998) 586 final, 30. 
272 Angelopoulos, ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  A Tort- Based Analysis’ (2016), 67. 
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a potential scenario. She states that a monitoring obligation issued against a single 
suspected infringer of a blog would qualify the specific site notion whereas it would be 
difficult to say that it is a specific obligation when it is applied to an entire social 
networking site despite it being directed at that specific site. The framework of specific 
obligation therefore still requires further guidance. However, the explanation given in the 
Explanatory Memorandum can be construed together with the following suggestion given 
in the doctrine to provide a clarity to some extent: ‘[m]onitoring is ‘general’ when it is a 
systematic arrangement requiring random or universal inspection, rather than relating 
to individual notified instances…’.273 Frosio,274 however suggests following test to be 
applied in distinguish the general monitoring obligation from a specific one:  ‘(1) as an 
exception, specific monitoring obligations must be interpreted narrowly, (2) both the 
scope of the possible infringements and the amount of infringements that can be 
reasonably expected to be identified must be sufficiently narrow, and (3) it must be 
obvious which materials constitute an infringement.’. 
 
On the other hand, implementation of Art.15 relating to future infringements is another 
challenging issue that arises from this Article. The CJEU also considered this matter in 
L’Oréal v Ebay. It must be noted that the CJEU in this case was asked to decide the issue 
regarding the injunction at stake and accordingly the application of Art.11 of the ED.275 
Indeed, this Directive is directly related to the intermediary liability debate. As is stated, 
the ECD does not affect the implementation of the injunctions of different kinds that 
target the termination or prevention of any infringement.276 The ED applies for the 
enforcement of IP rights277 and provides a framework for the application of such 
injunctive reliefs undertaken by Internet intermediaries. Therefore, principles provided 
both in the ECD and ED should be considered and applied together in relation to IP rights 
which includes trade marks.  
 
Reverting to L’Oréal v Ebay, the CJEU, on the question of the applicability of injunctions 
to prevent future infringements, held ‘[t]he measures required of the online service 
                                                 
273 Ibid.  
274 Giancarlo F. Frosio, ‘Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital 
Single Market Strategy’ (2017) Northwestern University Law Review, 112:251 20-45, 40. 
275 This directive is in application for the all intellectual property rights. 
276 See Chapter 3. 
277 With respect to the copyrights, however, the Infosoc Directive 2001/29 is applicable.  
87 
 
provider concerned cannot consist in an active monitoring of all the data of each of its 
customers in order to prevent any future infringement of intellectual property rights via 
that provider’s website.’278 With that decision, the implementation of the measures in 
preventing future infringements was held to be applicable without providing more 
guidance as to the framework of these measures.279 The scope of these measures was only 
confined within the conditions provided by the ED such as proportionality, fairness and 
affordability. Nevertheless, the precise borders of the general or specific monitoring still 
remain uncertain, even after the CJEU’s appraisal on the matter. On the other hand, it 
should be pointed that this test heavily depends on the facts of the case. Yet, it can still 
be said that the domestic courts, at the very least, seem to have been given some guidance 
on the required principles of the general monitoring obligation and the question of what 
those measures should not consist of. However, conclusion should only be drawn after 
examining the ED.  
 
Finally, Art.15(2) enables MSs to impose measures on intermediaries: 
 
 “[to] promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal 
activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or 
obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, 
information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom 
they have strong agreements.”280 
 
However, the CJEU’s decision in Promusicae v Telefónica281 confirmed that this cannot 
be interpreted as to ‘require the Member States to lay down, in order to ensure effective 
protection of copyright, an obligation to communicate personal data in the context of civil 
proceedings’.  
 
 
B. The Enforcement Directive 2004/48 (ED) 
 
                                                 
278 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 139. 
279 For detailed analysis See Headdon ‘Beyond Liability: on the availability and the scope of injunctions 
against online intermediaries after L’oreal v Ebay’ (2012). 
280 Brackets added. 
281 C-275/06 Promusicae v Telefónica [2008] ECR I-271, paras 58-59 
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The ED282 aims to provide effective protection for IP rights other than copyright, as the 
InfoSoc Directive seeks to apply these rights.283 It therefore establishes a harmonised set 
of rules for the enforcement of these rights. Accordingly, it appears directly related to the 
intermediaries’ liability regime. As stated, the ECD permits the imposition of injunction 
orders on intermediaries, regardless of the question of their liability, for the purpose of 
the termination or prevention of any infringement. The third sentence of Art.11 enables 
right holders ‘to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used 
by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right’. This has become one of the 
component elements of the intermediaries’ debate.  
 
The core rationale underlying such measures is the best cost avoider principle which 
stems from property law.284 This principle essentially means that ‘the party that has or 
can develop measures to avoid the harm most cheaply’285 is the one who should 
implement the measures.286 The intermediaries in that sense appear to be the best vehicles 
to prevent the infringements occurring in their services and accordingly they have become 
the subject of the injunctions. However, this is not the end of the issue. There exist 
potential negative outcomes of such measures on the intermediaries. An intermediary’s 
operation may be put in jeopardy if the injunction imposes a heavy burden on the 
intermediary. More significantly, imposing the duty of implementing and applying an 
injunction on the intermediaries who are not the wrongdoer may may harm the balance 
required between the parties whose rights are affected by this order.  
 
Art.3(1) of the ED provides some rules to strike the correct balance in those cases. It states 
‘… those measures, procedures and remedies shall be fair and equitable and shall not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted 
                                                 
282 Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] 
OJ L 195/16. 
283 As noted above, there are other Directives that directly deal with the copyrights: InfoSoc Directive 
2001/29.  
284 Its objection and general principles See Martin Husovec ‘Much Ado about Little- Privately Litigated 
Internet Disconnection Injunctions’ (2015) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 46(1) 11-36; Folkert G Wilman ‘A decade of private enforcement of intellectual property rights under 
IPR Enforcement Directive 2004/48: where do we stand (and where might we go)?’ (2017) European Law 
Review 42(4) 509-531, 514. 
285 Martin Husovec, ‘Accountable, not Liable: Injunctions Against Intermediaries’(2016) TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2016-012 , (Draft), 21. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2773768>   
286 Although different interpretations have been given in the doctrine. See Ibid. 
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delay’. Further, Art.3(2) says that those measures ‘shall also be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive and shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the criterion of barrier 
to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards as against their abuse’. By virtue of this 
Article, then, the scope of the injunctions is limited by the principles of being fair, 
equitable, effective, proportionate, affordable and uncomplicated. However, where the 
application becomes uncertain is, despite the general principles provided in the Directive, 
in determination of the precise scope of the injunctions. This is because principles are 
provided as minimum standards and the specification of the conditions required as well 
as the assessment of these are left to the national courts of the MSs. 287 Therefore, the 
evaluation of the CJEU becomes significant for clarification and harmonious applications 
at EU level.  
 
As examined earlier, the CJEU’s case law has mostly centred on copyright claims given 
that Art.8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive provides the same right288 for copyright owners. 
Moreover, as concluded in Chapter 2, copyright law appears particularly for trade mark 
through an analogical application. As such, those cases are of utmost importance. 
However, as they were examined thoroughly in Chapter 2, they will not be examined in 
here. The examination will be limited to cases that deal with trade marks and the ED in 
general.  
 
In L’Oréal v Ebay, the CJEU assessed injunctive relief for trade mark infringement. For 
the principles to be applied to the injunctions, the Court restated the fact that the 
injunction orders must be fair and proportionate and not be excessively costly.289 It was 
further stated that this kind of order should not create barriers to legitimate trade and so 
‘cannot have as its object or effect a general and permanent prohibition on the selling, 
on that marketplace, of goods bearing those trade marks’.290 Finally, the fundamental 
rights were stated as the limitation of the applicability of the injunctions since the order 
must strike a fair balance between the competing interests of the subjects who are affected 
by such measures. It can therefore be stated that the CJEU did not actually provide further 
                                                 
287 The ED 2004/48, recital 23; the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29, recital 59. 
288 Except, this Article does not explicitly include the interlocutory injunctions while the ECD does include 
this. However, this does not affect the general principle that enables the right owners to request the 
injunctions against the third parties. See Matthias Leistner, ‘Structural Aspect of Secondary (Provider) 
Liability in Europe’ (2014) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 9 (1) 75-90,76. 
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290 Ibid, para 140. 
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understanding on the application of the principles to be applied to the injunctions. The 
principles given in the ED and ECD were restated.  
There exists another CJEU case which dealt with an injunction order granted against an 
intermediary for trade mark infringement: Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC and Others v 
Delta Center AS.291 However, this case was different to previous cases examined by the 
CJEU under the ED because in this case the injunction was not granted against an online 
intermediary. The operator of a physical marketplace was the subject of an injunction. 
The question before the CJEU was whether an operator of a physical marketplace can 
qualify as an intermediary under the third sentence of Art.11 ED. This is because in the 
national proceedings the plaintiffs who were the brand owners and manufacturers started 
a proceeding against a tenant of a marketplace who sublets the stalls where the counterfeit 
items were sold. Accordingly, they applied for an injunction order involving the 
termination of the rental contract.292  
In the light of its previous decisions, especially L’Oréal v Ebay, the CJEU decided ‘an 
operator which provides to third parties a service relating to the letting or subletting of 
pitches in a marketplace’ must be regarded as an intermediary within the meaning of the 
ED.293 The Court further stated: 
 
 “[t]he fact that the provision of sales points concerns an online marketplace 
or a physical marketplace such as market halls is irrelevant in that connection. 
It is not apparent from Directive 2004/48 that the scope of the directive is 
limited to electronic commerce.”294 
 
This case was thus the first CJEU case to apply the rules of the immunity regime to an 
offline context by way of an analogy, not the other way around as it has been done 
constantly. However, its’ significance within the injunction regime appears to be greater 
than that. The delineation of what type of injunctions can be imposed in the offline context 
is now with the national courts and this assessment is bound by the ED, ie the rules 
established for the online world. It is evident that the capabilities and facilities of online 
intermediaries differ from the capabilities of landlords in terms of injunctions. In that 
respect, the extent of which type of injunctions that a landlord could be subjected to is a 
                                                 
291 Case C- 494/15 Tommy Hilfiger Licensing LLC and Others v Delta Center A.S. (7 July 2016). 
292 Ibid, paras 12-14. 
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question that needs to be answered and unfortunately the CJEU did not provide 
clarification on this matter in its decision.295 This lack of clarity would therefore be 
another issue for the injunction regime in general. The impacts of the case on the 
injunctions regime thus remain to be seen.  
 
Turning to online issues, as aforementioned, the CJEU’s case on trade mark law appears 
to have focused on the question of an imposition of injunctions with respect to future 
infringements. In L’Oréal v Ebay,296  the Court was asked whether an injunction order 
requiring online marketplaces to take measures to prevent future infringements is 
applicable under Art.11 of ED and if so what those measures would be.297 In that regard, 
the CJEU firstly distinguished the wording of the injunction as used in the third and first 
sentence298 of Art.11. It was held that the term injunction in the third sentence could not 
be equated with the first sentence’s wording: ‘injunction aimed at prohibiting the 
continuation of the infringement’.299 Given that the third sentence did not mention such 
continuing infringements, it was then held that there was nothing to prevent the courts 
from applying the injunction to future infringements. It was further stated that the 
implementation of such measures would be consistent with both the objective of the ED 
which is the effective protection of IP rights, and Art.18 of the ECD which requires 
‘Member States to ensure that court actions available under their national law 
concerning information society services’ activities allow for the rapid adoption of 
measures designed to terminate any alleged infringement and to prevent any further 
impairment of the interests involved’.300  
However, the court failed to discuss the one of the most important question of whether 
the hosting provider is under the duty to prevent similar infringements occurring in the 
future if it obtains the knowledge on the same specific infringement, although this matter 
was considered by the AG in its opinion. The AG stated in his opinion that if an 
                                                 
295 See for the detailed analysis on the judgment Markus Hetch and Birgit Clark, ‘Landlord liability for IP 
infringements: CJEU holds that operators of physical marketplace are intermediaries under the Enforcement 
Directive in Tommy Hilfiger (C-494/15)’ (2016) European Intellectual Property Review 38(11) 703-707, 
705-707. 
296 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
297 Ibid, para 125. 
298 ‘Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an 
intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at 
prohibiting the continuation of the infringement.’. 
299 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, paras 128-130. 
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intermediary can be imposed a duty to apply and injunction in order to prevent the 
continuation of a specific act of infringement, then it can also be required to implement a 
measure to prevent of repetition of the same or a similar infringement in the future, yet 
the certainty on the scope of such measures should be provided.301 In that respect, he 
argued that the test of ‘double requirement of identity’ can be the appropriate limit for 
this scope.302 According to this, infringements of the same right committed by the same 
person would satisfy the double requirement of identity and an intermediary would be 
under a duty to prevent such infringements.303  Even though the CJEU did not discuss 
this matter, as Van-Eecke304  astutely stated, the principles given by it appear to limit the 
application of such injunctions to very specific situations as in the cases that the AG 
considered in his opinion  
At this point, it must be noted that, the doctrinal debate on the injunctions against future 
infringements overlaps to a great extent the German doctrine of Störerhaftung (interferer 
liability). Briefly, this doctrine establishes that injunctive relief can be imposed on any 
person who wilfully contributes to direct infringement, regardless of their immunity from 
liability,305 if the reasonable duty of care in preventing such direct infringement is 
violated. This property law based principle became significant for the intermediaries’ 
liability regime, not only for the German law, but also for the EU law when three 
renowned German cases, known as the Internet Auction cases,306 applied the doctrine in 
the context of the Internet. Indeed, as it will be examined later, Arnold J, in the domestic 
proceeding of the L’Oréal v Ebay307 expressed his support for this doctrine. Although 
these cases are to be examined later, it can be stated that the German Court affirmed the 
application of this type of injunctive relief in the online context against third parties 
regardless of their knowledge on the issue but depending upon the violation of the 
reasonable duty of care and covering future infringements. However, it must be borne in 
                                                 
301 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, opinion of AG Jääskinen, para 181. 
302 Ibid, para 182. 
303 Ibid. 
304 Van-Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’ (2011), 1478. 
305 As it was stated that the application of the injunctive relief does not prejudice to the Art.14(1) in the 
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mind that this doctrine does not cover claims for damages it only provides injunctive 
relief.  
Overall, the examination undertaken above proves one significant point; how germane 
the injunction regime is actually to the liability regime of the EU.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis in this Chapter was undertaken in pursuit of an answer to the question: ‘Is 
the EU law’s immunity regime the appropriate approach to deal with online 
infringements and establish a contributory trade mark liability regime online? More 
importantly, does this regime have the answers to the challenges that the Internet brings 
or may bring in the future?’ 
The analysis given here does not provide a comprehensive answer to the first question 
since the issue of liability is for the national courts to assess. Thus, the implementation of 
these rules within MSs should be examined for the complete answer. In a similar sense, 
establishing the law of online contributory trade mark liability would not be possible 
without examining domestic applications. On these grounds, the answers depend on the 
examination undertaken within the next chapter. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
general framework of liability cannot be determined at EU level.  
On EU law in general, some points can and should be made under the appraisal 
undertaken in this chapter. First and foremost, the immunity regime considers the nature 
and the way of working of intermediaries and so establishes the rules by taking into 
consideration the type of intermediary, although it does not adopt a right-specific 
approach. Moreover, in establishing the immunity regime it provides harmonisation 
despite the chapter eventually concluding that the harmonisation remains very limited.  
The first thing that can be pointed out in this regard is the scope of the notion of an 
intermediary. Although the ECD falls short in dealing with Web 2.0 technologies, as it 
was enacted before those technologies emerged, the CJEU’s elaboration provides 
assistance. It was decided that most of these technologies such as online web auction sites, 
social networking platforms and Adwords are within the meaning of intermediary. This 
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demonstrates that the rules are still working satisfactorily in assessing the applicability of 
new technologies to some extent.  
In addition, the ECD provides some general rules regarding the safe harbour principles 
which can provide uniformity. Although the controversy still continues on the application 
of Art.14, case law provides some insight on that matter. In L’Oréal v Ebay, the Court 
clarified that awareness is the appropriate level of knowledge required for civil law 
matters and provided some insight into the assessment of this requirement by stating the 
circumstances that cover the diligent economic operator standard. Furthermore, it 
stipulated the test for the assessment of the required passivity level of the hosting 
intermediary as whether a hosting intermediary ‘plays and active role of such a kind as 
to give it knowledge of, or control over’308 the data provided by its customers.   
Another principle that serves the purpose of harmonisation is Art.15 of the ECD which 
prohibits MSs from imposing a general obligation on providers but excludes the 
obligations of a specific nature. However, this Article again appears as a boundary issue 
for the EU liability regime, since the notion of specific remains hypothetical in the 
absence of further explanation by the Directive and CJEU. With respect to this principle, 
its application to future infringements is another issue related to the EU liability regime. 
Although the CJEU provided insight to some extent in L’Oréal v Ebay, its guidance did 
not go beyond stating that the measures can be applied to prevent future infringements 
provided that those measures comply with the conditions provided by the ED.   
In relation to this, injunctions are another general principle that should be stated under 
the EU liability regime. The ECD states the general principle that injunctions can be 
applied against intermediaries to prevent infringement. Accordingly, the ED creates 
uniform sets of rules for the enforcement of IP rights and enables right holders ‘to apply 
for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe’ IP rights in the third sentence of Art.11. According to this, the injunctions should 
be proportionate, effective, equitable, fair, affordable and uncomplicated, yet not limited 
to these principles. Despite that, providing uniformity for injunctive reliefs appears 
challenging because the conditions and the procedures of the injunctions are ultimately 
left to the MSs to decide. Accordingly, the framework of injunctions can be differently 
                                                 
308 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 113. 
95 
 
shaped in practice as long as they respect the minimum standards established by the 
CJEU. Indeed, as aforementioned Austrian law permits the courts to grant a generic 
order309 while this may not be permitted in another MSs.  
To conclude, despite the immunity regime provides some uniform rules for the liability 
regime, harmonisation appears limited. What seems to be lacking in that regard is further 
insight given by either EU legislator or the CJEU. They both appear to establish general 
principles as to the application of the rules, but those principles lack practicality as the 
national courts have not been guided on the exact boundaries of these principles and how 
they should apply. This is an issue with respect to trade marks as well. As demonstrated, 
the application of the principles requires trade mark specific consideration for more 
certain and effective application. However, the EU case law dealing with contributory 
liability is very limited. In that sense, determining the current law of online contributory 
trade mark liability does not go beyond stating the general EU immunity regime. This 
also requires examination of the national applications.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). 
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
The previous chapter concluded that assessing only the immunity regime would not be 
sufficient to determine the current law of online contributory liability, nor would it 
provide an answer to the question whether the approach undertaken within the EU is 
appropriate in dealing with the challenges that arise online. This is because the immunity 
regime is provided as an additional shield for intermediaries. Henceforth, not qualifying 
for the immunity would only mean the loss of this additional protection for an 
intermediary. It would not necessarily mean that the intermediary is liable. As a 
consequence, intermediary’s liability issue becomes subject to the laws of the MSs 
governing the matter which is mainly tort law. Therefore, it would not be wrong to state 
that the issue of contributory liability within the EU ultimately depends on each MS’s 
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governing law. Indeed, in L’Oréal v Ebay,310 the issue was regarded as ‘a matter of 
national law’ by the CJEU. 
In that sense, the EU’s liability regime appears to be similar to US law where it is the 
domestic tort law rules that govern the liability. However, in the EU, the courts are also 
bound to apply the immunity rules and the principles established under the EU acquis. 
Therefore, the chapter needs to answer the following questions: ‘How is the immunity 
regime applied at the national level?’ and ‘To what extent do these applications 
contribute to the harmonisation?’. In pursuit of answers, the development of contributory 
trade mark liability in the chosen MSs will be assessed. Then it will be demonstrated how 
those rules applied to the online context together with the safe harbour rules. The 
assessment will be limited to the domestic laws of England and Germany since they 
represent the two major legal traditions -respectively common law and civil law- and have 
a great impact on the law of the other MSs.311 The first to be examined is English law.  
 
II. ENGLAND 
 
A. Contributory Liability (Accessory Liability) 
 
The term of accessorial liability is employed under English law to describe the 
circumstances when the liability of an accessory for a wrong committed by another 
arises.312 Accessorial liability stems from common law doctrine and was established in 
criminal law under the principle that the liability may be imposed on those who ‘aid, abet, 
counsel or procure’313 to the primary offence committed by another. However, the 
doctrine is regarded as lacking clarity in criminal law and more importantly as being 
embryonic for civil law related issues, ie where the primary wrong is tort, breach of 
contract etc. This is because the principles have mostly been embodied under other forms 
                                                 
310 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011, para 55 
311 Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law, (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2013), para 102-2. 
312 In that sense, it corresponds the secondary liability terminology used in this work. But for the sake of 
the clarity of the work, it must be reminded that notion of the contributory liability in this work is referred 
for the circumstances dealing with the liability issue derives from the wrong committed by another as has 
been occurred in the trade mark cases.  
313 The Accessories and Abettor Act 1861, S.8. 
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of liability which may have different principles.314 The liability that arises from third-
party infringements concerning IP rights may best reflect this complexity since 
infringement of an IP right is a tort.315 Lord Sumption explains this in the following way: 
 
“In both England and the United States, the principles have been worked out 
mainly in the context of allegations of accessory liability for the tortious 
infringement of intellectual property rights. There is, however, nothing in 
these principles which is peculiar to the infringement of intellectual property 
rights. These cases depend on ordinary principles of the tort.”316 
 
Therefore, the tort law doctrine of joint tortfeasance317 applies to IP rights under English 
law. However, one point must be made here. Although the doctrine of joint tortfeasance 
is equally applicable to copyright as well as other IP rights, there exist a doctrine of 
authorisation that has been the mainly applied principle in dealing with an infringement 
of copyright. This rule is statutorily provided. Section 16(2) of the Copyrights, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) provides ‘(c)opyright in a work is infringed by a person 
who without the licence of the copyright owner does, or authorises another to do, any of 
the acts restricted by the copyright.’ Therefore, one who authorises another to infringe 
copyright will be liable for this infringement. The notion of authorisation and its 
implementation by the courts need to be examined in more detail. This will be done in the 
chapter where intermediaries’ liability is considered.318 As stated the doctrine of 
authorisation is only provided for copyright matters.319   
The joint tortfeasance doctrine is therefore applied to trade mark infringements. This 
doctrine embraces some elements of accessorial liability. However, the implementation 
of the principles of accessorial liability developed under criminal law to civil law has 
                                                 
314 Paul S. Davies ‘Accessory Liability: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights’ (2011) Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 4 390-409, 390. 
315“Infringement of a patent or copyright is a tort.” Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v Export Credits 
Guarantee Department [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19 (CA), [44].   
316 Fish & Fish Ltd. v Sea Shepherds UK [2015] UKSC 10; [2015] A.C. 1229, [40]. 
317 This doctrine applies unless there is specific statutory provision provided such as Patents Act 1977 S.60 
(2) or S.10 (5) of Trade Marks Act 1994. Under these provisions, the secondary liability is established 
mainly depending upon the knowledge requirement. 
318 However, for detailed examination on authorisation See Sir Richard Arnold and Paul S. Davies 
‘Accessory Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement: The Case of Authorisation’ (2017) Law 
Quarterly Review 133 (Jul) 442-468. 
319 However, Sir Richard Arnold and Paul S. Davies argue that there is nothing to prevent the application 
of the authorisation doctrine to the trade marks, designs and patent. Accordingly, they propose two options: 
either extending the authorisation applicable to all statutory IP rights, or removing authorisation from the 
copyright law. For comprehensive examination See Ibid. 
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been rejected by the courts. Yet, the applicability of these rules to IP matters has still been 
discussed in the doctrine. Hence, the accessorial liability as applied to criminal law should 
also be examined to provide a more comprehensive understanding of contributory trade 
mark liability in England. However, the joint tortfeasance doctrine shall be examined 
first.  
 
B. The Doctrine of Joint Tortfeasance 
 
Joint tortfeasance is described as the doctrine that ‘holds parties liable for the same harm 
where they are linked to the tort complained of by the plaintiff’ in the oft-cited article by 
Carty320. Joint tortfeasor is one of the subcategory of the concurrent tortfeasors other than 
the several concurrent tortfeasors which imposes a liability to persons whose separate 
tortious acts create a single damage.321 This would follow that joint tortfeasance imposes 
liability on persons whose tortious acts are linked and result in the same single damage.322 
This stipulates that joint tortfeasors are liable as if a principal wrongdoer. Dietrich, 
however, underlines ‘the fact that the joint tortfeasors are treated by the law as if they 
are principal tortfeasors does not alter the accessorial nature of the liability…” He adds 
“the preferable approach is specifically to identify, where such case is the case, liability 
that is based on the involvement of an accessory in a principal tortfeasor’s wrong.’.323   
 
Williams states that the following three circumstances give rise to the joint tortfeasance 
liability: ‘(a)where one is the principal of or vicariously responsible for the other, or (b) 
where a duty imposed jointly upon them is not performed, or (c) where there is a 
concerted action between them to a common end.’324 
 
The first category amounts to vicarious liability, as it is embraced in the US, in which the 
liability depends on the relationship between the tortfeasors such as the agent/principal 
or employer/employee relationship. According to this doctrine, the employer is liable for 
                                                 
320 Hazel Carty ‘Joint tortfeasance and assistance liability’ (1999) legal studies 19 489-514, 490. 
321 Glanville L. Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence (Steven & Sons Limited London 1951), 
1. 
322 Clerk &Lindsell on Torts, (21st ed. Sweet Maxwell 2014) 4.01-4.12, p. 295-302 
323 Joachim Dietrich ‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011) 31 Legal Studies 231-258, 233-234. 
324 Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence, 1. 
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the tort committed by his/her employee if this tortious act occurs within the course of the 
employment.325 The latter indicates the circumstances where the law imposes the duty on 
the parties. This type of liability is not pertinent to the research subject since English law 
does not impose any duty on intermediaries in that respect. Finally, the last category 
indicates the contributory liability which depends on the participation link between the 
parties and this is the legal ground to assess the intermediary’s liability in the IP cases. 
By virtue of the case law, three participation links are identified by Carty as being main 
links for the imposition of the liability.326 These are procurement, authorisation and 
combination.327  
 
1. Procurement 
 
Procurement was defined by the House of Lords (HL)328 as amounting to an inducement, 
incitement or persuasion in CBS Songs Ltd. v Amstrad Consumer Electronics Plc.329 
where copyright infringement was the issue before the Court. In this case, CBS as a 
copyright owner started the proceeding against Amstrad claiming that Amstrad authorised 
the infringements committed by its users and was joint infringer with these users. This 
was grounded on the fact that the hi-fi system manufactured and advertised by Amstrad 
allowed its users to record the content from pre-recorded cassettes on to blank tapes. 
Therefore, the fact that such system had a potential for infringing use by the users was 
the matter before the Court and the ground of the plaintiff’s joint tortfeasors’ liability 
claim.  
 
For the authorisation requirement as provided within the CDPA, it was claimed that there 
was an authorisation by Amstrad as the advertisement for the hi-fi system encouraged the 
user to make the recording despite the fact that it might amount to copyright 
                                                 
325. For its application in US law See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v Concession Services Inc.,955 F.2d 
1143 (7th Cir.1992). AT&T v Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 63 USLW 2382 (3d Cir. 
1994). Procter & Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 317 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2003). 
326 Carty ‘Joint tortfeasance and assistance liability’ (1999), 491. 
327 Ibid. It should however be noted here that the participation links as identified by Carty are the most 
commonly used ones. But, not all the academics are agreed on them. McBride and Bagshaw consider the 
possibility of “ratification” as another participation link. McBride & Bagshaw, Tort Law (5th ed, Pearson 
2015) 885.  
328 It has been transferred to a new body ‘Supreme Court’ by 1 October 2009.  
329 [1988] A.C. 1013, 1058. (CBS v Amstrad) 
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infringement.330 However, this claim was rejected by the HL.331 Assessment then turned 
to the joint liability claim where the Lords examined the participation links.  
 
Joint liability was claimed on the same ground, ie providing a hi-fi system which enabled 
users to record the content on to blank tape cassettes. Amstrad then asked the claim to be 
struck out and eventually had this argument accepted both at the Court of Appeal and HL. 
At the HL, Lord Templeman in his leading speech held that selling or advertising hi-fi 
technology to customers did not amount to a procurement to the possible infringement.332 
Having found no procurement, Lord Templeman relied on Buckley LJ’s observation in 
Belegging en Exploitatiemaatschappij Lavender B.V. v Witten Industrial Diamonds 
Ltd333 which stated ‘[f]acilitating the doing of an act is obviously different from procuring 
the doing of the act.’ He concluded ‘[g]enerally speaking, inducement, incitement or 
persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and must 
identifiably procure a particular infringement in order to make the defendant liable as a 
joint infringer.’334 It was evident from the present case ‘[t]he purchaser will not make 
unlawful copies because he has been induced or incited or persuaded to do so by Amstrad. 
The purchaser will make unlawful copies for his own use because he chooses to do so’.335 
 
This meant that mere assistance to a tort is insufficient to establish a participation link 
between the contributory tortfeasor and the tort committed. Accordingly, this does not 
give rise to joint tortfeasorship. This principle was later explicitly stated by Hobhouse LJ 
in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v Export Credit Guarantee Department 
(ECGD)336 with the following words:   
 
“…there is no second category (of aiding and abetting)337 in the law of tort. 
Mere assistance, even knowing assistance, does not suffice to make the 
‘secondary’ party jointly liable as a joint tortfeasor with the primary party.” 
 
                                                 
330‘The advertisement boasted that the model "now features 'hi-speed dubbing' enabling you to make 
duplicate recordings from one cassette to another, record direct from any source and then make a copy 
and you can even make a copy of your favourite cassette.’ And asterisked footnote stated ‘The recording 
and playback of certain material may only be possible by permission. Please refer to the Copyright Act 
1956, the Performers' Protection Acts 1958-1972.’ CB. v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013, 1051 
331 Ibid, 1045-1056.  
332 Ibid, 1058. 
333 [1979] F.S.R. 59, para 65. 
334 CBS v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013, 1058. 
335 Ibid, 1058. 
336[1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19, [46]. 
337 (Brackets inserted).  
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Hence, the application of the broader concept of assistance in criminal law is precluded 
by the authority.338 This is significant in terms of online infringements and intermediaries’ 
liability issue as even knowing assistance has been held insufficient in establishing the 
participation link necessary for joint tortfeasance. This is because under this principle 
holding an intermediary jointly liable appears to be impossible for an intermediary such 
as Ebay. Nevertheless, this will be examined later.  
 
 
2. Combination 
 
In The Koursk,339 the combination element was held by the Court of Appeal as sufficient 
to establish the participation link and therefore for the imposition of joint liability when 
Scrutton LJ found the following observation as the most appropriate view on joint 
liability: 
 
“Persons are said to be joint tortfeasors when their respective shares in the 
commission of the tort are done in furtherance of a common design (…) but 
mere similarity of design on the part of independent actors, causing 
independent damage, is not enough; there must be concerted action to a 
common end.”340 
 
Henceforth, holding a person liable as joint tortfeasor depends on finding that this person 
committed an infringement in concert with another pursuant to a common design in the 
infringement. Relying upon this, in CBS v Amstrad, a joint liability claim was also 
examined through the combination element. However, it was held that there was no 
common design, either.341  
 
Nevertheless, after CBS v Amstrad, Mustill LJ held in Unilever Plc. v Gilette (UK) Ltd 
that common design does not ‘call for any finding that the secondary party has explicitly 
mapped out a plan with the primary offender. The tacit agreement will be sufficient.’.342 
                                                 
338 It must be reminded that there were cases in which the accessorial liability in civil law was examined in 
a similar way to the criminal law. For instance: Petrie v Lamont [1841] Car & M 93, 96 (‘[a]ll persons in 
trespass who aid or counsel, direct, or join are joint trespassers.’) It was stated by Davies that this approach 
has also been cited by leading practitioners in the cases. See Paul, S. Davies, Accessory Liability (Hart 
Publishing 2015) at fn.5 
339 The Itria v The Koursk [1924] P.140.  
340 Ibid, 156. 
341 CBS v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013, 1057. 
342 [1989] RPC 583 (CA), 594. 
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This appears to expand the boundaries of the common design test. In the Supreme Court 
case of Fish & Fish v Sea Shepherd343 this test was unanimously344 approved since it was 
held that the assistance pursuant to a common design ‘must be material, but that means 
no more than that it must be more than de minimis’.345 Moreover, it was underlined that 
the doctrine is ‘so fact sensitive’346 and depends heavily on the facts of the case. In that 
sense, establishing a common design link appears less challenging than before.  
 
 
3. Authorisation 
 
As stated, authorisation is a statutorily provided test for copyright. Davies and Arnold 
argue that there is no sound reason indicating that the core principles of accessory liability 
should apply differently as between different rights. Indeed, an authorisation also appears 
as a participation link in establishing liability under the doctrine of joint tortfeasor which 
applies to all statutory IP rights.347    
It was described by Whitford J in CBS Inc. v Ames Records & Tapes Ltd. 348: 
 
“… [A]n authorisation can only come from somebody having or purporting to 
have authority and that an act is not authorised by somebody who merely 
enables or possibly assists or even encourages another to do that act, but does 
not purport to have any authority which he can grant to justify the doing of 
act.” 
 
What was significant in this decision was that mere assistance was not held sufficient to 
prove an authorisation. A more positive role than the mere assistance was required. This 
was later approved in CBS v Amstrad349 by the HL although in this case authorisation was 
                                                 
343 [2015] UKSC 10. 
344 Although the decision was held with majority (3 to 2), the dissenting judges did not raise any rejection 
on the stated legal test of joint liability.   
345 Fish & Fish v Sea Shepherd [2015] UKSC 10, [49]. 
346 Ibid, [56]. 
347 Sir Richard Arnold, Paul S. Davies ‘Accessory Liability for Intellectual Property Infringement: The 
Case of Authorisation’ (2017). Davies also underlined the fact that in another article ‘authorisation was 
previously recognised by the common law as leading to a liability as a joint tortfeasor (Harris v James 
(1876) 45 L.J.Q.B 545)’. Paul S Davies ‘Accessorial Liability for Assisting Torts’ (2011) The Cambridge 
Law Journal 70 353-380, 359. 
348 [1982] Ch. 91, 106. 
349 CBS v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013, 1054. 
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claimed under S.16(2) CDPA. Ultimately, the Court held that there was no authorisation 
by Amstrad to make the illegal recordings.  
 
Although not much can be said with respect to trade mark as authorisation element is 
mainly examined in relation to copyrights, rejecting the application of mere assistance in 
establishing authorisation appears important for trade mark realm, as well. As it will be 
assessed later, the Courts have dealt with intermediaries’ liability issue mainly under 
authorisation test, accordingly it would be assistive for trade mark liability regime of 
English law by means of analogy.  
 
 
C. Joint Tortfeasance and the Accessorial Liability of Criminal Law 
 
As demonstrated, under the joint tortfeasance doctrine of tort law, participation links are 
interpreted strictly, ie the mere assistance is held inadequate to establish procurement or 
authorisation. This is where the joint tortfeasance doctrine becomes removed from 
accessorial liability in criminal law. Despite the courts’ rejection of the implementation 
of this test within the civil liability cases,350 the scope of accessory liability still appears 
pertinent to the joint tortfeasor liability.351 Moreover, it is significant for the discourse on 
intermediary liability as this would also have a role in assessing intermediaries’ liability 
as joint tortfeasor. 
 
Accessorial liability in criminal law has a broader scope. Acts of assistance or facilitation 
are sufficient for criminal liability if it is proven that the accessory ‘at least know[s] of 
                                                 
350 It must be noted here that the Courts rejected to apply accessory liability within tort law, whereas it has 
been applied in equity. See Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 2 A.C. 378; Twinsectra Ltd v 
Yardley [2002] UKHL 12; [2002] 2 A.C. 164.   
351 Application of the broader principles is also proposed in the literature by some academics. Such as: 
Williams, Joint Torts and Contributory Negligence, 1351, 11 (‘In a criminal law a principal in the second 
degree shares the full guilt of the actual perpetrator of the crime, and is defined as anyone (other than the 
principal in the first degree) who, being a conspirator, is present at the time of the crime, or who (whether 
a conspirator or not) assists in its commission. It is submitted that a similar definition can be used to 
indicate a joint tortfeasor.’; Philip Sales ‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’ (1990) 49 
Cambridge Law Journal 491-514, 509 (‘Indeed, the existence of general principles of secondary liability 
on criminal offences on the basis of both procuring and assisting in the commission of such offences is itself 
a strong indication that there ought to be such principles in the civil law. The criminal rules govern 
secondary criminal liability in respect of acts to which civil liability often attaches.’); Dietrich ‘Accessorial 
Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011) (‘… the current tests for accessorial liability, in rejecting liability for 
‘mere’ assistance, are too narrowly stated.’); Davies, Accessory Liability (2015). 
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the essential matters which constitute that offence’.352  More precisely, accessory liability 
arises based on ‘a widely-defined conduct element (assistance or facilitation) coupled 
with a narrow mental element (knowledge)’353 whereas in tort law the mere assistance 
does not suffice for liability. Specific knowledge in the principal’s act is required under 
the current case law. Yet, it is argued that the implementation of the criminal law approach 
to the tort context would ensure a better and more effective protection for the concerned 
rights, more precisely for IP rights.354 This is because in some cases ‘[t]he distinction 
between procurement and assistance may be very fine’355 or even ‘so fine as to be non-
existent’356. It is also argued that the courts have neither explained the grounds for why 
criminal law and civil law principles should apply differently 357 nor addressed the content 
of the question in those cases358.  
 
However, this suggestion is rejected by some academics on the ground that this would 
bring uncertainty to the law and would even inhibit legitimate activities.359 Although the 
uncertainty claim is sound, this does not seem convincing not to implement the accessory 
liability rules in tort law. This is because certainty can be ensured by specifying the 
boundaries of the mental element as Davies suggested.360 Indeed, he astutely proposes 
                                                 
352 [1995] 2 A.C. 378, 392. Brackets added. 
353 Davies ‘Accessorial Liability for Assisting Torts’ (2011), 357. (Brackets added) 
354 Ibid; Dietrich ‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011).  
355 Davies, Accessory Liability, 199. He explains this with an example: ‘The current unwillingness to 
recognise assistance liability, coupled with the continued acceptance of inducement liability, means that 
the difficult boundary between inducement and assistance must be confronted. For instance, in Innes v 
Short and Beal, it was considered to be lawful for the defendant to sell powdered zinc, even if he thought it 
was to be used by the purchasers in a manner which infringed the claimant’s patent. Yet inducement liability 
arose on the facts of the case since the defendant had asked the purchaser to use the product in that way 
‘in order to induce them to buy his powdered zinc from him’. The distinction between these situations is 
very fine; even in the latter scenario, the purchaser might already have decided to infringe, and so the acts 
of the defendant could still be considered to constitute assistance of the infringement. It may be better to 
focus upon the mental element required of accessory liability: there should only accessory liability if the 
defendant actually knew that the primary tort would occur.’; Dietrich ‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of 
Torts’ (2011), 240 with referring to Sales ‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’ (1990), 
507.  
356 Sales ‘The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability’ (1990), 507.  
357 Davies ‘Accessorial Liability for Assisting Torts’ (2011), 368. While criticising Hobhouse L.J.’s holding 
in Credit Lyonnais v ECGD, Davies states ‘[i]t is readily accepted that the paradigm cases of criminal and 
civil law differ, as do some of their underlying rationales, but when considering whether someone should 
bear responsibility for a wrong which is both a criminal and civil wrong, what are the ‘obvious policy 
reasons’ for the criminal law going further than the civil law?’. 
358 Dietrich ‘Accessorial Liability in the Law of Torts’ (2011), 246. (‘…the ‘content of knowledge’ issue 
simply has not been adequately addressed in torts cases that reject ‘knowing assistance’ liability. Once 
that issue is address, many of the decisions can be rationalised with such a broader basis for liability.’). 
359 McBride & Bagshaw, Tort Law, 887.  
360 Davies ‘Accessorial Liability for Assisting Torts’ (2011), 361 
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that the scope of liability should be confined through a mental element; culpability361 
(knowing assistance). This would mean that: 
 
 “… the victim of a tort cannot just ‘shop around’ in order to sue any third 
party who has somehow assisted the breach, but should only be successful 
against a person who knew that the assistance rendered would assist the 
primary tort. This narrow mental element is crucial in limiting the scope of 
accessory liability; negligent conduct cannot suffice.”362 
 
 
However, in Fish & Fish v Sea Shepherd,363  Lord Sumption reapproved the courts 
existing application by stating that ‘…because in the criminal law aiding and abetting the 
commission of an offence is itself an offence distinct from the primary offence. Knowledge 
that the primary offence is being aided and abetted is therefore sufficient mens rea.’. 
Furthermore, it was stated that even though in some cases the evidence regarding the 
elements such as common design or the difference between procurement and assistance 
is very fine, ‘they are unexceptionable as statements of the kind of accessory support 
which may give rise to liability as a joint tortfeasor.’364 
 
In the light of the case law, therefore, it does seem unlikely that assisting or facilitating 
the tort with a specified degree of mental element would be approved and regarded as a 
ground for joint liability to arise in the near future. However, there exists an important  
aspect of the issue which keeps the debate alive regardless of the existing judicial 
persistence. It is the fact that joint tortfeasance is now more commonly discussed through 
a new context; the Internet. Indeed, in the domestic proceeding of L’Oréal v Ebay365 
Arnold J expressed his considerable sympathy for the idea that Ebay could and should 
bear the liability more than Loreal since the risk of infringement was increased as Ebay 
‘knowingly facilitated’ to and profited from the infringements.366 Moreover, as it was a 
new platform ‘[i]t requires the application of well-established principles to a new and 
rather different scenario to those to which they have previously applied.’367 If knowing 
                                                 
361 Ibid. 
362 Ibid. Further states ‘[b]y knowingly assisting the primary wrong the accessory has acted culpably; such 
culpability should prevent the assister from complaining if he is later made to compensate the victim of the 
wrong’.  
363 [2015] UKSC 10, [39]. 
364 Ibid, [38]. 
365 [2009] EWCH 1094, [369]-[370]. 
366 However, this would amount to the extension of the participation link established in CBS v Amstrad 
case. 
367 L’Oréal v Ebay [2009] EWCH 1094, [369]. 
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assistance or facilitation is implemented as a ground for joint tortfeasance liability, then 
Ebay would most probably have been held joint tortfeasor and so, would have been liable 
for its users infringing activities provided that the mental element was proved in the case.  
 
Indeed, there might be some circumstances where imposing liability on the ground of 
knowing assistance may prove to be a more effective in tackling online infringements or 
in providing a more balanced liability regime. For instance, when an online auction site 
provider encourages its customers to upload and sell counterfeit products, it facilitates the 
infringements. However, if it cannot be proved that such a platform had the specific 
knowledge pertaining to the specific infringements, it is unlikely it would be held liable 
under the existing law. It would therefore escape from the liability regardless of its 
involvement in the infringement. At first sight, therefore, Davies’ proposition of the 
application of ‘knowing assistance’ to tort law appears to be appropriate for IP cases in 
the online context yet may be limited to hosting providers as their services consist of 
greater involvement than those of an intermediary. However, before drawing a final 
conclusion the case law pertaining to intermediaries should be examined.  
 
 
D. Implementation of Joint Tortfeasance Doctrine in the Online Context 
 
The ECD was implemented into the English law by the 2002 Regulations.368 In general, 
the ECD was transposed into national law with very few changes to the wording of some 
of its provisions such as Arts.12-14 ECD.369 However, these sections do not bear different 
meanings. The knowledge standard of Art.14 ECD was preserved in 2002 Regulations 
under Section 19370 and it stipulates actual knowledge for criminal liability and awareness 
for a claim for damages. Nevertheless, Art.15 (general monitoring prohibition) was not 
                                                 
368 2002, No.2013. Available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2002/2013/made>. 
369 Transposed as Section 17-19. 
370 ‘Section 19 (Hosting) :  Where an information society service is provided which consists of the storage 
of information provided by a recipient of the service, the service provider (if he otherwise would) shall not 
be liable for damages or for any other pecuniary remedy or for any criminal sanction as a result of that 
storage where—  (a)the service provider—  (i)does not have actual knowledge of unlawful activity or 
information and, where a claim for damages is made, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which it 
would have been apparent to the service provider that the activity or information was unlawful; or  (ii)upon 
obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the 
information, and  (b)the recipient of the service was not acting under the authority or the control of the 
service provider.’ 
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transposed into the 2002 Regulations. Moreover, the Regulation provides a section on the 
prerequisites of the notices371 in determining the knowledge for the purposes of the mere 
conduit and hosting exemptions. By virtue of this Section, the required knowledge can be 
obtained through a notification if the notification has the requirements stated in the 
Section.  
Besides this, the ED was transposed by the Intellectual Property (Enforcement, etc.) 
Regulations 2006372 into domestic law. What is significant is that the third sentence of 
Art.11 ED, which enables the right holders to apply for an injunction, was not 
implemented in this Regulation as the government stated that implementation was not 
needed in that regard. English law, however is not completely deprived of injunctive relief 
by the provision. Art.8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive,373 which provides the same right to a 
copyright owner, was implemented by Regulation 27 into Sections 97A and 191 JA in 
Parts I and II respectively of the CPDA374. Section 97A states: ‘[t]he High Court (in 
Scotland, the Court of Session) shall have power to grant an injunction against a service 
provider, where that service provider has actual knowledge of another person using their 
service to infringe copyright.’ Actual knowledge is required as a threshold condition in 
determining the applicability of an injunction order against an intermediary while the 
InfoSoc Directive does not include such a requirement. As such, actual knowledge of an 
intermediary as to the copyright infringements committed in its service must be proven 
by the copyright owner before the English Court. It is further stated in that regard that 
actual knowledge should be determined by considering all the relevant facts. More 
notably, it is stated that existence of a notice would be regarded as evidence of actual 
knowledge.375 Thus, the actual knowledge requirement of English law does not appear to 
represent a big difference.  
                                                 
371 ‘Section 22:  In determining whether a service provider has actual knowledge for the purposes of 
regulations 18(b)(v) and 19(a)(i), a court shall take into account all matters which appear to it in the 
particular circumstances to be relevant and, among other things, shall have regard to— (a)whether a 
service provider has received a notice through a means of contact made available in accordance with 
regulation 6(1)(c), and (b)the extent to which any notice includes— (i)the full name and address of the 
sender of the notice; (ii)details of the location of the information in question; and (iii)details of the unlawful 
nature of the activity or information in question.’ 
372 SI 2006/1028 Available at <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1028/contents/made> . 
373 InfoSoc Directive 2001/29 was implemented into domestic law by the Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003, SI 2003/ 2498 (the 2003 Regulations).  
374 SI 2003/ 2498 (the 2003 Regulations). 
375 ‘Section 97A Injunctions against service providers: (1) The High Court (in Scotland, the Court of 
Session) shall have power to grant an injunction against a service provider, where that service provider 
has actual knowledge of another person using their service to infringe copyright. (2)In determining whether 
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In the light of these briefly mentioned provisions, it is time to turn to the case law. 
However, it must be noted here that the case law will be assessed in relation to how it 
provides a general understanding of the domestic application of the EU rules. 
The first case to be examined is L’Oréal v Ebay376 since it was referred from the English 
Court to the CJEU.  As stated, this case related to trade marks in which the right holder 
brought the proceeding against an online auction site, Ebay, claiming its primary and 
contributory liability over third parties’ sales of counterfeit products on Ebay’s platform. 
It was basically a claim that Ebay should be jointly liable for its users’ sales of products 
bearing the L’Oréal trade mark which were counterfeits, goods intended for sale outside 
the EU and unauthorised sample products.377 It was claimed that Ebay was also directly 
liable from the use of keywords corresponding to L’Oréal trade marks as it allowed the 
placement of links to infringing goods on its platform. Finally, it was stated that if there 
was a finding of infringement, then an injunction order should be granted against Ebay. 
This case was referred to the CJEU. Guidance was then received by the English Court, 
but it did not have the opportunity to apply the principles to the case because the litigation 
was settled between the parties after the CJEU handed down its decision. Nevertheless, 
the judgment of the English High Court will be examined.  
In his judgment, with respect to joint tortfeasor liability, Arnold J held that Ebay was not 
liable as joint tortfeasor for the infringements committed by its users. In his appraisal, 
Ebay’s specific service was examined under the joint tortfeasance doctrine by applying 
the tests of procurement and participation in a common design.378 Accordingly, it was 
held that there was neither procurement nor common design elements in Ebay’s activity 
in relation to the particular acts of infringement. It was done by relying heavily on the 
case law examined above. In assessing these elements, Arnold J focused on the fact that 
                                                 
a service provider has actual knowledge for the purpose of this section, a court shall take into account all 
matters which appear to it in the particular circumstances to be relevant and, amongst other things, shall 
have regard to— (a)whether a service provider has received a notice through a means of contact made 
available in accordance with regulation 6(1)(c) of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 
2002 (SI 2002/2013); and (b)the extent to which any notice includes— (i)the full name and address of the 
sender of the notice; (ii)details of the infringement in question. (3)In this section “service provider” has 
the meaning given to it by regulation 2 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.’ 
376 [2009] EWCH 1094. 
377 Liability claim with respect to the goods were intended to sale outside of the EU and not authorised to 
sale was assessed under the Trade Mark Directive 89/104 and Trade Mark Regulation 40/94 to answer 
whether selling of these products were amounted to an infringement, accordingly whether trade mark owner 
had a right to prevent such selling.  
378 L’Oréal v Ebay International AG, [2009] EWCH 1094, [343]-[364]. 
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Ebay took action to terminate the infringements within sufficient time after receiving 
notice from the right holders and implemented a filtering system in its service to prevent 
such infringements, although it was not under a legal duty to prevent infringements. Given 
such efforts, it was held that Ebay did not participate in a common design, either. Also, 
mere knowledge 379 and intention to profit were held insufficient to impose liability as the 
doctrine stipulates.380  
What was most remarkable is the following pronouncement by Arnold J stated on the 
liability issue:  
 “Ebay could and should deal with the problem of infringement by accepting 
liability and insuring against it by means of a premium levied on sellers” since 
“Ebay and its competitors have created a new form of trade which carries with a 
higher risk of infringement than more traditional methods of trade”.381 
 
With this, Arnold J appears to suggest that the application of the joint tortfeasor doctrine 
to the Internet should be reconsidered given its different nature. 
Following L’Oréal v Ebay, the English Courts mostly encountered with the issue of the 
liability of intermediaries in relation to copyright matters.382 The so-called Newzbin I- 
II383 cases provided further insight for the application of the traditional rules to the online 
world but in relation to copyright. Newzbin was a website which operated as a search 
engine but directed its users to Usenet which was a platform that allowed its users to 
upload binary content, including films, TV shows, DVDs and CDs. The Newzbin website 
indexed and provided links related to the content made available on Usenet and allowed 
its premium account users384 to download these links which were likely to be protected 
by copyright. However, it was asserted by the defendants that the operation of Newzbin 
was ‘content agnostic’ like search engines and they had no knowledge about the 
infringements on their website.  
                                                 
379 CBS v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013. For detailed analysis See Chapter 3. 
380 L’Oréal v Ebay International AG, [2009] EWCH 1094, [382]. 
381 Ibid, [369]. 
382 For a comparative analysis See O’ Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: 
implications on ISPs, site owners and IPR owners’ (2016). 
383 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch); [2010] E.C.C. 13 (Ch D) 
(Newzbin I); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 
(Ch); [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch); [2012] 1 All E.R. 806 (Ch D) (Newzbin II). 
384 Upon weekly payment. 
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In the first Newzbin case, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd (Newzbin 
I),385 film makers and distributors, who held the copyright of the movies, brought an 
action against Newzbin by claiming its primary and joint tortfeasor liability from the 
copyright infringements committed on its website. For its contributory liability, it was 
claimed that Newzbin authorised its members’ acts of infringement and procured and 
participated in a common design with its members. It was held that Newzbin authorised 
its’ users infringing acts since it failed to show any intention to prevent the illegalities 
committed on its platform by implementing a filtering measure or something similar. In 
contrast, it enabled its users to download the infringing copies made available on Usenet 
and made payment to Usenet for this service.386 
The assessment on the joint tortfeasor liability was given in the light of the seminal case, 
CBS Songs v Amstrad.387 It was held that there was procurement and participation in a 
common design with its users’ infringement by encouraging its users to download 
copyright-protected contents. Moreover, it was held that its operation was designed and 
intended to provide a platform for the infringing copies and was promoted in that way.388 
The decision reached a different conclusion to the one in L’Oréal v Ebay with respect to 
intermediaries’ liability as joint tortfeasors. However, it is evident that the facts of these 
cases were different, especially the operations of the intermediaries. Newzbin I focused 
on the operation and the design of the intermediary. In that regard, it was found that 
Newzbin actually ‘involved himself in the tort so as to make it his own’389. This therefore 
demonstrates the significance of implementing a mechanism to deal with the potentially 
infringing activities for intermediaries in order not to be held liable. However, this 
criterion is bound to be fact-specific as there are different sized intermediaries which may 
affect their ability to implement different mechanisms. Moreover, in the end the 
examination did not only depend on the mechanisms implemented. Intermediaries’ 
activity and operation with respect to the infringing activities should be more than mere 
assistance as the doctrine stipulates.  
                                                 
385 [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch). 
386 Ibid, [85]-[102]. 
387 CBS v Amstrad [1988] A.C. 1013.  
388 Newzbin I [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch), [103]-[112]. 
389 Ibid, [108]. 
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Following this case, in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v British Telecommunications 
Plc. (Newzbin II),390 copyright owners chose a different path against the Newzbin II 
website, which operated in the same way as Newzbin I,391 and sought an injunction order 
against BT, the largest ISP in the UK, which required the implementation of a technology 
to block users’ access to the Newzbin II. This order was sought pursuant to S.97(A) 
CDPA. The defendant BT claimed that the imposition of this injunction would not fulfil 
the requirements of S.97(A) since there was no ‘use’ of its service to infringe copyright 
and it had no ‘actual knowledge’ of another person using its service to infringe copyright.  
It was also claimed that imposition of this injunction would be contrary to the principles 
established under Art.15 ECD, Art.12(3) ED and the fundamental rights enshrined under 
the Charter and ECHR.  
 
Nevertheless, Arnold J held that both requirements namely the use of the service and 
actual knowledge were satisfied in the case. With regard to the ‘use’ standard, it was held 
that S.97(A) should be interpreted in the same way as Art.8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
By analogically applying the assessment of the CJEU in LSG-Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 Telecommunication GmbH392, 
it was decided ‘the defendant’s subscribers and the operators of the Newzbin 2 website 
both “used” the defendant’s service’393. For the actual knowledge requirement of 
S.97(A), it was decided that this standard should not be understood in a restrictive manner. 
It was further elaborated that, establishment of actual knowledge does not require to prove 
actual knowledge of ‘a specific infringement of a specific copyright work by a specific 
individual’. Yet, the ‘focus of the requirement was knowledge of the use of the service to 
infringe rather than upon the infringements committed’ and ‘it was relevant to consider 
whether it had been given notice of the infringement; and that, in the circumstances, the 
defendant had sufficient knowledge to satisfy the requirements of section 97A’.394 
Therefore, the knowledge requirement was held to be satisfied in the case. 
 
                                                 
390 [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch); [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch); [2012] 1 All E.R. 806 (Ch D). 
391 As closed after the Newzbin I case by locating its servers outside of the UK. 
392 Case C-577/07 LSG-Gesellschaft zur Wahrnehmung von Leistungsschutzrechten GmbH v Tele2 
Telecommunication GmbH [2009] ECR I-1227 (LSG v Tele2).  
393 Newzbin II [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [103]-[113]. 
394 Newzbin II [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch), [147]. 
114 
 
With regard to the injunction’s compatibility with the EU regime, it was stated that the 
concerned injunction was consistent with the related Directives and struck the balance 
between the rights of the parties. The remarkable outcome was on the applicability of the 
injunction under the general monitoring obligation prohibition since Art.15 was not 
transposed into national law. Arnold J stated that Art.15 does not prevent the imposition 
of monitoring obligations to specific infringements. The injunction in this case, 
accordingly, would not contravene this Article as it amounted to a specific one.395 In this 
way, Arnold J considered and applied Art.15 to the case despite it not having been 
transposed into domestic law. Ultimately, the injunction order was held proportionate and 
to have struck a balance between the fundamental rights of the parties.396  
 
These two cases brought success for copyright owners in protecting their rights online. 
They were followed by others: Dramatico Entertainment Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting 
Ltd397 and EMI Records Ltd v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd.398. Although these cases will 
not be examined in detail, they should be briefly mentioned. In Dramatico, copyright 
owners started proceedings in pursuit of an injunction order against P2P service (The 
Pirate Bay, TPB) whose servers were located outside the UK. The court, however, first 
dealt with the issue of whether the users had infringed copyright by copying and 
communicating sound recordings to the public, and whether TPB’s operators were jointly 
liable for having authorised that infringement. By following Newzbin I, the Court found 
that the operators went ‘far beyond merely enabling or assisting. On any view, they 
sanction, approve and countenance the infringements of copyright committed by its 
users.’399 Thereafter, the applicability of the blocking injunction request was assessed and 
granted as it was found consistent with the EU principles.400 However, it should be noted 
that at the time of the judgment, the CJEU had handed down its judgment in Scarlet v 
SABAM. However, the English Court seemed to have failed to assess the injunction order 
at issue under the test laid out in this case by the CJEU, especially from the fundamental 
rights’ aspect.401  
                                                 
395 Ibid, [162]. 
396 Ibid, [177]-[200]. 
397 [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch); [2012] 3 C.M.L.R. 14.  
398 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
399 [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch), [81]. 
400 Dramatico Entertainment Ltd. v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd. (No 2) [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch); [2012] 
3 C.M.L.R. 15. 
401 Guadamuz, ‘Developments in Intermediary Liability’ (2014) 329-330. 
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Similarly, in EMI Records v British Sky Broadcasting402 the Court granted a blocking 
injunction against an ISP on the ground that certain torrent tracking websites infringed 
plaintiffs’ copyrights. Copyright owners’ success in such cases by being granted 
injunction orders against intermediaries appeared to have an impact on trade mark owners 
as lately the English Court was challenged to decide such an injunction order against ISP 
but for trade mark infringement. Notably, liability was not the issue before the Court as 
copyright owners argued in the aforementioned cases. As such, they differed from 
L’Oréal v Ebay in that regard.  
 
Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting and Others (Cartier I)403 was the 
first case dealing with an injunction request for trade mark infringement. This injunction 
was pursued against five main UK ISPs404 and it required from these ISPs to block, or at 
least impede, the access of their respective subscribers to the websites (target websites) 
which were advertising and selling counterfeit copies of the plaintiff’s goods. The 
assessment of the applicability of this injunction was undertaken by Arnold J under five 
main aspects, namely; 1) jurisdiction, 2) threshold conditions to grant such an order, 3) 
application of these conditions to the case, 4) principles to be applied to grant an order 
and 5) appropriateness of granting such an order under the facts of the case.  
Jurisdiction was the first issue before the Court, because, in contrast to copyright law 
there is no specific provision dealing with injunctions under the trade mark law of 
England. It was, therefore claimed that the Court had no jurisdiction to apply an injunction 
order as neither the third sentence of Art 11 of the ED was transposed into domestic law, 
nor did the domestic law provide any right for trade mark holders similar to the right 
provided for copyright holders under S. 97 (A) of the CDPA. However, Arnold J 
examined the jurisdiction issue pursuant to domestic law namely S.37(1) of the Senior 
Courts Act 1981.405 According to this section; ‘the High Court may by order (whether 
                                                 
402 [2013] EWHC 379 (Ch). 
403 [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3915 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3794 (Ch). 
404 Sky, BT, EE, Talktalk and Virgin. Collectively the ISPs. 
405 ‘Powers of High Court with respect to injunctions and receivers. (1) The High Court may by order 
(whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears 
to the court to be just and convenient to do so.  (2) Any such order may be made either unconditionally or 
on such terms and conditions as the court thinks just.  (3) The power of the High Court under subsection 
(1) to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining a party to any proceedings from removing from the 
jurisdiction of the High Court, or otherwise dealing with, assets located within that jurisdiction shall be 
exercisable in cases where that party is, as well as in cases where he is not, domiciled, resident or present 
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interlocutory or final) grant an injunction … in all cases in which it appears to be just 
and convenient to do so.’ It was thus concluded by applying the associated case law of 
this Section that the Court had jurisdiction. In reaching this conclusion Arnold J also 
drawn an analogy with Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise Commissioners406 
known as Norwich Pharmacal orders. The order granted in this case was the disclosure 
of the certain information about the subjects of the infringing activity. According to the 
principle laid out in this case, such remedy can be granted against a third party who 
happens to be either in possession of the goods subjected to the infringement or in a best 
position to prevent this infringement given her equitable duty in protecting these goods, 
regardless of the fact that she is not the wrongdoer. In relying on this, Arnold J stated 
‘[a]lthough this principle is inapplicable to the circumstances of the present case, it is 
not a long step from this to conclude that, once an ISP becomes aware that its services 
are being used by third parties to infringe an intellectual property right, then it becomes 
subject to a duty to take proportionate measures to prevent or reduce such infringements 
even though it is not itself liable for infringement’. 407 
In the presence of the reservations from the ISPs on the applicability of S.37(1), it was 
pointed out that even if the court had had no power under the domestic interpretation of 
S.37(1), the Court would have had the jurisdiction when S.37(1) was interpreted in 
compliance with the third sentence of Art.11 of the ED following the ‘Marleasing’408 
principle.409  
After holding that the Court had jurisdiction, Arnold J examined the threshold conditions 
to grant such an order. In that respect, conditions applied to copyrights were analogically 
                                                 
within that jurisdiction.  (4)The power of the High Court to appoint a receiver by way of equitable execution 
shall operate in relation to all legal estates and interests in land; and that power (a)may be exercised in 
relation to an estate or interest in land whether or not a charge has been imposed on that land under section 
1 of the Charging Orders Act 1979 for the purpose of enforcing the judgment, order or award in question; 
and (b)shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any power of any court to appoint a receiver in 
proceedings for enforcing such a charge. (5)Where an order under the said section 1 imposing a charge 
for the purpose of enforcing a judgment, order or award has been, or has effect as if, registered under 
section 6 of the Land Charges Act 1972, subsection (4) of the said section 6 (effect of non-registration of 
writs and orders registrable under that section) shall not apply to an order appointing a receiver made 
either (a)in proceedings for enforcing the charge; or (b)by way of equitable execution of the judgment, 
order or award or, as the case may be, of so much of it as requires payment of moneys secured by the 
charge.’ 
406 [1973] UKHL 6 (26 June 1973). 
407 Arnold J also draw an analogy with Cartier v BskyB, [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [106]. 
408 According to the CJEU’s ruling in Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-04135, the Courts of the MSs shall interpret their national legislations in 
respect of the EU legislation even though the legislation has not been implemented by the member state.   
409 Cartier I [2014] EWCH 3354 (Ch), [132]. 
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applied to the issue as trade mark law does not provide any guidance in that respect. Those 
principles were construed in accordance with the related provisions especially with the 
third sentence of Art 11 of the ED. After the examination, the threshold conditions for 
trade mark infringements were laid down as follows;410  
 “1.The ISPs must be intermediaries within the meaning of the third sentence 
Article 11; 
 2. The users and/or operators of the website must be infringing the claimant’s 
trade-mark(s); 
 3. The users and/or the operators of the website must be using the ISP’s 
services to infringe; and 
 4. The ISPs must have actual knowledge of the infringement.” 
 
Having assessed these conditions, the Court confirmed that they had been satisfied in the 
present case. The first and second conditions were held to have been met since the ISPs 
in the case were an intermediary under Art. 11 of the ED and the target websites infringed 
the trade marks. However, for the third threshold condition ‘Do the operators of the 
Target Websites use the ISPs’ services to infringe?’ it was claimed by the counsel of the 
ISPs that the issue was in need of guidance from the CJEU for trade marks.411  
Nevertheless, Arnold J stated that there exists two CJEU’s cases applicable to the current 
issue: LSG v Tele2412 and UPC Telekabel413. In the light of these cases, it was concluded 
that the third condition was also satisfied since ‘(….) the operators of the Target Websites 
are infringing the Trade Marks by placing on the internet advertisements and offers for 
sale which are targeted at UK consumers. The ISPs have an essential role in these 
infringements, since it is via the ISPs’ services that the advertisements and offers for sale 
are communicated to 95% of broadband users in the UK. It is immaterial that there is no 
contractual link between the ISPs and the operators of the Target Websites.’414  
                                                 
410 Ibid, [141].  
411 Ibid, [147]. 
412 Case C-577/07 LSG v Tele2 [2009] ECR I-1227. (Where, the CJEU held ‘access providers which merely 
provide users with Internet access, without offering other services such as email, FTP or file-sharing 
services or exercising any control, whether de iure or de facto, over the services which users make use of, 
must be regarded as intermediaries within the meaning of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29’.) 
413 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). (In that case, the CJEU decided that intermediary 
‘covers any person who carries a third party’s infringement of a protected work or other subject- matter in 
a network’ within the meaning of Art. 8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive to qualify the use of the services 
requirement.) 
414 Cartier I [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [155]. 
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Finally, for the requirement of actual knowledge, it was held that there was evidence to 
show that ISPs acquired the actual knowledge415 when Richemont informed them by 
sending emails concerning its registered trade marks and the test purchases from the target 
websites.416  
Following this, Arnold J determined the principles to be applied in examining the 
injunctions when the threshold conditions are met. The principles submitted by the 
counsel of ISPs were the minimum standards provided under the EU regime, namely: the 
relief must be necessary; effective; dissuasive; must not be unnecessarily complicated or 
costly; must avoid barriers to legitimate trade; must be fair and equitable and strike a ‘fair 
balance’ between the applicable fundamental rights; and must be proportionate.417 In 
considering these principles, Arnold J pointed out that most of them were actually 
indicated the same thing: proportionality.418 Accordingly, the principles were applied to 
the case with the proportionality principle at the core of the appraisal. For the appraisal, 
the main question was stated as being ‘…whether the likely costs burden on the ISPs is 
justified by the likely efficacy of the blocking measures and the consequent benefit to 
Richemont having regard to the alternative measures which are available to Richemont 
and to the substitutability of the Target Websites.’419  
After undertaking a rather comprehensive analysis of the issues, a website blocking 
injunction against those ISPs was granted.420 A safeguard clause determining the time 
period of the order was also provided to prevent potential abuse of the order. 421 Finally, 
the implementation cost of the order was left to the ISPs to bear. Therefore, it became the 
first injunction granted in the trade mark realm.  
Two years later, following the success in Cartier I, in Cartier International AG & others 
v BSkyB & Others, (Cartier II)422 the same plaintiffs sought another blocking injunction 
                                                 
415 Ibid, [57] 
416 Ibid, [157]. 
417 Ibid, [158]. 
418 Ibid, [169]-[190] 
419 Ibid, [261]. 
420 For more detailed analysis over the effectiveness of a blocking injunction See Althaf Marsoof, ‘The 
blocking injunction- a critical review of its implementation in the United Kingdom in the context of 
European Union’ (2015) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 46(6) 632-
664, 652-655. 
421 Cartier I [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch), [265]-[266]. Mr. Justice Arnold stated his provisional view for the 
sunset clause as two years. See Marsoof, ‘The blocking injunction- a critical review of its implementation 
in the United Kingdom in the context of European Union’ (2015) 650-651. 
422 Cartier II [2016] EWHC 339 (Ch). 
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order against the same five ISPs on the same ground. Identical to the Cartier I case, the 
injunction order at issue required ISPs to block, or at least impede, access of the target 
websites. Hacon J took Arnold J’s comprehensively reasoned judgment into consideration 
and applied it to the current case. Relying on Arnold J’s reasoning, the blocking injunction 
against the ISPs was granted. This case was also appealed later by the ISPs.  
It must be noted that, while Cartier II was finding its way to the first-degree court, Cartier 
I was at appeal, but the judgment had not yet been given by the Court of Appeal. However, 
later the Court of Appeal handed down its judgment in Cartier I.423 In the appeal, ISPs 
challenged the decision on all the five main points424 examined by Arnold J. In assessing 
Arnold J’s reasoning and the ISPs’ claims, the Court of Appeal upheld the first-degree 
court’s judgment and confirmed the application of the concerned blocking injunction 
against the ISPs.  However, there are some points worth remarking on. As examined, 
Arnold J held that the Court had jurisdiction by virtue of S.37(1) of the Seniors Courts 
Act 1981. Nevertheless, at the appeal, the jurisdiction issue was considered by Kitchin 
LJ425 by focusing on the EU acquis instead merely focusing on the interpretation of the 
domestic law. In that regard, Kitchin LJ stated that although this provision was also a 
proper basis in concluding that the Court had jurisdiction,426 ‘… Article 11 does indeed 
provide a principled basis for extending the practice of the court in relation to the grant 
of injunctions to encompass, where appropriate, the services of an intermediary, such as 
one of the ISPs, which have been used by a third party to infringe a registered trade 
mark’427 under the CJEU’s guidance given in L’Oréal v Ebay428. Thus, he concluded that 
‘subject to the threshold conditions (…) this court must now recognise pursuant to 
general equitable principles that this is one of those new categories of case in which the 
                                                 
423 Cartier I [2016] EWCA Civ 658 (06 July 2016). 
424 Ibid, [7]. This was explained by the Court of Appeal in a broad manner with the following words: ‘They 
[ISPs] contend, in broad outline, that they are wholly innocent parties and are not alleged to be 
wrongdoers; that the court had no jurisdiction to make any such order; that if the court did have 
jurisdiction, the jurisdictional threshold requirements were not satisfied in the circumstances of these 
cases; that the judge failed properly to identify the correct principles that should be applied in deciding 
whether or not to make an order; that the orders made were disproportionate having regard to the evidence 
before the court; and that the judge fell into error in making the orders that he did in relation to costs.’ 
425 Who gave the leading judgment. 
426 Ibid, [66]-[74]. 
427 Ibid, [65]. 
428 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011.  Kitchen J stated in the para 60 ‘the jurisdiction 
conferred in accordance with the third sentence of Article 11 on national courts must allow those courts to 
order an online service provider, such as the provider of an online marketplace, to take measures that 
contribute not only to bringing end the actual infringements committed through that marketplace, but also 
to preventing further infringement’ referring to the paras 131-134 of L’Oréal v Ebay. 
120 
 
court may grant an injunction when it is satisfied that it is just and convenient to do so’.429 
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Court was explicitly confirmed by Briggs LJ, in his 
concurring opinion with the  following words:430 ‘[t]he courts could and probably would 
have developed this jurisdiction regardless of the requirement in the two Directives that 
it be made available as specified’.  
Furthermore, Kitchin LJ provides further elaboration with respect to the ISPs’ position in 
the online world and for the surrounding doctrinal debate in general. He stated: 
 “I recognise that the ISPs are not guilty of any wrongdoing. They have not 
infringed Richemont's trade marks, nor have they engaged in a common design 
with the operators of the websites offering counterfeit goods for sale. I also 
accept that it is clear in light of the decision of the House of Lords in CBS 
Songs Ltd v Amstrad plc that they do not owe a common law duty of care to 
Richemont to take reasonable care to ensure that their services are not used by 
the operators of the offending websites.”431  
Having stated that, however, Kitchin LJ believed that the ISPs are in the best position to 
prevent the infringements. Accordingly, ‘[t]he operators of the target websites need the 
services of the ISPs in order to offer for sale and sell their counterfeit goods to consumers 
in the United Kingdom, and the ISPs are therefore inevitable and essential actors in those 
infringing activities.’432 This demonstrates dilemma that the Courts encountered in trying 
to impose a measure on the intermediaries although they cannot be held liable. This also 
triggers the question about who should bear the costs of implementation of an injunction 
order even though Arnold J’s decision on the costs, that the cost of the implementation of 
the injunction should be borne by the ISPs, was also approved by the Court by relying on 
the normal cost rule.433  
This has been the question before the Supreme Court since two ISPs had been granted 
permission to appeal on the costs ground. On this, Briggs LJ’s dissenting judgment at the 
Court of Appeal must be noted as he dissented in the decision on the implementation of 
costs. In his dissenting judgment, his Lordship stated that the costs concerning the 
                                                 
429 Cartier I [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [65]. 
430 Ibid, [205]. 
431 Ibid, [54]. 
432 Ibid, [56]. 
433 For general analysis on the cost issue of the blocking injunctions in the UK See Paul S. Davies, ‘Costs 
of Blocking Injunctions’ (2017) Intellectual Property Quarterly (4) 330-345. 
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blocking injunction should be met by right owners as the ISPs in those cases were not the 
wrongdoers434.435  
In fact, the Supreme Court agreed with Brigg’s LJ in its keenly awaited decision.436 It 
was decided that the matter of compliance costs is a matter for English law, accordingly 
the ordinary principle should be applied. According to this principle ‘unless there are 
good reasons for a different order an innocent intermediary is entitled to be indemnified 
by the right-holder against the costs of complying with a website-blocking order’.437 
Thus, it was established that the right-holders should indemnify the ISPs against their 
compliance costs which are reasonable and proportionate.438 These implementation costs 
are explained under three heads : ‘the marginal cost of the initial implementation of the 
order, which involves processing the application and configuring the ISP’s blocking 
systems; the cost of updating the block over the lifetime of the orders in response to 
notifications from the rights-holders, which involves reconfiguring the blocking system 
to accommodate the migration of websites from blocked internet locations; and the costs 
and liabilities that may be incurred if blocking malfunctions through no fault of the ISP, 
for example as a result of over-blocking because of errors in notifications or malicious 
attacks provoked by the blocking.’439  This decision is very significant for the 
intermediary’s liability regime. This is not only because it is the first of its kind -at least 
to the author’s knowledge-, this is also because of the courts’ reasoning. First, the court 
grounded its decision on the legal innocence of the ISPs. It was stated that an ISP serving 
as a mere conduit is neither liable from the infringements of its users nor is under a duty 
to take any proactive steps to prevent or terminate the access to an illegal content.440 In 
the lack of such responsibility, it cannot be expected to bear to burden of remedying an 
                                                 
434 Cartier I [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [211]. (‘It is, according to the evidence, a modest cost but one which 
in principle the rightsholder ought to defray as the price of obtaining valuable injunctive relief for the better 
exploitation of its intellectual property. I consider that, while there may be exceptional cases justifying a 
different order, the judge was wrong in principle in concluding that the ISP ought usually to pay the costs 
of implementation’). 
435 In his dissenting judgment Briggs LJ relied on the Norwich Pharmacal Co. v Customs and Excise 
Commissioners [1973] UKHL 6 and stated that equitable principle stated in this case concerning the 
injunctive relief should be applied analogically to the case, accordingly to the ISPs if they are regarded to 
non-wrongdoers.  
436Cartier International AG and others (Respondents) v British Telecommunications Plc and another 
(Appellants) [2018] UKSC 28 (13 June 2018). 
437 Ibid, [31]. 
438 For all the costs that can arise from the implementation of website blocking injunction, See Ibid, [5]. 
439 These are the only costs that the ISPs complained about. Ibid. 
440 Ibid, [33]-[34]. 
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injustice. Moreover, dealing with such infringements and preventing them benefits the 
right holders and the costs relating to it are naturally a cost of the right holders.441  
In that regard, the decision of leaving the compliance costs of blocking injunction to right 
holders appears to strike the balance between the parties of an injunction cases as it no 
longer imposes an economical burden on an intermediary. It can moreover be stated that 
imposing these costs on right holders could prevent the use of injunction requests as a 
weapon against intermediaries. On the other hand, the decision is not free from the 
questions. Its applicability on copyright related matter is an important one. As examined, 
English courts mostly dealt with the injunction request for the copyright matters. For the 
online trade mark infringement issue, those cases applied analogically. It is therefore 
keenly awaited to see of this decision could be applied analogically to copyright cases. 
Another question is related to the costs that can be indemnified. The court held that the 
reasonable costs of compliance can be indemnified. Yet, determining the limits of the 
reasonableness might be challenging. For example: an intermediary may not have 
filtering capabilities while another one has already implemented filtering measure as its 
own measure. Could then the first type of intermediary ask for the costs of installation, 
maintaining, implementing etc.? These are the questions that needs to be answered.  
There is one final point which must not be overlooked. In deciding the above-mentioned 
cost rule, the court distinguished the ISPs from the other service providers namely caching 
and hosting intermediaries. It was underlined that intermediaries in question were mere 
conduits so that the same principle may not be applicable to caching and hosting 
intermediaries given that their operations involve a greater degree of participation which 
might result in them not to be regarded as innocent intermediaries.442 Thus, the 
applicability of this principle to these intermediaries should not be taken for granted.  
 
 
E. Discussion 
 
                                                 
441 Ibid, [35]. 
442 Ibid, [37]. 
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The tort law doctrine of joint tortfeasance applies to intermediaries’ liability issue under 
English law. Under this doctrine basically a party who procures or authorises the act of 
the primary tortfeasor or acts in pursuit of a common design with the primary tortfeasor 
is held liable. Moreover, this liability is confined by the courts with a conduct element, ie 
mere assistance does not suffice to create liability since the application of accessorial 
liability principles of criminal law is rejected. This is a principle which received criticism 
in the literature. It is argued that ‘a widely-defined conduct element (assistance or 
facilitation) coupled with a narrow mental element (knowledge)’443 namely knowing 
facilitation or assistance would work better for liability that arises from online 
infringements. It can be noted that cases in which this rather broad application was 
rejected were not dealing with online infringements.444  
Understandably, case law pertaining to online infringements henceforth did not focus on 
the issue. The precedents and established principles were applied in these cases. Thus, 
Arnold J restated the fact that mere assistance or mere knowledge of the infringements 
was not sufficient to impose liability on Newzbin in Newzbin I. However, in that case 
Newzbin was still found liable as its operation suggested that it did not take any action to 
prevent the infringements committed through its service, even though it encouraged its 
users to download the illegal copies. Similarly, in L’Oréal v Ebay, Ebay’s self-initiated 
NTD mechanism was at the core of the assessment. In fact, this was the reason why the 
court did not hold Ebay liable.  
It appears that under the case law intermediaries’ way of operation and the mechanisms 
implemented or the genuine efforts undertaken by them in tackling the infringements 
were where the courts laid their focus. This therefore appears to be the test in assessing 
the intermediary’s assistance or facilitation in the provision of its services. Although it 
aligns with Art. 14 ECD, it appears challenging as it is bound to be very fact specific. For 
instance, it is not clear what steps would have been regarded sufficient to demonstrate 
that Newzbin made sufficient effort to deal with the infringements. What we know from 
                                                 
443 Davies ‘Accessorial Liability for Assisting Torts’ (2011), 357. (Brackets added) 
444 Dinwoodie states on that point ‘[a]lthough there is no formal difference (between the test applicable 
offline and online intermediaries), in practice courts may be willing to infer the required mental element in 
ways that extend liability for online service providers or interpret the general standards in a way that leads 
to broader prima facie liability being imposed’. Dinwoodie ‘Comparative Analysis of the Secondary 
Liability of Online Service Providers’ (2017), 66. 
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case law is that Ebay’s NTD system was regarded as sufficient. Nevertheless, this 
sufficiency still depends on the facts of the case before the court. Hence, this test 
seemingly fails in providing the required certainty. In the call for certainty, the test of 
knowing facilitation appears a feasible approach in establishing the liability of an 
intermediary provided that the required level of mental element (knowledge) is clearly 
specified.  
Finally, other significant outcomes of English case law should be highlighted. First, the 
liability issue was considered and applied purely as a matter of domestic law by the 
English courts. The immunity rules of the ECD have barely been considered unless 
injunctive relief was an issue. Even in injunction cases, the courts appear to have failed 
to deal with the issue from s fundamental rights’ aspect. On the other hand, the non-
implementation of Art.15 does not appear to be an issue under English law, as it was 
considered and applied in Newzbin II. Finally, the parts of the appraisals of Kitchen LJ in 
Cartier I and Arnold J in L’Oréal v Ebay where both judges considered the intermediaries 
should be underlined. Those appraisals pointed out the same dilemma; although the 
intermediaries are not the wrongdoers and under a legal duty to act, they are in the best 
position to prevent the infringements. The Supreme Court’s judgment on the costs issue 
however can be regarded as a movement providing more balance between the parties.  
 
III. GERMANY 
 
A. Contributory Liability 
 
Under German law, there is no specific tort principle like the joint tortfeasorship liability 
of English law. The German Civil Code, the BGB, comprises a Section which deals with 
‘joint tortfeasor and persons involved’. Yet, this Section, S.830(1), only maintains that 
joint tortfeasors are responsible for the damage and that the instigators and accessories 
are equivalent to joint tortfeasors (S.830(2)). The assessment of whether the concerned 
party is joint tortfeasor or not is dealt with under general tort principles. The applicable 
Section, S.823(1) of BGB reads as follows:  
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“A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make 
compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this.” 445 
 
 
Furthermore, S.823(2) restates the same rules but for breach of statutory rights.446 Under 
this Section, contributory liability arises depending upon the following requirements: 1) 
there must be an infringement, 2) the tortfeasor must be culpable, ie intention 
(Vorsatz)447 or negligence (Fahrlässigkeit)448, 3) the infringement must be unlawful 
(Rechtswidrigkeit)449 and 4) there must be a causal link between the tortfeasors’ act and 
the damage. Intention, in the light of this section, is the formal limitation of tort liability. 
However, negligence satisfies the culpability requirement as well. Hence, the difference 
between intention and negligence appears to be minimal in practice given that negligent 
conduct is easier to establish than intention.450 Thus, tort liability can be imposed upon 
negligence under German law. In that regard, German contributory liability principles 
appear to have a broader scope than joint tortfeasance liability has under English law. The 
different outcomes with respect to the liability of intermediaries would therefore not be 
unanticipated.  
 
However, it is not this general tort law principle that the courts consider and apply to IP 
and online infringement cases. Instead, a judge-made doctrine,451 ‘Störerhaftung’ 
liability, is primarily applied to these issues. This translates as ‘disturber or interferer 
liability’. According to the doctrine: 
 
“Anybody who- without being an offender or participant- contributes in any 
way wilfully and with adequate causation to the infringement of a protected 
position can be the subject of proceedings to cease and desist an infringement 
                                                 
445 <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3483>. 
446 ‘The same duty (S. 823/1) is held by a person who commits a breach of a statute that is intended to 
protect another person. If, according to the contents of the statue, it may also be breached without fault, 
then liability to compensation only exist in the case of fault.’ (brackets added). 
  <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p3483>  . 
447 Cees Van Dam, European Tort Law, 2nd ed., para 802-2. 
448 Ibid, para 802-2. 
449 Ibid, para 701. 
450 Ibid, para 802-2. It was stated that the difference between those conduct elements is significant under 
the S.826 ‘where only intentional infliction of damage is sufficient to establish liability’.   
451 The first decisions of the BGH pertaining this doctrine were stated as following: German Federal Court 
of Justice (BGH), May 18, 1955, I ZR 8/54, 1955 GRUR 492 – Grundig-Reporter (copyright matter); 
January 15, 1957, I ZR 56/55, 1957 GRUR 352- Pertussin II (trademark matter). See Alexander Bayer 
‘Liability 2.0- Does the Internet environment require new standards for secondary liability? An overview 
of the current legal situation in Germany’ in M. J. Adelmann et al. (eds), Patents and Technological 
Progress in a Globalized World (Springer, 2006), 365-377.  
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of an intellectual property right in its capacity of a perpetrator of a 
‘disturbance.” 452  
 
 
The origin of the doctrine is in fact in property law, namely S.862 and S.1004 of the BGB, 
not in tort law principles.453 Those articles, in general, deal with disturber’s unlawful 
interference to possession and entitle the proprietor with the right to ask the disturber to 
remove the disturbance or implement a prohibitory injunction on any further interference. 
More significantly, this liability only provides interim relief to the aggrieved right owner 
such as injunctions provided under the EU regime do. For this reason, it cannot be claimed 
as a legal basis for the damages.454 Moreover, the doctrine principally applies to 
circumstances where the direct infringer is not within legal reach or is not known. Online 
infringement cases, therefore fit in with this perfectly most of the time.  
 
The doctrine applies to the circumstances where a causal link between the third party’s 
indirect acts (or omissions) and the infringement exists. However, in order to impose a 
liability, a third party must also be able to prevent the ongoing infringement. Finally, it 
should be underlined that there must be no fault since it is a form of strict liability. If there 
is fault then liability under the S.823(1)455 is triggered. In the light of these, the three 
elements of this liability are stated as follows: 
 
 “… [A] wilful adequate causal contribution to the infringing acts of any third 
party; the legal and factual possibility of preventing the resulting direct 
infringements; and the violation of a reasonable duty of care to prevent these 
infringements.”456  
 
It has been stated that the reasonableness standard was established by the courts to limit 
liability because it had been criticised as being a form of pure causal liability.457 This 
reasonableness standard is assessed on a case-by-case basis although there exists some 
                                                 
452 I ZR 304/01, 11 March 2004 (Internet- Versteigerung I) (Ger), 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng). 
453 Angelopoulous ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for 
Copyright Infringement in Europe’ (2013), 267; Thomas Hoeren and Silviya Yankova ‘The Liabilty of 
Internet Intermediaries- the German Perspective’ (2012) International Review of Industrial Property and 
Copyright Law 43 (5) 501-531, 504. Nevertheless, Bayer claimed that ‘the dogmatic origin of this concept 
remains open’. See Bayer ‘Liability 2.0- Does the Internet environment require new standards for secondary 
liability? An overview of the current legal situation in Germany’ (2006). 
454 It is because the disturber is neither primarily nor secondly liable under the tort principles. 
455 Annette Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany 
and Throughout the EU’ (2014) Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 37 525-540, 532.  
456 Leistner ‘Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe’ (2014), 79. 
457 Hoeren and Yankova ‘The Liabilty of Internet Intermediaries- the German Perspective’ (2012), 504.  
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common criteria that the courts have considered in the cases. These are: the interferer’s 
economic or technical capability to prevent the infringements and the effect of the 
infringement over other rights.458 The former in fact is the same reason that the EU 
legislators rely on for the purpose of applying injunctions against intermediaries: the 
intermediaries are in the best position to apply the measures to prevent the infringements. 
Indeed, the Störerhaftung doctrine is argued to be the most appropriate legal principle to 
be applied to online intermediaries’ liability question in those cases on the ground that it 
‘…is intended to be available only in cases where the direct infringer is not known or 
within legal reach or where, although the direct infringer might be known, the nature of 
the infringement requires action against the disturber in order to ensure immediate and 
effective relief’.459 Thus, it has been discussed by German courts within the scope of the 
injunction regime of the EU. Moreover, the impact of this liability appears to go beyond 
its jurisdiction. As aforementioned, Arnold J mentioned and discussed the doctrine in 
L’Oréal v Ebay460 and expressed his sympathy for it.  
 
Finally, German trade mark law should be mentioned with respect to contributory 
liability. It deals with matters that amount to contributory liability but in a very limited 
sense. S.14(7) of the German Trade Marks Act (Markengesetz, MarkenG) maintains the 
vicarious liability for trade mark infringements in a similar way to English and US law.461 
Furthermore, the Act, addresses situations which can be considered equivalent to both the 
English concept of participant-based liability and the US doctrine of contributory 
liability.462 Indeed, citing S.14(4),463 the German Federal Court of Justice 
                                                 
458 Ibid. 
459 Angelopoulous ‘Beyond the Safe Harbours: Harmonising Substantive Intermediary Liability for 
Copyright Infringement in Europe’ (2013), 266. 
460 [2009] EWCH 1094, [456]-[464]. 
461 This Article reads as:‘If the act of infringement is committed in a business operation by an employee or 
agent, the right to an injunction and, insofar as the employee or agent acted intentionally or negligently, 
the compensation claim, may also be asserted against the proprietor of the operation.’ See 
<http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_markeng/englisch_markeng.html#p0085>. 
462 Kurt Saunders amd Gerlinde Berger-Walliser ‘The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods: 
A Comparative Analysis of Secondary Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe’ (2011) 
32 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 37-92, 55. 
463 ‘1. affixing a sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark to packaging or wrappings or to 
means of marking such as labels, tags, sewn-on labels or the like; 2. offering packaging, wrappings or the 
means of marking under a sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark, putting them on the 
market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign; or, 3. importing or exporting packaging, 
wrappings or means of marking under a sign which is identical with or similar to the trade mark, if there 
is a risk that the packaging or wrappings are being used for the packaging or the wrapping of goods or 
services, or the means of marking for marking goods or services, in respect of which, pursuant to 
subsections (2) and (3), third parties would be prohibited from using that sign.’ 
128 
 
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) held a ‘defendant liable for trademark infringement for 
producing labels which were identical to a trademark and- without using them himself- 
selling these labels to businesses who attached them to similar goods as those protected 
under the trademark.’464 Nevertheless, these sections’ applicability are confined to the 
matters specified in these sections. Beyond these provisions, German law fails to deal 
with contributory trade mark infringements in general. The Störerhaftung doctrine is thus 
applied by the courts. Yet, unfortunately, no case has yet dealt with contributory trade 
mark liability that arises from the offline world. The seminal case in that regard 
considered the liability of an online auction website.  
 
 
 
 
 
B. Störerhaftung and Intermediaries’ Liability 
 
The ECD was implemented into German law as a part of the Telemedia Act (TMG)465 
which regulates information society services and e-commerce. Also, the ED was 
transposed by the German Enforcement Act.466 Although the provisions implemented 
will not be assessed in detail, some general points must be mentioned. S.10 of the TMG 
which corresponds to Art.14 ECD does not mention actual knowledge; it merely states 
the knowledge. Also, the test for awareness, which is applicable to the claim for damages, 
is determined by the ‘reasonable man standard’ as it is applied in most of the MSs. Finally, 
German law does not provide formal NTD procedures. Bearing these in mind, German 
case law should now be examined for further insight. As stated above, case law relies 
heavily on the Störerhaftung doctrine in dealing with contributory liability matters. The 
safe harbour rules have not been considered much in those cases. The domestic rules have 
been at the core of the appraisal as is the case under English law.    
                                                 
464 Ettaler Klosterliqueur, Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 18, 1955, 
Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] 179, 1956 (Ger) citing from Saunders and Berger- 
Walliser ‘The Liability of Online Markets for Counterfeit Goods: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary 
Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe’ (2011), 56, fn. 123. 
465 Telemediengesetz [TMG] Feb. 26, 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGB I] at 179 (Ger), 
available at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/tmg/ > 
466 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Durchsetzung von Rechten des geistigen Eigentums, September 2008. 
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1. The Internet Auction cases 
 
The trilogy of Internet Auction cases (Internet Versteigerung I, II, III)467 are the seminal 
cases in which the courts applied Störerhaftung liability to an online context. More 
importantly, these cases concerned trade marks. It should also be noted that they shared 
very similar facts with other Ebay cases brought before other MSs’ courts.468 Therefore, 
they are also significant for comparative assessment.  
As the trilogy of Internet Auction cases had very similar facts and the last two cases 
appeared as a confirmation of the first one, it would be accurate to examine the first case 
and indicate the differences with the other cases if any.  
These cases concerned trade mark infringements committed by the users of an online 
auction site when counterfeit products were uploaded and sold by them. It was claimed 
that the online auction provider469 was liable as an interferer for these infringements as it 
was the one who provided the platform for the users; accordingly, who made the 
infringements possible. On that basis, the claimants sought injunctive relief together with 
the disclosure of information and payment of damages. 
The issue, therefore, was whether the online auction site at stake was liable as a störer 
(interferer). This is, where these cases differed from other Ebay cases brought in other 
jurisdictions. This is because the Störerhaftung doctrine provides injunctive relief to the 
aggrieved right owner. The court, therefore did not assess the liability under tort law rules 
in contrast to the English Ebay case where the liability was assessed under joint 
tortfeasance liability. 
In Internet Auction I, the Appeal Court held that the intermediary was not liable as 
interferer as there was no willful participation in the infringements by it. It was stated by 
the court that the intermediary’s operation was merely hosting; it did not exert any 
influence on the seller and the details of the seller’s product. However, the BGH 
                                                 
467 I ZR 304/01, 11 March 2004 (Internet- Versteigerung I) (Ger), 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng); 
I ZR 35/04, 19 April 2007 (Internet- Versteigerung II) (Ger), [2007] E.T.M.R. 70 (Eng); Case I ZR 73/05 
(Internet- Versteigerung III), Bundesgerichtshof, April 30, 2008 (Ger). 
468 L’Oréal v Ebay [2009] EWCH 1094, [2009] R.P.C. 21; Louis Vuitton Malletier SA v eBay Inc, 
Unreported June 30, 2008 (Trib Comm (Paris)); Lancome Parfums et Beatue &Cie v eBay International 
AG, eBay Europe SARL (Belgium, Comm. Bruxelles) May 28, 2008. 
469 It was Ricardo.de in the first case, and Ebay in the other two cases.  
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disagreed. In its appraisal, the interferer’s liability was assessed through the duty to 
investigate test. It is submitted that interferer liability cannot be unduly extended to third 
parties who have not themselves committed the infringing act but have facilitated it 
somehow. It is required to show that the third party infringed its duty to investigate on 
the part of the perpetrator.470 The scope of this duty was also determined by the court with 
the following test: ‘whether and to what extent the perpetrator could be expected to carry 
out an investigation on the particular circumstances of the case’.  
With respect to the platform concerned, it stated that it cannot be expected to check every 
product before it is uploaded on the Internet. Indeed, this would lead to a general 
monitoring. Yet, whenever it is made aware of the infringement then it should act 
accordingly which was specified by the Court as blocking the concerned infringements 
and preventing possible future ones. From the facts of the case, the BGH decided that 
there were clearly ascertainable trade mark infringements that the defendant should have 
investigated. Yet, the ultimate decision on the application of injunctive relief was not 
given by the BGH since the Appeal Court did not make any ruling as to whether the 
sellers’ activity was a trade mark infringement. Thus, the BGH held that it could not 
decide whether there was interferer liability in the absence of the primary trade mark 
liability.471  
Nevertheless, this did not restrain the BGH from deciding on the matter of the 
Störerhaftung’s compatibility with EU law. In that regard, the BGH decided that the 
governing provisions are clear so, guidance from the CJEU would not be needed. This is 
because the immunity provided under Art.14 does not cover the applicability of the 
injunctive relief against an intermediary. The Court also stated that interferer liability is 
borne out by Art.14(1)(a) since the Article requires awareness for immunity from 
damages. In that regard, it was stated that if the injunctive relief were covered by the 
immunity stated under this Article, which depends upon the knowledge, this would mean 
that stricter requirements would apply to injunctive relief than the liability for damages.472 
Moreover, it was held that the implementation of such injunctive relief would be 
compatible with Art.14(3) ECD and Art.11 ED since these allow the implementation of 
                                                 
470 (Internet Auction I), 40-41. The Court states this duty as a duty to investigate. Yet this duty has various 
names in the literature such as duty to review, duty of care.  
471 Ibid, 44. 
472 Ibid, 29-30. See also analysis from Joachim Bornkamm ‘E-Commerce Directive v. IP Rights 
Enforcement- Legal Balance Achieved?’ (2007) GRUR International 642.  
131 
 
the preventive measures by the courts. Thus, qualifying for the immunity does not prevent 
injunctions to be granted against the intermediary under the Störerhaftung doctrine. 
Finally, the court approved the Appeal Court’s decision which refused the plaintiff’s 
claim for damages. This is because as underlined by the court, interferer liability does not 
give rise to a claim for damages.  
As can be deduced from the BGH’s decision, the limitation to the störerhaftung liability 
is the intermediaries’ reasonable duty to investigate the infringement. Accordingly, this 
was where the court focused on its appraisal to decide whether the intermediary was a 
störer. This was determined by the question of ‘whether and to what extent the 
perpetrator of the “disturbance” can be expected to carry out an investigation in the 
particular circumstances of the case’.473 It is evident from Internet Auction I that an 
intermediary cannot be expected to check every offer listed on its platform before making 
it available online. Internet Auction II further elaborated that the injunctions should not 
be unreasonable as this would jeopardise the ISP’s business model, such as the 
requirement of the implementation of very costly measures. It was also held that the ISPs’ 
duty to take such measures to prevent infringements could be undertaken against future 
infringements ‘if potential interferer gives reason to suspect the likelihood of a first 
infringement’.474 In the light of these, however the outcome of the BGH’s decision 
appears to be conflicting. While an intermediary cannot be expected to check every listing 
appears to be in line with Art.15 of the ECD and EU case law, the application of the 
reasonableness test may lead to incompatible injunctions since the court did not provide 
extensive clarification on the scope of this condition in these cases. Moreover, the 
possibility of the implementation of an injunction against future infringements can result 
in a broad application that amounts to general monitoring.  
 
Fortunately, there exist two recently decided copyright cases that may shed light on the 
court’s interpretation of the scope of the reasonableness test under the Störerhaftung 
doctrine in relation to online infringement cases. At the same time, those cases also 
demonstrate that the reasonableness test can indeed be construed broadly by the courts as 
having a negative impact on the competing rights of the parties of the case.  
 
                                                 
473 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng), 40. 
474 [2007] E.T.M.R. 70 (Eng), 41. 
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2. A Reasonable Duty to Investigate: Has the Scope of 
Reasonableness Been Clearly Specified? 
 
There exist two copyright cases which help to specify the scope of reasonableness. Both 
cases were brought against a file hosting provider, Rapidshare which offered digital 
storage for content that is only accessible via direct links to files which could be shared 
by an individual user. The first case, Atari v Rapidshare AG475 concerned the computer 
game ‘Alone in the Dark’ which was illegally made available to the public on third-party 
search platforms. The game was actually stored in Rapidshare’s storage. Right holders 
notified the third-party and hosting provider (Rapidshare) together for the removal of the 
content which was illegally stored. Yet, the intermediary did not remove it from its 
servers. Right holders claimed that Rapidshare was under a duty to remove the content 
from its servers as well as to prevent future access to the same content. This claim was 
approved by the BGH after it found that Rapidshare was liable476 as Störer. As such, it 
should have taken appropriate measures to prevent current and future infringements from 
the time the notification was received.477 Further, the appropriate measure to do this was 
determined as filtering which would terminate the access to the illegal content currently 
stored on servers and would monitor the same users who uploaded the illegal content to 
prevent possible future infringements. The BGH in fact decided that this measure was 
proportionate and reasonable to impose on the hosting provider since monitoring ‘a single 
digit number of external websites’ was regarded as one specific work.478 This appears to 
be consistent with Art.15 ECD as long as the injunctive relief concerned the specific 
infringements.  
 
                                                 
475 I ZR 18/11 Unreported July 12, 2012 (Ger.) (Alone in the Dark).  Analysis of the case from Annette Kur 
‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’, Columbia Journal of Law& The Arts, (2014); Annette Gartner and Andreas Jauch, 
‘GEMA v RapidShare: German Federal Supreme Court extends monitoring obligations for online file 
hosting providers’ (2014) European Intellectual Property Review 36(3) 197-200. 
476 In the absence of the actual knowledge it was held immune from the liability by virtue of the Art.14 of 
ECD regarding the initial infringements.  
477 Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’ (2014), 537-540. 
478 Gartner and Jauch ‘GEMA v RapidShare: German Federal Supreme Court extends monitoring 
obligations for online file hosting providers’ (2014), 198-199. 
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In a similar vein, in GEMA v Rapidshare479 the monitoring obligation imposed on 
Rapidshare was the issue before the BGH on the ground that illegal uploads of the 
numerous songs were made available on its server and again remained accessible even 
after the notice was given by right holders.480 The BGH relied on its former decision and 
the findings of the lower courts, and accordingly held that Rapidshare was under a duty 
to terminate and prevent the infringements on its servers due to its liability as a 
Störer481.482 Nevertheless, this time the monitoring obligation was ordered in a broader 
sense on the ground that: 
 
 “[i]f the business model of a file hosting service is not a priori designed for 
the infringement of rights, the fact that measures taken by the operator increase 
the risk of an infringing use of the service is to be taken into account in 
determining the extent of the monitoring obligations incumbent upon him as 
infringing party”.483  
 
 
This was based on the fact that the new business model of Rapidshare which offered 
premium accounts affected its neutral position as this model more was likely to give rise 
to illegal content sharing by users.484 Therefore, the BGH considered it reasonable to 
impose a measure on Rapidshare which would oblige it: 
 
 “to investigate through search engines such as Google, Facebook or Twitter 
using appropriately formulated searches and possibly also with the 
assistance of so-called webcrawlers, whether indications can be found as to 
further illegal links to its service with regard to the relevant works”.485  
 
 
The court’s only limitation to this rather extensive monitoring obligation was the 
proportionality requirement stipulated by the CJEU in L’Oréal v Ebay. In that regard, the 
                                                 
479 I ZR 80/12, 15 August 2013, (Ger) (File- Hosting Services) Analysis of the case from Kur ‘Secondary 
Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU’ 
(2014), and Gartner and Jauch, ‘GEMA v RapidShare: German Federal Supreme Court extends monitoring 
obligations for online file hosting providers’ (2014) 197-200.  
480 GEMA, as a collecting society of composers and songwriters. 
481 But immune from the liability regarding the initial infringement under Art.14 of the ECD as there was 
no actual knowledge.  
482 Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’ (2014), 537-540; Annette Gartner and Andreas Jauch, ‘GEMA v RapidShare: German 
Federal Supreme Court extends monitoring obligations for online file hosting providers’ (2014), 199-200. 
483 Cited from ‘Germany: “Rapidshare III”- Telemedia Act secs. 7 (2)’ (2014) International Review of 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law 45(6), 716-719. (Case Comment). 
484 It is because, the premium accounts are provided to the users depending upon the number of their files 
downloaded by the others.  
485 Cited from Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in 
Germany and Throughout the EU’ (2014), 539. 
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court underlined that this obligation should not impose a heavy burden on the provider. 
However, it is difficult to say that the injunction imposed in this case was either 
reasonable or compatible with the EU acquis. Such an extensive injunction which 
comprises monitoring of third-party websites is seemingly incompatible with the 
principles established under the EU regime and case law as it would likely affect the fair 
balance between the fundamental rights of the parties and would constitute a general 
monitoring under Art.15 ECD by virtue of Scarlet v SABAM486 and SABAM v Netlog487. 
Accordingly, this decision hints at how unclear and malleable the reasonableness test can 
be applied under German law.  
 
Besides those two cases, the BGH also had the opportunity to evaluate the blocking 
injunction order on the Störerhaftung ground in the case of Goldesel.to.488 In this case, 
the court was asked to grant a blocking injunction order against an ISP requiring it to 
block its customers’ access to a P2P sharing network (Goldesel) as illegal copies of the 
claimant’s work were available there and could easily be downloaded. In assessing 
Störerhaftung liability, reasonableness was assessed according to ‘whether and to what 
extent the party sued as disturber can reasonably be expected to perform such duties 
depending on the circumstances’. Under the facts of the case, it was held that the ISP at 
stake was not a Störer. Accordingly, the imposition of the blocking injunction would be 
unreasonable in that regard.  This is because ‘[a] disturber’s liability of the internet access 
provider only comes under consideration if the right holder first undertook reasonable 
efforts to stop those involved who – like the website operator- themselves committed the 
infringement or –like the host provider- contributed to the infringement by providing 
services’.489 
 
 In this respect, it was stated that, the ISP’s business model was designed not to create a 
particular risk for copyright infringement. Accordingly, imposing heavy measures would 
jeopardise its business and be disproportionate unless it was notified by the claimant 
regarding illegality or the risk of continuous illegality. The BGH made a further 
                                                 
486 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959. See p 36-37. 
487 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012) C-360/10. See p 37-38. 
488 I ZR 174/14 (BGH, unreported 26 November 2015) (Ger). Analysis from AF ‘Germany: Disturber 
Liability of an Access Provider’ (2016) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
47(4), 481-490 (Case Comment); Jaani Riordan ‘The Liability of Internet Intermediaries’ (Oxford 
University Press 2016), p. 516. 
489 AF ‘Germany: Disturber Liability of an Access Provider’ (2016), 481 (Case Comment). 
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assessment on the proportionality of the blocking injunction request under the facts of the 
case and considering the fundamental rights of the parties. It was stated that imposing 
such a duty on the ISP at issue would be unreasonable since the claimants failed to make 
a reasonable effort to prevent the infringements. Neither did they demonstrate why such 
an injunction would be effective in combatting those infringements. Moreover, it was 
concluded that the probable circumvention over blocking the access and the potential 
danger in blocking the lawful element would make the blocking injunction ineffective in 
preventing the infringements in contrast to Arnold J’s holding in Cartier I. 
 
In this case, the BGH examined the issue from both parties’ perspective. On the one hand, 
the ISPs are regarded as being in the best position to terminate the infringements that 
occur on their platforms, yet BGH pointed to the fact that the duty imposed on them 
should be reasonable both under EU law and the doctrine of Störerhaftung. Therefore, 
right holders’ activities in aiming to prevent or terminate infringements were taken into 
consideration in assessing the reasonableness of this duty. In that sense, the BGH 
appeared to strike a balance between the parties in contrast to the last Rapidshare case. 
However, the issue is still being debated.  
 
 
C. Discussion  
 
The most significant feature of German law as to intermediaries’ liability is the fact that 
the liability is primarily dealt with under a property law based doctrine, Störerhaftung. 
This liability as a strict liability provides interim relief, and so appears as an accessory to 
the primary infringement.490 Liability for damages is dealt with under general tort law 
rules so the fault or intention must be proved. The Störerhaftung liability, however, 
depends on the third-party’s duty to investigate on the perpetrator. Yet, as can be seen 
from the above assessment this duty cannot be equated with the duty of care of the 
negligence liability, although the notion of duty of care is used interchangeably with the 
duty to investigate or review in the literature.  
                                                 
490 ‘It is rather intended as a tool to extend the legal protection of property rights by broadening the group 
of possible infringers.’ Hoeren, and Yankova, ‘The Liabilty of Internet Intermediaries- the German 
Perspective’ (2012), 504. 
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The duty imposed with Störerhaftung liability is a separate and accessory obligation. 
However, it appears that the courts have failed to provide clarity on this. More precisely, 
there is no clear and uniform answer given by the courts on the extent of the investigation 
that could have been expected from a Störer. In GEMA v Rapidshare, the extent of this 
duty was set down broadly while monitoring and filtering throughout the third-party 
websites was being held reasonable by the court. Moreover, preventive measures as to 
the future infringements were regarded reasonable to implement without clearly 
specifying the borders. The matter, as a whole, thus depends on the facts of the cases.  It 
can therefore be concluded that German law does not provide the required legal certainty 
in establishing the intermediary liability as well as failing to consider the EU liability 
regime within its national law. The CJEU’s guidance as to the compatibility of 
Störerhaftung with Art.15 of the ECD seems to be a must at least for providing some 
measure of clarity.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Two different national laws governing contributory trade mark liability have been 
assessed in this chapter since whether an intermediary is contributorily liable is for the 
national laws of the MSs to assess. It is therefore evident that the EU’s immunity regime 
is in fact a two-tiered system. There are safe harbour rules which provides immunity from 
contributory liability for certain types of intermediaries. Accordingly, they deal with the 
question of whether an intermediary should be regarded as immune from the liability. 
There also exist MSs’ domestic tort law rules governing the issue which decide whether 
the same intermediary is contributorily liable under the national law of that particular MS. 
Thus, the latter deals with the main liability question whilst the former provides the rules 
for an additional protection. More significantly, it is evident that tort law rules are not 
harmonised under EU law, although the immunity rules are uniformly provided. This 
chapter indeed proves the existing fragmentation of the liability matter.  
First, the two legal systems examined have conceptual and fundamental differences in 
their tort law rules which have had an impact on the evolution of contributory trade mark 
liability principles, and so too on the liability of intermediaries online. Indeed, the joint 
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tortfeasance doctrine of English law is a common law doctrine that stems from accessory 
liability as a criminal law rule.491 Significantly, the joint tortfeasance doctrine imposes 
liability on persons whose tortious acts are linked and result in the same single damage. 
In dealing with these issues, as was demonstrated, assessment is heavily dependent on the 
mental element of the tortfeasor (ie the intent) as the application of knowing facilitation 
or assistance as applied under the accessory liability doctrine of criminal law was rejected 
by the courts.  
On the other hand, under German law the general principles of tort law apply. The 
S.823(1) of BGB in that respect stipulates both intention and negligence for the liability. 
However, as the courts have primarily relied on the Störerhaftung doctrine for 
contributory liability issues concerning IP rights, it is not very clear to what extent the 
negligence applies to the matter. The German courts focus on the Störerhaftung doctrine 
of the property law and the injunctive relief it provides. Therefore, German contributory 
trade mark law liability has evolved differently to English one since the liability does not 
depend on a tort-based doctrine.  
In the presence of these conceptual and fundamental differences, divergent outcomes in 
relation to contributory trade mark liability should not be unexpected. However, this is 
not where the controversy ends. More significantly, the Internet as a new platform makes 
the issue more challenging. The above examination demonstrates the courts’ struggle in 
dealing with this new context and the new technologies and issues it brings. As stated, 
the most fundamental difference between the offline and online world is the Internet’s 
digital nature in contrast to the tangibility and the possibility of physical possession in the 
offline world. It is not straightforward to assess the mental state of an intermediary 
compared to a vendor in the offline world since an intermediary would necessarily be 
involved in provision of its service to some extent as the AG astutely stated in L’Oréal v 
Ebay. That is arguably why the application of knowing facilitation is still discussed within 
the English literature despite the courts’ rejection of it. In a similar sense, German case 
law fails to provide a clear framework for the duty of investigation on an intermediary as 
an interferer since the intermediaries’ infrastructure enables them to be more active and 
                                                 
491 The Accessories and Abettor Act 1861, s 8; Davies ‘Accessory Liability: Protecting Intellectual Property 
Rights’ (2011), 390. 
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gives more infrastructural advantages to them in dealing with the infringing activities than 
what a vendor is able to do in the offline world.  
On the other hand, English and German implementations hint that the courts have actually 
considered the Internet and intermediaries’ operation to some extent. Arnold J in L’Oréal 
v Ebay492 emphasised that Ebay has created a new form of trade so, it should and could 
deal with the infringing activities committed on its platform as its way of working carries 
a higher risk of infringements than traditional trade. Similarly, the BGH in Internet 
Auction I stated that an online auction provider cannot be expected to check every listing 
in assessing the extent of its duty to investigate. Yet, those considerations would not be 
sufficient to conclude that national courts have satisfactorily implemented and applied 
the rules to online infringements.  
Moreover, the above examination points to another significant outcome. Although 
harmonised immunity rules are provided within the EU, these have been of little 
assistance in providing uniformity at a national level or in establishing a solid liability 
regime. As examined, the national courts’ appraisals primarily focused on their national 
laws. Those case laws did not provide further insight into how the immunity rules should 
be implemented, construed and applied within the national law context. The BGH even 
decided that there was no need to ask for guidance from the CJEU as to the compatibility 
of the Störerhaftung doctrine with the EU acquis since it opined it was clearly compatible. 
All these outcomes actually underline the importance of the uniformity which EU law 
seems unable to provide at both the national and EU level. Therefore, the above appraisal 
concludes that establishing an online contributory trade mark liability law with a solid 
framework is incredibly challenging task under the two-tiered system of the EU. It would 
follow that the EU’s approach undertaken for the intermediaries’ regime which 
establishes an immunity regime in pursuit of harmonisation is not proving to be 
appropriate or satisfactory for contributory trade mark liability issues online. Quite the 
opposite, it brings divergence in application while providing very limited uniformity. The 
task of the next chapter is to seek a solution for a more concrete and clearly established 
regime for trade marks.  
                                                 
492 [2009] EWCH 1094, [369]. 
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I. OVERVIEW 
 
Throughout the previous chapters, the evolution of the law of online contributory trade 
mark liability has been examined in the light of the immunity regime and domestic laws 
of the chosen MSs. Ultimately, it was concluded that the current state of the law that 
governs contributory trade mark liability has failed to stand up to the challenges that the 
Internet poses. However, this does not necessarily mean that the current system is not 
working at all. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that there are some significant elements 
of the EU’s liability regime which cannot be ignored in assessing its feasibility. These 
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are: 1) the immunity rules are specifically established by taking the way that the Internet 
and intermediaries operate into the consideration; 2) immunity is provided according to 
the type of activity that the intermediary undertakes, thus, adopted a problem-oriented 
approach; and 3) the regime provides general principles to create uniformity and more 
balanced regime.  
However, the examination undertaken so far has concluded that the EU regime fails to 
provide the certainty and establish a solid framework for the law despite all this. 
Specifically, the immunity regime provided within the ECD appears to have failed to 
address the gaps in relation to online infringements. These rules only deal with situations 
in which certain intermediaries can be regarded as immune from liability. Therefore, its 
assistance remains limited in providing the necessary framework. There is also a lack of 
guidance from the CJEU and the EU legislators on the application of the rules which 
prevents the law from being more solid and effective. Finally, the fact that the EU liability 
regime is actually two-tiered and primarily dependent on the national tort laws of the MSs 
cannot be ignored. As demonstrated, this makes the EU liability regime more fragmented 
and ultimately prevents the regime from achieving its main aim of creating uniformity.  
In the light of these, the remedy should be sought in order to deal with the existing 
challenges that arise from the Internet as well as to provide a more effective and solid 
framework for the law of online contributory trade mark liability. This is what this chapter 
will focus on. While doing this, the Chapter will re-evaluate the current state of the law 
under the new developments undertaken within the EU, more precisely under the 
published Communications which are pertinent to trade mark law. These are: the DSM 
Strategy493 and the Communications published related to this Strategy,494 
Communication on Tackling Illegal Content495 and the draft Proposal of the CD496. Those 
Communications, in general, aim to provide the required assistance for the issues 
identified in relation to the intermediaries’ regime for the purpose of creating a DSM. 
Creation of a DSM would mean free movement of goods, persons, services, capital and 
data which would pave a way to an economic boost, innovation and more uniform rules. 
                                                 
493 Communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COMM (2015) 192 final.  
494 EU Commissions press release on ‘Digital Single Market: Commissions calls for swift adoption of key 
proposals and maps out challenges ahead’ IP/17/1232; Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the 
Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final. 
495 Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555. 
496 Proposal of ‘a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ COMM (2016) 593. 
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Those Communication do not necessarily target trade mark issues. Nevertheless, those 
developments mention the implementation of specific mechanisms or indicate the 
prospects for new policies. These are pertinent to the trade mark discussion with respect 
to the horizontal approach of EU law even though trade marks are not expressly 
mentioned in some of these Communications. Along with those developments, existing 
mechanisms will also be examined to see whether they can work for the online 
contributory trade mark liability regime if further action is taken. Those mechanisms are 
NTD and injunctions.  
By undertaking this assessment, the Chapter aims to contribute to the main purpose of the 
thesis by answering the following question: ‘Can a remedy be found within current EU 
law governing online contributory trade mark liability without a radical overhaul of the 
existing regulatory framework?’. The examination should start by mapping out the 
current law of online contributory liability with the challenges that have arisen in the light 
of the examination undertaken so far.  
 
II. MAPPING OUT ONLINE CONTRIBUTORY TRADE MARK LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES  
 
In the preceding chapters, the law governing contributory liability that arises online is 
assessed for the purpose of establishing the current law that is applicable to trade mark. 
As demonstrated, the applicable law has been established horizontally and unfortunately 
there is no comprehensive case law either at EU or national level dealing with trade mark 
matters. As a result, application of the law has been mainly examined from the perspective 
of copyright as copyright has dominated the liability discourse. Yet, those cases are still 
pertinent to trade mark law as Chapter 2 concluded that they are the most analogous rights 
to trade mark.  
In the light of all examinations undertaken, the law of contributory trade mark liability 
applicable to online issues should now be mapped out and the existing challenges should 
be identified in the light of the examination undertaken so far.  
For contributory trade mark liability matters that arise online, the most pertinent legal 
instrument is the immunity regime of the ECD as it is for the other rights. Those rules can 
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therefore be said to be the rules that shape the law. As the immunity regime is 
comprehensively assessed within chapter 3, there is no need to restate them here. What is 
needed in order to map out the law is the trade mark-specific implementations. Google 
France497 and L’Oréal v Ebay498 are the only CJEU cases at hand. It was especially the 
latter which set an important precedent for the trade mark realm since it considered Ebay, 
which is an online auction site, and the counterfeit sales on it. This type of infringement 
on an online marketplace is the most common trade mark infringement as well as the 
main consideration of this thesis. By virtue of the CJEU’s decision, the following 
principles given below can be established for the application of the immunity rules in 
relation to trade mark infringement. 
First, just as it is for intermediaries’ liability in general, hosting intermediaries’ liability 
is the focus of debate in relation to trade mark. Assessing hosting intermediaries’ 
involvement in the infringing activity through a knowledge standard was what the CJEU 
focused on in these cases. In fact, in Google France, the CJEU also assessed this but in 
L’Oréal v Ebay the applicable test was laid out more thoroughly. In this case, the diligent 
economic operator test was provided. In examining the awareness of the online auction 
site about trade mark infringements committed by its users, the applicable test is set as 
whether a diligent economic operator should have identified the illegality in question as 
a result of either its own investigation or a receipt of notification and acted accordingly. 
However, the court failed to give further insight on how this test should be applied to 
infringements that arise from counterfeit selling.  
As previously demonstrated, the identification of the genuineness of a good requires 
expert information unless there are obvious signs as to the counterfeit nature of the good. 
An online auction provider is not expected to have such expertise. It also never takes the 
physical possession of the goods for comprehensive investigation. Given this, how much 
diligence should be regarded sufficient for fulfilling the diligent economic operator role? 
It is clear that taking an offline market place as a standard is not appropriate given the 
differences in their way of working. Neither is considering another online auction 
provider as a standard of the ‘diligent economic operator’ given their potential differences 
in terms of size and capabilities. Perhaps implementing a filter mechanism whereby 
certain words are filtered out as a result of this process could place upon an intermediary 
                                                 
497 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417. 
498 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011. 
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the awareness as to the infringing activity committed. Providing answers to these issues 
are quite important because the duty to act is triggered after obtaining such awareness. 
Given the lack of certainty, further guidance on the practical application of the diligent 
economic operator is what is needed.  
Second, analysis of the domestic laws of the chosen MSs reveals that the examination of 
the contribution through a mental element has also been significant element in 
determining contributory liability for domestic courts. This appears to be a significant 
element of joint tortfeasance liability under English law. However, it is clear that English 
law sets a different level of knowledge as a condition since knowing facilitation is rejected 
under its case law. For trade marks, English case law’s contribution is limited to L’Oréal 
v Ebay. This case’s influence also remains limited as the case was settled between the 
parties and the guidance received from the CJEU was never implemented.  
As happened in L’Oréal v Ebay, a notification is the most common way of obtaining the 
awareness in practice. In that regard, further clarification on the issue would provide a 
solution for the shortcomings of the regime. In fact, the Court assessed the notification 
element in the case to decide the immunity of Ebay. However, the EU regime lacks 
uniformity and certainty as it has not established a solid NTD system with necessary 
safeguards, and neither has the CJEU provided further clarification.  
The duty to take appropriate action, ie by the removal of the content or by blocking access 
to it, is also important for trade mark infringements. This relates to Art.15 and the 
injunctions. The duty to act differs from injunctions as they are applied quasi-judicial 
while injunctions granted are part of a judicial process. What we have for trade mark law 
are the minimum standards that the injunctions should fulfil which are provided in the 
ED. Moreover, the applications of injunctions are not limited to infringements already 
committed. Injunctions against future infringements are also applicable if they target a 
specific infringement, as the CJEU approved in L’Oréal v Ebay. However, the Court did 
not determine what specific infringement or specific monitoring means. The German 
doctrine of Störerhaftung hints at the importance of resolving this issue from the 
application of the reasonableness standard under German case law. Although the case law 
examined in that regard related to copyright, the seminal Internet Auction499 cases 
                                                 
499 I ZR 304/01, 11 March 2004 (Ger), 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng); I ZR 35/04, 19 April 2007 
(Ger), [2007] E.T.M.R. 70 (Eng); Case I ZR 73/05 Bundesgerichtshof, April 30, 2008 (Ger). 
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considered trade mark and an online auction site and approved the implementation of 
injunctions for future infringements. More remarkably, the applicability of Störerhaftung 
liability was not referred to the CJEU for clarification.  
The decision of the CJEU in Google France500 appears to assist in determining the law 
of online contributory trade mark liability, as well. This case concerned another common 
trade mark infringement online: infringements that arise from purchasing and bidding for 
Adwords that correspond to others’ trade marks. In this case, the CJEU held that Google’s 
activity with respect to Adwords fulfils the hosting activity stated under Art.14. Thus, it 
can be granted immunity provided that the conditions are satisfied.  
The above are the rules that govern online contributory trade mark liability. However, as 
is highlighted, the law is far from complete. There appear to be two reasons behind this: 
1) lack of uniformity and further guidance pertaining to the liability regime, and 2) lack 
of an Internet specific or even sector-specific problem driven approach. Lack of 
uniformity is an issue for online as well as offline infringements. Yet, it appears to bring 
many more challenges for the online world given the Internet’s borderless nature. In the 
presence of fragmented rules that change from one country to another, intermediaries are 
subject to a range of diverging legal requirements which affect the legal certainty that an 
intermediary seeks. The immunity regime as demonstrated provides only limited 
uniformity. Early cases brought against Ebay before the different MSs of the EU illustrate 
this best. Their outcomes were diverging. This may lead an intermediary to cease its 
operations in a country where the rules differ considerably. This would ultimately impact 
the economy as well as creating a DSM.   
Along with that, the Internet’s sui generis nature also demands more defined problem- 
oriented liability regime. It is clear that the courts have failed to conduct a right-specific 
analysis when dealing with the issues. There is limited case law dealing with trade mark. 
To make matters worse, in those limitedly available cases the courts failed to pay specific 
attention to the specifics of the trade mark realm which might require different 
implementation. This, appears more important with respect to the application of the 
enforcement mechanisms, namely NTD and injunctions. Those mechanisms are provided 
for effective protection. However, the nuance is the level of effectiveness that those 
measures can provide for the prevention of different types of infringements. The 
                                                 
500 Joined cases C-236/08 to C-236/10 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417. 
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effectiveness may differ depending on the type of measure implemented or type of 
infringement committed. Besides the case law demonstrates that the courts have failed to 
assess the applicability of these measures from the fundamental rights ground although 
the balancing act is established as a test in the injunction cases. This is significant and 
should not be overlooked in the purpose of providing and enhancing legal security and 
the fair balance for the parties as the enforcement mechanism are directly related to the 
balance that exists between the parties.   
Moreover, as previously concluded, the analogy deployed with offline world 
infringements is somewhat inadequate and has led to ambiguous applications and an 
imbalance between the parties according to the responsibilities imposed. Safe harbour 
rules have been tailored for certain intermediaries, yet their assistance remains limited 
since those rules only deal with specific situations in which only specific intermediaries 
can be regarded as immune from liability.  
In the light of all these, it appears that the missing part is the rules that govern the liability 
of intermediaries as well as more solid rules for the enforcement of the rights. In that 
regard, what appears to be necessary or desirable for the intermediary regime is the 
enactment of the rules that deal specifically with the question of when an intermediary is 
liable. However, although desirable, expecting enactment of new legislation dealing with 
the liability question would not be realistic under the current EU developments. This is 
firstly because it is evident under current EU policy that the EU legislators have no 
intention of taking such action, at least for the time being. Even if this option were 
considered in the future, the enactment of new legislation would have the potential to 
easily become outdated in the short term given the nature of the Internet and how fast 
technologies evolve. Such a process would also be time consuming. 
 Secondly, regulating the liability question horizontally might not offer a desirable result 
either -as the Chapter 2 hinted-  while the enactment of vertically applicable rules may be 
an impossible task for EU legislators to undertake, either. Moreover, there is nothing 
indicating that harmonisation on tort law rules at EU level, nor specifically provided 
contributory trade mark liability law are a possibility for the time being or even for the 
future. This thesis therefore seeks after a remedy from existing mechanisms to establish 
a more satisfactorily working contributory trade mark liability regime for the EU.  
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The reason why the existing mechanisms can still be taken into consideration in the 
pursuit of the aim of this thesis lies in the EU’s latest actions in dealing with the challenges 
surrounding the intermediary liability regime. The Communications published by the EU 
in the last two years are in fact indicate a possible change in the EU’s approach. The first 
initiative that should be considered in that regard is dated 2012.501 In that Communication, 
adaptation of a horizontally applicable notice-and-action procedure was proposed for the 
effective and clear protection of rights.502 However, in 2013,503 the proposal for a 
Directive dealing with the matter was withdrawn. Following this, in 2015 the DSM 
Strategy was published.504 Briefly, the strategy in relation to the intermediaries’ liability 
regime was stated as to provide ‘a fit-for purpose regulatory environment for platforms 
and intermediaries’.505 It was further stated that more effective enforcement should be 
provided to combat the illegal content and to enhance the uniformity within the EU. A 
duty of care was mentioned as a possible measure to reach this aim. This duty is simply 
explained as requiring ‘intermediaries to exercise greater responsibility and due 
diligence in the way they manage their networks and systems’.506 
One year later, another Communication was published507 which aimed to identify the key 
issues of online platforms508 and the EU’s policy in combatting these issues was set out. 
In that regard, the Communication emphasised the need for a ‘balanced and predictable 
liability regime for online platforms’.509 For the creation of such a regime, the 
implementation of new types of initiatives, ie EU-wide self-regulatory measures,510 
formal notice-and-action procedures511 were mentioned for further consideration. In the 
                                                 
501 Commission ‘A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and 
online services’(Communication) COMM (2011) 942 final. 
502 Ibid, p 13-15. 
503 Leaked draft Commission ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
procedures for notifying and acting on illegal content hosted by online intermediary service providers 
(‘Directive on notice-and-action procedures’)’ […] (2013) XXX draft, and See letter by nine MEPs to 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier on the matter, 3 July 2013 
,available at: 
<https://ameliaandersdotter.eu/sites/default/files/letter_commissioner_barnier_notice_and_takedown.pdf> 
504 Communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COMM (2015) 192 final.  
505 Besides this purpose, the strategy covers many areas related to the digital market which fall afoul of the 
scope of the thesis.  
506 Communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COMM (2015) 192 final, p 12. 
507 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final. 
508 The communication employs the term online platforms however, in this thesis the term of intermediaries 
will be continued to employ.  
509 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final, p 8. 
510 Ibid, 7-9. 
511 Ibid. 
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mid-term review of the DSM Strategy, which was published in May 2017512, the 
Commission again set out the notice-and-action mechanisms as part of their policy 
initiatives in its aim of promoting the fairness and responsibility of online platforms and 
of combating illegal content on the Internet. In a lately published Communication, 
Tackling Illegal Content Online,513 the importance of intermediaries in the fight against 
illegal content was underlined by stating that their responsibility in that regard ‘flows from 
their central role in society’.514 Accordingly, the implementation of voluntary measures 
by them are encouraged. What is asked from the intermediaries is, in brief, to take the 
appropriate actions suggested in the Communication against infringing content along with 
ensuring the protection of fundamental rights and due process. 
Finally, the new CD was proposed as part of the developments undertaken by the EU for 
the intermediaries’ liability regime.515 This proposal also includes a provision that require 
the imposition of the new obligations on the intermediaries. Under the proposed Art.13, 
intermediaries which provide storage and access to the public to large amounts of 
copyright protected works uploaded by their users are required to take appropriate 
measures to ‘prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-matter 
identified by rightholders’ such as the use of ‘effective content recognition 
technologies’.516 
When all these developments are taken into consideration together, the EU’s approach to 
the intermediary regime appears to focus on intermediaries’ responsibility rather than 
their liability by means of implementing and applying enforcement measures. Indeed, 
throughout these Communications, effective enforcement mechanisms are considered 
such as notice-and-action procedures, but more importantly intermediaries’ position in 
tackling the infringements has been the focal point. The notice mechanism is still 
discussed in this latest Communication. Furthermore, new obligations are mentioned and 
considered within these Communications. While the CD proposal opted for a legislatory 
                                                 
512 EU Commissions press release on ‘Digital Single Market: Commissions calls for swift adoption of key 
proposals and maps out challenges ahead’ IP/17/1232. 
513 Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555. 
514 Ibid, 2. 
515 Proposal for ‘a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ COMM (2016) 593.   
516 See also Ibid, recital 38.  
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obligation, self-regulatory obligations517 have been also considered as an alternative in 
reaching the aim of a fit-for purpose regulatory environment.  
On the other side of the coin, these developments may also be considered as suggesting 
another potential policy change in intermediaries’ liability regime. Besides emphasising 
the imposition of more responsibility on the intermediaries in pursuit of a fit-for-purpose 
regulatory environment, implementation of a sectorial, problem-driven approach to 
regulation518 was also pointed out. What was proposed in Art.13 of the CD draft would 
indeed be the best to reflect such a sectorial, problem-driven approach in practice if it 
were accepted. In this Article, the intermediaries which store and provide to the public 
access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users are 
required to implement the enforcement measure stated in the Article. The EU legislators’ 
goal in proposing such an obligation is an attempt to prevent the illegal content and solve 
the so-called value gap519 issue between the copyright holders and the platforms. 
Therefore, regardless of its possible impact on the EU regime and trade mark realm, this 
was proposed as a copyright specific solution so, it is a sector specific approach.  
Nevertheless, this approach’s compatibility with the existing regime should not be taken 
for granted. As Frosio520 soundly argues, ‘[i]ntroducing proactive monitoring solely 
through copyright regulation- rather than amending the horizontal eCommerce 
regulation- would open a systematic crack into the EU liability regime.’ Indeed, as it will 
be examined later, the proposed Art.13’s compatibility with Art.14 has been raised as a 
concern in the literature on the ground that it might damage the current negligent-based 
liability regime. Henceforth, a sectorial, problem-driven approach may result in a policy 
change which would affect the whole liability regime. 
Against all these developments, the current mechanisms, ie the injunctions and notice 
mechanism as well as newly proposed ones ie imposition of duty of care or new 
obligations, and self-regulatory measures should be assessed to see whether these can 
                                                 
517 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final, p 7-9. 
518 Ibid, p 8. 
519 This term is used to describe the difference in remuneration obtained by some intermediaries, such as 
YouTube and Spotify. As Spotify works with the right owners and pays the licenses for the distribution of 
a content, YouTube does not do such licence agreement with the right holders. The proposal aimed to 
provide the fair distribution.  
520 Giancarlo F. Frosio ‘From Horizontal to Vertical: An Intermediary Liability Earthquake in Europe’ 
(2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 12 (7) 565–575, 571. 
149 
 
provide the required remedy for trade mark law. Those mechanisms will be assessed 
through the lens of the EU’s new approach in order to see how they would fit in the 
existing regime, if they could provide the required assistance to the trade mark law and 
the creation of DSM. 
 The notice mechanisms will be examined first. 
 
III. NOTICE-and-ACTION REGIME 
 
Notice-and-action is an umbrella term which comprises different types of notice 
mechanisms such as notice-and-takedown (NTD) and notice-and-stay-down. These will 
be considered in this thesis as the current developments focus on these mechanisms in 
tackling the illegal content as well as the current liability regime employs the NTD 
procedures. 
 
A. Current State of EU Law 
 
Under Art.14 ECD, a hosting intermediary is under a duty to act when it obtains the actual 
knowledge or awareness (for the damages) about the illegal activity on its service. One 
of the ways of having awareness is by a receipt of a notification. This is in fact the most 
common way of obtaining awareness given the general monitoring obligation prohibition 
in Art.15 unless an intermediary implements its own measures. An intermediary should 
therefore act accordingly when it receives the notification as to the claimed unlawfulness. 
This act would either be the removal of the material or the blocking of access to the 
material. However, it should be noted that the duty imposed on the caching intermediaries 
within Art.13 differs from the duty of hosting intermediaries. A caching intermediary is 
under a duty to remove or disable the information which has already been removed or 
disabled at the source while the hosting intermediary’s duty to act expeditiously is for the 
information which is being hosted by an intermediary at the time of obtaining the 
awareness. 
In that regard, what makes the takedown difficult for a hosting intermediary is its 
involvement in the decision process of takedown. The existing NTD mechanism and its 
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discussion revolve around hosting intermediaries. Nevertheless, the guidance as to the 
application of the NTD system is limited. As it is stated in Recital 46, specific 
requirements are left to the MSs’ discretion and their domestic laws. This leads, in the 
Commission’s own words, to ‘a heavily fragmented system in the EU over the elements 
of the NTD mechanisms’ to the point where in some MSs it applies as notice-and-stay-
down-like procedures in practice.521 In fact, the NTD mechanism has arguably become 
the least harmonised part of the intermediary liability regime. According to the 
Commission’s staff working document dated 2012, these existing uncertainties mainly 
arise from the fragmentation of the following elements: the requirements of notice, the 
possibility of a defence for providers of information, and the time frame.522 
Despite these uncertainties, there have been some developments since Art.21 of the ECD 
requires the Commission to analyse if there is a need for the proposals regarding NTD 
procedures. As the leaked draft indicates, even the adoption of a Directive on notice-and-
action procedures was on the Commission’s agenda. Yet, unfortunately the proposal was 
later revoked.523 Nevertheless, the latest initiatives taken by the Commission under the 
DSM Strategy, as stated above, hint that further development as to the notice-and-action 
procedures is still a possibility. Accordingly, these procedures are important for the 
thesis’s aim of providing remedy for the contributory trade mark liability regime. 
However, since there is neither an EU-wide applicable NTD system, nor further 
harmonisation on the matter, the DMCA’s rather comprehensively established and 
seemingly well-functioning NTD system should be of assistance. It should be noted here 
again that the DMCA in S.512 creates an ECD-like safe harbours for the intermediaries 
for their particular activities and it is applicable for copyright claims. Nevertheless, its 
NTD regime would still be greatly assisted by its analogical analysis and more 
importantly for understanding the mechanisms’ operation, effectiveness and impacts on 
the liability regime. Thus, it cannot be ignored.  
 
                                                 
521  For instance: the French HADOPI law’s three strike procedures for copyright infringements appears as 
notice-and-stay down like procedure. For detailed explanation and detailed analysis on the legislative 
developments in MSs concerning NTD systems See Commission Staff Working Document, Online 
Services, Including e- Commerce, in the Single Market Accompanying the document Communication on 
‘A coherent framework to boost confidence in the Digital Single Market of e-commerce and other online 
services’ SEC (2011) 1641 final, 43. 
522 Ibid, 43-46. 
523 Angelopoulos ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright: A Tort-Based Analysis’ (2016), 59. 
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B. Notice-and-Takedown Mechanism of S.512 DMCA 
 
S.512 basically creates safe harbour rules for four particular intermediaries, namely: 1) 
transitory digital network communications (Internet access, mere conduit),524 2) system 
caching,525 3) information residing on a system or networks at direction of users 
(hosting)526 and 4) information location tools (linking)527.528 Further, it establishes a NTD 
system for caching, hosting and linking providers as they are under a duty to act 
accordingly after gaining actual knowledge or awareness about illegal content in order to 
be granted immunity for their users’ copyright infringements committed on their services. 
Nevertheless, relying on the same grounds stated above, the US debate over the NTD also 
focuses on the hosting intermediaries as well as information location tools. S.512 provides 
a comprehensively established NTD mechanism under the sub-section designated for 
hosting providers, S.512(c)(3).   
This sub-section specifies the elements that a notice must have. These are specified as 
follows: 1) the notification must be written and include either the physical or electronic 
signature of the person authorised to act on behalf of the copyright owner,529 2) detailed 
information regarding the allegedly infringing content must also be provided in the 
notice530 and 3) a statement indicating the good faith of the complaining party must be 
included in the notification.531 Failure to comply with these requirements will result in 
the notification not to be considered in the determination of knowledge requirement.532 If 
the notification contains all these elements, then the intermediaries’ duty to act 
expeditiously to remove the content or disable the access to it is triggered.533 S.512 also 
creates rules for intermediaries to follow after removal of the content by means of 
safeguards. Firstly, upon receiving the notification, the intermediary is required to 
promptly notify the person, who uploaded the allegedly infringing content, about the 
                                                 
524 the DMCA, S 512(a). 
525 Ibid, S 512(b). 
526 Ibid, S 512(c). 
527 Ibid, S 512(d). 
528 These mapped out in the ECD respectively as follows: art 12 (mere conduit), art 13 (caching) and art 14 
(hosting). As stated however information location tools as stated in the DMCA did not included in the ECD.  
529 The DMCA, S 512 (3) (A) (i).  
530 Ibid, S 512 (3) (A) (ii), (iii), (iv).  
531 Ibid, S 512 (3) (A) (v) (vi).  
532 Ibid, S 512 (3) (B). 
533 The intermediary will not be liable to any person from the takedown unless the infringing nature of the 
material is apparent. Ibid, S 512 (g) (1). 
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removal of this content.534 Accordingly, the accused infringer is given a right to issue a 
counter-notification to the intermediary, yet this notification must also contain the 
required elements specified under S.512(g)(3).535 This counter-notification should be sent 
to the provider of the first notification by an intermediary. If the provider of the 
notification fails to show that the legal action has been started in order to restrain the 
accused infringer in engaging in the infringing activity after 14 days, then the 
intermediary can restore the content.536 
The system created under S.512 appears as a good model for NTD systems since it deals 
with the elements that were identified as persisting issues in the EU’s staff working 
document. ie requirements of notice, after- notice safeguards as counter-notice. 537 It 
clearly provides the requirements of the notice, sets a time frame, creates a counter-notice 
mechanism and regulates the liability question as to the wrongful notice issuance or 
takedown. Yet, it cannot be concluded that adopting the DMCA system in EU law is the 
answer. This is because, even these safeguards cannot be a solution to the challenges that 
arise from NTD mechanisms. First and foremost, the mechanism still put intermediaries 
in the position of being able to assess the alleged illegality of the content and act 
accordingly. More precisely, it gives them power to act as if they are the judges in the 
cases.538 Therefore, the fundamental rights of the parties are at stake as it is the case for 
injunctions. Yet, it must be underlined that the position of ISPs in the operation of the 
NTD system differs from its position in the application of injunctions as the latter is the 
result of the judicial process while in the takedown process it is the intermediary who 
decides to takedown. Furthermore, there is again the question of the effectiveness of the 
application of the mechanism in practice.  
In the presence of these questions, it is difficult to conclude that the DMCA’s system is a 
good precedent for EU law. It appears that it offers the answers as to the procedural 
requirements, but it fails to provide answers for some other important points relating to 
the substance of the process of the NTD mechanism such as leaving the take down 
                                                 
534 Ibid, S 512 (g) (2) (A). 
535 These requirements are same to the requirements stated for the form of the notification received from 
the right owner.  
536 S 512 (g) (2) (C) of the DMCA. 
537 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Online Services, including e- Commerce, in the Single Market’ 
SEC (2011) 1641 final, p 43-46. 
538 Georgios N. Yannopoulos ‘The Immunity of Internet Intermediaries Reconsidered?’ in Mariarosaria 
Taddeo and Luciana Floridi, The Responsibilities of Online Service Providers (Springer International 2017) 
43-59, 54-56. 
153 
 
decision and discretion to a service provider and the fundamental right affected by this 
act. 539   
 
C. An Effective Remedy? 
 
The NTD mechanism should be the first notice-and-action mechanism to examine in 
pursuit of an effective remedy for the liability regime given that EU law indicates the 
implementation of the NTD procedures for immunity within the ECD and there is a 
statutorily established NTD system in S.512 of the DMCA. First of all, the intermediaries’ 
position and their involvement in the decision process as to the takedown arises as the 
most criticised element of this procedure. This is because when the notification is received 
it will be the intermediary who checks the content and then takes down if necessary. Aside 
from putting an intermediary in the position of a judge and resulting in a private 
enforcement, this may also appear a burden for the intermediary in certain cases. Indeed, 
the intermediary may not have the knowledge to be able to assess the legitimacy of the 
notified content. For trade mark and copyright, this would be the most likely case as the 
decision requires expertise to some extent and its legitimacy can depend on the specific 
circumstances. For instance, it would be challenging for an online auction intermediary 
to assess the authenticity of a good, or for the hosting website to assess the legality of a 
digital copy of a movie.540 The intermediaries’ incompetence or difficulty in ascertaining 
the infringing nature of the content may lead the intermediary to take the content down 
without undertaking an adequate assessment, or perhaps without any assessment at all in 
order not to have liability imposed. Furthermore, the lack of transparency541 as to their 
process of taking down has made the issue more challenging in terms of providing a well-
balanced system. Transparency in the process is therefore essential for both 
intermediaries and other parties who become affected by the procedure.  
                                                 
539 It has indeed been criticised with respect to its effectivity. For detailed analysis See Jennifer N Urban, 
Joe Karaganis and Brianna L Schofield ‘Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice’ (2017) University of 
California Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2755628. Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628 > 
540 Van-Eecke ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Balanced Approach’ (2011). (‘Indeed, 
even information that some would presume to always be illegal – such as copies of recent Hollywood films 
that are made publicly available on a peer-to-peer network- can be legal.’) 
541 This concern is raised in the public consultation on e-commerce by the respondents. See Commission 
Staff Working Document, ‘Online Services, including e- Commerce, in the Single Market’ SEC (2011) 
1641 final, p 45. 
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Indeed, empirical research have been conducted to demonstrate that the criticisms 
levelled against the NTD system correspond with the practical reality, even if they are not 
representative. In the Liberty Project,542 two ISPs, one US and one UK based, were 
chosen for the Mystery Shopper Test. Researchers first uploaded the illegal content on the 
hosting pages of the chosen ISPs and, then sent a notification to them claiming the 
illegality of that content by acting as copyright owner and asked for it to be taken down. 
Remarkably, in this artificially created notification neither the detailed address of the 
sender nor other proof of identity were provided. As a response to these notifications, the 
US ISP did not directly act to takedown but instead asked for further information as to 
the illegal content in order to comply with the requirements set out in S.512. Yet, this 
further information was intentionally not provided by the researchers so, no further action 
was taken by the US ISP. On the other hand, the UK ISP responded by taking down the 
content after just 5 days from receiving the notification, and more importantly without 
asking for more detail about the allegedly infringing content.  
In another piece of research focusing on ten different ISPs located in the Netherlands, the 
Multatuli Project,543 it was demonstrated that the responses of these ISPs to the same 
notification were varied. In the Take Down Test undertaken, the notification was again 
created artificially by the researchers and did not contain detailed information. Even 
more, the content uploaded by the researchers was not in fact protected by copyright as 
the copyright holder had died many years ago, so copyright had expired. Despite these 
facts, seven of the ten ISPs responded to the notification by removing the content but 
without examining the validity of the notification. Only one ISP considered and examined 
the legality of the claim and then refused to takedown the content while other two ISPs 
asked for the further information with a questionnaire, but did not take further action, so 
the process ended.544 The research also revealed that the application of the expeditious 
act requirement of Art.14 as to the removal differed from one ISP to another in practice. 
Amongst the ISPs in the test, the time frame for the removal of the content varied from 
                                                 
542 Christian Ahlert, Chris Marsden and Chester Yung ‘How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The 
Mystery Shopper Tests Internet Content Self-Regulation’ (2004) (Liberty project). Available at 
<http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/sites/pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/files/ > 
543 Sjoera Nas, ‘The Multatuli Project ISP Notice & take down’ (2004) (Multatuli project) <https://www-
old.bof.nl/docs/researchpaperSANE.pdf>  
544 Ibid. 
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three hours to ten days,545 which is an important outcome to demonstrate the existing 
uncertainty in practice as this divergence arose within just one country.   
As such, the NTD mechanism under EU law not only represents serious uncertainties but 
also carries a potential for interference on the fundamental rights of the parties who are 
subject to the takedown. The fundamental rights that can be affected by such take down 
are mostly the users and content providers’ right to freedom of expression and information 
whereas it appears to respect the intermediaries’ freedom to conduct of business and right 
owners’ right to have an effective remedy.546 This is because the existing regime appears 
to have adopted or promoted the ‘shoot first ask questions later’ approach. Even perhaps 
without applying the second part in most of the cases since the aforementioned pieces of 
research indicate that the asking questions part was not properly applied. Moreover, there 
is no counter-notice mechanism which would violate the fundamental rights of the content 
provider as to the procedures such as fair trial  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the elements and the application of the EU’s NTD 
regime as it is represents a serious danger to the freedom of expression of the parties and 
due process These elements appear to give rise to potential abuses which can be specified 
as follows: over-blocking or censorship or false removal given the lack of expertise of the 
intermediaries in identifying the legality of the content or notification and the lack of a 
comprehensive examination undertaken by the intermediaries. There is a lack of guidance 
or provisions on what will happen if the false notification is received by an intermediary 
or if an intermediary unlawfully removes the content, as well as a lack of transparency as 
to the intermediaries’ assessment principles and lack of counter-notice mechanism.  
Therefore, the present state of the regime undoubtedly requires safeguards and clearer 
rules in order to be considered feasible and have its desired effect under the EU liability 
regime. To this end, the DMCA sets a good precedent for the EU in relation to the 
procedural safeguards as stated above.547 Yet, even with those safeguards in application, 
                                                 
545 Ibid. 
546 Wallberg assesses these in detail. See Knud Wallberg, ‘Notice and takedown of counterfeit goods in the 
Digital Single Market: a balancing of fundamental rights’ (2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice 12 (11) 922-936. See also Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a 
Balanced Approach’ (2011), 1479. 
547 There is also Japanese system which is called notice- wait and takedown. In this system, the intermediary 
is required to wait for the specified time before taking down the allegedly infringing material, yet the 
mechanism still appears as the NTD system with slight difference; waiting. Therefore, this mechanism 
arguably eliminates the concerns raised for the NTD system. See Angelopoulos and Smet ‘Notice-and-fair-
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the NTD and its possible effectiveness should not be taken for granted as this would not 
be the end of the discussion. In fact, the DMCA’s counter-notice mechanisms are not as 
effective as they were intended to be. Bridy and Keller states ‘[c]ounter-notices certainly 
appear to be far less common than the improper removals that they are intended to 
counteract’.548  
Against this background, it would be wrong to conclude that the NTD is a fail-safe 
enforcement system in dealing with infringements which also provides the fair balance 
between the parties. Moreover, the DSM Strategy and the EU agenda hint that the NTD 
is not the only system in the Commission’s mind for further harmonisation and effective 
enforcement mechanisms. The specific mention of the sectoral approach also indicates 
the probability of the adoption of the different notice mechanisms. Therefore, those 
variations will not be ignored and will be examined next.   
 
D. Variants of Notice-and-Action Mechanism 
 
There exist many types of notice mechanisms adopted or applied within the national laws 
of the countries as applicable for different types of rights.549 However, not all of these 
alternatives will be examined in this part since the thesis’ focus is trade mark. Therefore, 
the most appropriate alternatives for trade mark, but mainly the currently adopted notice 
mechanisms for copyright, are to be considered as copyright is the most appropriate 
vehicle for analogical comparison if the application of the same rules is not regarded as 
feasible. The following alternatives will be examined here: 1) notice-and-stay down 2) 
notice-and-notice 3) notice-and-judicial-takedown and 4) notice-and-disconnection. 
 
1. Notice-and-Stay Down 
 
                                                 
balance: how to reach a compromise between fundamental rights in European intermediary liability’ (2016), 
296-297. 
548 Annemarie Bridy and Daphne Keller ‘US Copyright Office Section 512 Study: Comments in Response 
to Notice of Inqury’ 31 March 2016 Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757197>. 
549 Notice and suspension, notice-wait and takedown, automatic takedown can be stated as an example to 
these alternatives beside the ones will be examined. For examination of each system for different clashes, 
See Angelopoulos and Smet ‘Notice-and-fair-balance: how to reach a compromise between fundamental 
rights in European intermediary liability’ (2016). 
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Notice-and-stay down means that an intermediary is also under a duty to prevent the 
reappearance of the illegal content which is previously removed pursuant to a notice. 
More precisely, intermediary not only takes down the illegal content but also needs to be 
sure that this particular content will never be uploaded again on its platform. To achieve 
this, the intermediary should have the appropriate mechanism in place for monitoring all 
the contents that are uploaded. Automated filtering and monitoring systems would 
therefore be the most appropriate option for implementation as the required monitoring 
could not be done by human supervision.  
Requiring an intermediary to monitor all uploaded contents to ensure that the concerned 
material is not re-uploaded presents serious challenges without providing any safeguards 
if not already harms the fair balance between parties. Actively seeking to identify the 
previously removed content for an unlimited time would most likely amount to general 
monitoring which poses a serious concern for the freedom of expression and information 
of the users as it promotes censorship. More importantly, general monitoring is prohibited 
under Art.15 ECD, and, as confirmed by the CJEU in Scarlet v SABAM550 and SABAM v 
Netlog551 such a filtering system, which was applicable for all users and for an unlimited 
time, was not compatible with Art.15. At that point, one can argue that the CJEU’s 
decision in L’Oréal v Ebay  with respect to the application of injunctions to future 
infringements was the confirmation of the notice-and-stay down mechanism. However, 
there is a significant nuance which should be considered in applying preventive 
mechanisms. Whether the right to act to prevent future infringements comprises of the 
preventing act taken for the same, similar or every infringement? Along with the AG’s 
opinion in L’Oréal v Ebay, the CJEU’s judgment should be read as granting an injunction 
only for the re-appearance of the same infringement. The other possibilities however may 
appear possible for notice-and-stay down mechanisms in the lack of explicitly established 
rules. This is evident that such mechanism would represent serious concerns on the 
fundamental rights as well as is in conflict with Art. 15.   
Against this background, the notice-and-stay down mechanism appears to be an 
unfavourable mechanism for the effective enforcement of the rights given the serious 
concerns that arise from the system. Indeed, the imposition of such a duty on the 
                                                 
 
550 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959. 
551 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012). 
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intermediaries was also rejected by the Milan Court of Appeal552 in 2015 and French 
Supreme Court553 in 2012 on the grounds that it was incompatible with EU law and it 
would be a great burden to impose on intermediaries. Despite this, the mechanism still 
receives a great deal of attention on both sides of the Atlantic, especially from right 
holders. In the EU Commission’s staff working document, it was revealed that the most 
of the right holders who were part of the public consultation expressed their support for 
the notice-and-stay down procedures.554 Moreover, the study undertaken by the US 
Copyright Office demonstrated the same kind of support for a mechanism from some 
right holders in the US.555 More importantly, the system was mentioned by the EU 
Commission in its 2015 Communication556 as an alternative tool for copyright issues. 
Finally, the Communication, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online’557 considers the stay down 
mechanisms and appears to encourage intermediaries to implement required technologies 
to prevent the re-appearance of the illegal content. It then indicates the importance of the 
safeguards in that regard yet does not offer further insight on what type of safeguards 
should be implemented.  
Overall, despite its popularity amongst right holders, it is evident that it has not proven 
itself to be efficient, just and proportionate as an enforcement mechanism on the grounds 
that it poses a serious danger to the fundamental rights of the users and imposes a great 
burden on intermediaries by leaving it to them of preventing re-appearance of illegal 
content558.  
 
2. Notice-and-Notice 
 
                                                 
552 Milan Court of Appeal, Reti Televisive Italiene S.p.A. (RTI) v. Yahoo! Italia S.r.l (Yahoo!) et al, 7 
january 2015. Cited from, Monica Horten ‘Content Responsibility: The looming cloud of uncertainty for 
internet intermediaries’ (2016) Center for Democracy and Technology1-24, 10. 
553 La société Google France c La société Bach films, Cour de cassation (Première chambre civile) 12 July 
2012 Cited from Angelopoulos and Smet ‘Notice-and-fair-balance: how to reach a compromise between 
fundamental rights in European intermediary liability’ (2016), 289. 
554 Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Online Services, including e- Commerce, in the Single Market’ 
SEC (2011) 1641 final, p 43. 
555 Giancarlo F. Frosio ‘Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to 
Responsibility’ (2017) Oxford International Journal of Law and Information Technology 26(1) 1-33. 
556 Commission, ‘Towards a Modern, More European Copyright Framework’ (Communication) COMM 
(2015) 626 final. 
557 Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555. 
558 This also justifies the right holders’ position in support of the mechanism, as the process does not impose 
any burden to the copyright holders other than issuing a notice for the removal.   
159 
 
A notice-and-notice regime basically requires an intermediary to forward the notice to the 
user of its service who is claimed to have infringed the right. After doing this, the 
intermediary is no longer involved in the process. This mechanism was adopted by 
Canada for copyright issues with the aim of discouraging online copyright infringement. 
Under the relevant sections of Canada’s Copyright Act,559 an intermediary’s only duty is 
to forward such notice to the alleged infringer who is the user of the service. If the 
infringer cannot be identified, then the records of the notice should be kept for six months 
by the intermediary. This regime also sets out the conditions that the notice should 
contain.  
The most significant outcome of this regime is that the intermediary’s involvement is 
limited to passing the notice on the user. There is no requirement of takedown. 
Accordingly, the decision about whether to takedown the infringing content is not one for 
the intermediaries to make. This decision is left to the notified user under this regime. 
The user may takedown the content or may not. Depending on the users’ act, the copyright 
owner may start proceedings.  
On this basis, mechanism eliminates the concerns raised for the NTD and notice-and-stay 
down mechanisms since it leaves the intermediaries out of the decision process on the 
illegality of the content and potential takedown. The copyright owner who has the 
expertise and knowledge regarding the content is now more involved in the process. The 
alleged infringer is given the right to represent itself as part of due process. Thus, it 
eliminates the concerns raised with respect to fundamental rights of the parties and 
appears to ensure the fair balance while its effectiveness raised as a question.   
Under the Canadian regime, the content owner is neither under a duty to respond to the 
notice nor to contact the copyright owner. If for instance, it uploads the content 
legitimately, yet chooses not to inform the copyright owner as there is no requirement for 
that, the copyright owner may start the proceedings given that the content has not been 
removed. This can be time consuming as well as conflicting with the rule of procedural 
economy since the user lawfully uploaded the content. Even if the content is infringing 
and illegally uploaded, the content owner may still not want to remove it. In that case, the 
copyright owner will most likely start the court proceedings in seeking removal of the 
                                                 
559 Copyright Act (Revised Statutes of Canada 1985, c. C-42) ss. 41.25-41.27. See <<http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-42/>>. 
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content. Therefore, in either case, the mechanism appears to be more time consuming for 
resolving the matter than the other systems examined above. Nevertheless, this does not 
necessarily mean that the notice-and-notice mechanism is not preferable to the other 
mechanisms. Given the fact that the notice-and-notice regime provides a relatively more 
balanced system especially with respect to the fundamental rights, it should be in the 
legislators’ mind as the strongest alternative for further harmonisation in tackling online 
infringements.  
 
3. Notice-and-Judicial Takedown 
 
As it can be deduced from its name, under the notice-and-judicial takedown system, 
taking down or blocking cannot be done without a court order. This means that the 
removal or blocking of content is always a result of the judicial process. After receiving 
the order, an intermediary should act accordingly to the order of the court. This appears 
to be the preferred in Spain560 and was adopted in Chilean copyright law561. Moreover, 
this regime was regarded as a good alternative to the NTD system by the Special 
Rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Council in his report since the NTD 
system is regarded as posing a serious danger of violation of fundamental rights.562 
 Indeed, the mechanism offers the required protection for fundamental rights given that 
the removal of the content is done after a judicial process and by virtue of a court order. 
However, in terms of time and procedural economy, it poses the same challenges as the 
notice-and-notice mechanism and does not offer any solution, either.563 The 
establishment of an alternative dispute resolution model specifically dealing with these 
issues could be considered as means of lightening the burden of the judicial system and 
shortening the process. Having this option in mind, this mechanism also appears to be 
proportionate in protecting the fundamental rights of the parties and in providing an 
effective remedy for right owners.  
                                                 
560 Angelopoulos and Smet ‘Notice-and-fair-balance: how to reach a compromise between fundamental 
rights in European intermediary liability’ (2016), 299. 
561 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, Frank La Rue, United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council A/ HRC/17/27 (2011), 
13.  
562 Ibid. 
563 Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability- Background Paper 30 May 2015,17 <<https://www.eff.org/ 
files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_background_paper.pdf>>  
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4. Notice-and-Disconnection (Graduated Response Scheme) 
 
This mechanism is most commonly adopted in copyright law to prevent infringing content 
made available through P2P file sharing. Although its application may diverge between 
countries,564 it principally stems from the idea of preventing repeated infringements. In 
that regard, if the infringer continues to the infringing activity even after receiving a 
certain number of notices in a specified period of time,565 it will then be subject to a 
sanction which is mainly takes the form of the suspension of Internet access for a specified 
time. The general framework of the mechanism, however differs from one country to 
another in practice. These divergent elements generally relate to the required number of 
notifications before the imposition of a sanction, who is the issuer of these notifications, 
the types of sanctions that can be imposed on the infringer and who will impose the 
sanctions on the repeat infringer. For example, in France there are administrative agencies 
who are responsible for the operation of this system. With respect to the related law, 
French HADOPI law,566 infringers are notified and warned by these agencies. If one 
infringer is identified for a third time in one year (three-strike model), then the 
administrative agency can apply to a court for the imposition of a sanction which would 
be the suspension of access for a time determined by the Court.567 Similarly, South 
Korean law adopted the three-strike model for copyright infringements yet the suspension 
orders are issued by the Minister of Culture, Sports and Tourism.568  
                                                 
564 For detailed examination See Frosio ‘Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability 
to Responsibility’ (2017); Nicolo Zingales ‘Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying Best Practices for 
Africa’ Association for Progressive Communications (2013).  
565 Which is regulated differently under the national laws. 
566 Law No. 2009-669 of June 12, 2009, Promoting the Dissemination and Protection of Creative Works on 
the Internet (HADOPI Law) (France). See Frabboni, ‘File Sharing and the Role of Intermediaries in the 
Marketplace: National, European Union and International Developments’ (2010), 136-137; Guadamuz, 
‘Developments in Intermediary Liability’ (2014) 333-336. 
567 It should be noted that when the HADOPI law first enacted, the law enabled these administrative 
authorities to decide and impose the sanctions on the infringers without referring to the Court. However, 
after it was held that this was not consistent with the French Constitution by the French Constitutional 
Court, the related provisions were amended as requiring a judicial determination as to the infringer’s access 
suspension. Loi favorisant la diffusion et la protection de la création sur internet, Conseil Constitutionnel, 
Décision n° 2009-580 DC du 10 juin 2009 cited from Zingales ‘Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying 
Best Practices for Africa’ (2013), fn 77. 
568 Frosio ‘Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility’ (2017). 
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Besides the legislative adoption by countries, this mechanism is also favoured by private 
parties as part of voluntary agreements. In an abandoned model569 of the graduated 
response scheme (GRS) called Copyright Alert System, which the five largest US 
broadband ISPs and the entertainment industry voluntarily agreed on, the six-strike model 
was chosen, and the intermediaries were the ones who would impose the specified 
measures on the infringers.  
In Ireland, however, GRS came into play in a rather different way. The Irish ISP, Eircom 
voluntarily made the agreement with Irish record companies by means of a settlement 
after those companies sought an injunction against Eircom which required Eircom to 
implement a three-strike GRS for illegal file sharing. The implementation of the 
mechanism was sought by the right owners through an injunction order from a court.570 
Although in this case Eircom voluntarily accepted to implement such mechanism, later in 
Sony Music Entertainment (Ireland) Limited v UPC Communications Ireland Limited 
(No1),571 the Irish Court granted the injunction against the concerned ISP (UPC) which 
required the UPC to implement the GRS to prevent copyright infringements.572  
Based on the models adopted either through a legislation or a voluntary agreement, the 
first and foremost outcome that can be deduced with respect to the mechanism is its 
potential negative outcome on users’ rights. Regardless of how many strikes are required 
before imposing sanctions or the specified time period in order to establish a more 
balanced system, the fact that the last sanction is -more commonly- the suspension or the 
termination of an Internet access means there is a high likelihood of the violation of the 
fundamental rights of the users. Furthermore, under the possibility of creating a system 
that enables either an intermediary or administrative authority to decide on a suspension 
without judicial process, this mechanism becomes less able to strike a balance between 
the parties. Secondly, the effectiveness of the mechanism in reaching its aim which is to 
prevent illegal activity online is also criticised. For the French HADOPI law, it was stated 
that ‘the Hadopi law has not deterred individuals from engaging in digital piracy…’.573 
                                                 
569 It was discontinued in January 2017. Ibid, 18  
570 EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd & ors v. Eircom Ltd, [2010] IEHC 108. 
571 [2015] IEHC 317. 
572 For detailed analysis of these Irish cases See Kelly Gerard ‘A court-ordered graduated response system 
in Ireland: the beginning of the end?’ (2016) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 11(3) 183–
198. 
573 Micheal Arnold, Eric Darmony, Slyvain Dejean and Thierry Penard ‘Graduated Response Policy and 
the Behavior of Digital Pirates: Evidence from the French Three-strike (Hadopi) Law’ (2014) Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2380522>. Also See Annamarie Bridy ‘Graduated 
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Finally, the cost of the implementation of such a mechanism is another matter that would 
have an impact on the effectiveness of the mechanism as well as ensuring the proper 
balance between the parties since the implementation costs are borne by the 
intermediaries.   
Overall, it would not be wrong to conclude that the scheme poses a significant risk of 
encroaching on the fundamental rights of the users. This makes the mechanism least 
favourable within the considered systems. Accordingly, it should not be considered as a 
strong candidate in the search for an effective means of enforcement.  
 
E. Application to Trade Marks 
 
The analysis undertaken so far demonstrates that although the ECD implies the use of the 
NTD system, there are many variations of the notice-and-action mechanisms 
implemented and applied within countries. However, there is no mechanism specifically 
and statutorily designed for trade mark issues. All the variations examined above target 
copyright infringements. It is clear that the EU notice regime takes a horizontal approach, 
meaning that the rules are applicable to all types of illegal content from hate speech to IP 
rights. However, in the presence of the Communications suggesting a sector-specific 
approach for copyright and the existing fundamental differences between copyright and 
trade mark in terms of the extent of the protection provided for the right owners, the 
following questions should be asked: Are the differences between copyright and trade 
mark substantial enough to require a different and, specifically adopted notice mechanism 
for each realm? If so, which mechanism would prove to be effective for trade mark?     
The differences between copyright and trade mark pertinent to the application of the 
notice mechanisms should be set out in order to answer the first question. The most 
relevant difference in that regard is the extent of the protection provided for right holders. 
It is evident that the copyright owner is entitled to a wider protection than the trade mark 
owner. The trade mark owner’s right is to use the mark in the course of trade. In other 
                                                 
Response American Style: 'Six Strikes' Measured Against Five Norms’ (2012) Fordham Intellectual 
Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 23(1) 1-66. Frabboni also states that an administrative 
authority as in French HADOPI law could provide higher standards of safeguards but creating such an 
authority is challenging. Frabboni, ‘File Sharing and the Role of Intermediaries in the Marketplace: 
National, European Union and International Developments’ (2010), 138. 
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words, to be regarded as an infringement, the mark should be used in the course of trade 
without authorisation, or the use of an identical sign should give rise to confusion.  
In contrast, copyright protection provides more absolute control to its owner. When 
copyright protected content is used without the consent of the owner, infringement occurs. 
This is because copyright protects the contents itself whereas trade mark protection is 
given for a certain function of the mark, ie identification or quality functions. That 
difference is also significant for infringements committed online. Trade mark 
infringement occurs when the infringing good is made available online within the course 
of trade or for the purpose of trade. For example, as happened in L’Oréal v Ebay, the trade 
marks of L’Oréal were held to be infringed when the counterfeit version of a L’Oréal 
product was uploaded by an Ebay user to make a sale, thus fulfilling the requirement of 
‘use in the course of trade’. In contrast, the mere use of copyright protected content 
without consent would constitute an infringement.574 In that respect, as Senftleben 
astutely states ‘[t]he infringement test in trademark law is more context-specific than the 
infringement analysis in copyright law’.575 
Trade mark infringement being more context-specific is a fact that would make a 
difference in practice in the appraisal of the infringing nature of a mark when a notice is 
received. Indeed, as examined, the NTD regime creates an extra-judicial system where 
the intermediaries act as the judges in the court process since they are the ones who decide 
the illegality of a notice and eventually the removal of the content. Besides all the 
aforesaid negative externalities that make the system one of the least favourable among 
others, the fact that the assessment of the illegality is done by the intermediary alone does 
not appear to assist in fulfilling the aim of the effective enforcement of trade marks. This 
is because the likelihood of an intermediary to make false takedown is seemingly high 
for trade mark matters with respect to its context-specific nature. The intermediary should 
have detailed information as to the allegedly infringing good to be able to act with the 
lowest margin of error. In the world of almost perfectly imitated goods, simple checking 
would not be sufficient to verify the illegality of goods. Yet, it is evident that the 
intermediaries would be unlikely to have such expertise. Moreover, not taking the 
physical possession of the goods leaves the door open for more mistakes in the decision 
                                                 
574 Of course, the exceptions are still available and applicable. 
575 Martin Senftleben ‘An Uneasy Case for Notice and Takedown: Context- Specific Trademark Rights’ 
(2012) VU University Amsterdam, 10, 7. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2025075>. 
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process.576 Therefore, as it is concluded from a general point of view, NTD systems would 
not work to strike a balance and provide effective enforcement for trade mark 
infringements. 
Provision of safeguards similar to those in the DMCA for copyright could also be 
considered for the trade mark realm and can be construed as an alternative, if the existing 
drawbacks of S.512 were eliminated.577 Mechanisms which may require the 
implementation of an automated filtering mechanisms such as notice-and-stay down or 
GRS would also prove to be inefficient in respect to the difference between these two IP 
rights. This is because such automated processes would be highly unlikely able to 
accurately identify the trade mark infringement.578 
Pursuant to the second question asked above, amongst the other variations adopted in the 
copyright realm the notice-and-notice and notice-and-judicial takedown regimes appear 
as the most appropriate candidates for trade mark as well as for copyright as those respect 
the fundamental right of parties and provide the fair balance. Besides the positive 
outcomes stated above, these systems eliminate the intermediary’s involvement in the 
decision process pertaining to the illegality of the good579 as well as reducing the 
likelihood of false removals caused by the specific nature of the trade mark rights.   
Against all this background, an overall evaluation should therefore be done in the pursuit 
of the aim of the thesis. The first thing that can be deduced from the above appraisal is 
that some of the variations of notice regimes namely notice-and-notice and notice-and-
judicial-takedown, appear to provide the required assistance for an effective enforcement 
of IP rights online. Yet, it is evident that the NTD system as indicated by the ECD is not 
one of them unless the required certainty and safeguards are provided. Secondly, it was 
also demonstrated that the fundamental differences between the scope of the protection 
of copyright and trade mark should be construed in seeking the best means of enforcement 
for these specific rights under a notice mechanism. However, the appraisal undertaken 
                                                 
576 O’ Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications on ISPs, site 
owners and IPR owners’ (2016), 85. 
577 For example, the fact that DMCA S 512 requires claimant to declare that the notification issued with a 
good faith and its legitimate, whereas the defendant is required to swear an oath and its liability for wrong 
counter-notice is to be the penalties for perjury. Together with that the one-sidedness of the way of the 
provisions created is mostly criticised. See Zingales ‘Internet Intermediary Liability: Identifying Best 
Practices for Africa’ (2013), 17. 
578 Senftleben ‘An Uneasy Case for Notice and Takedown: Context- Specific Trademark Rights’ (2012), 5. 
579 In notice-and-notice regime, the intermediary would be out of this process leaving the issue to other 
parties to solve while in notice-and-judicial takedown the decision is held by the judge.  
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reveals that the notice-and-notice and notice-and-judicial takedown mechanisms are also 
the most appropriate candidates for trade mark amongst the others since those appear to 
correspond to the differences underlined. Therefore, it can be concluded that, although 
the vertical approach is suggested for different rights for the EU liability regime, this is 
not necessarily the case for trade mark and copyright. As it is examined, the promotion 
of notice-and-notice, notice-and-judicial-takedown or a similar notice mechanism, which 
minimises the involvement of an intermediary as much as possible in the appraisal of the 
illegality of content appear to provide the legal certainty as well as respecting the fair 
balance between fundamental rights are the preferred mechanisms which would work for 
the enforcement of both trademark and copyright  online provided that safeguards for 
trade mark specific situations are put in place by the legislators 
IV. THE INJUNCTIONS REGIME 
 
Injunctive relief as provided in the third sentence of Art.11 of the ED is one of the current 
mechanisms of the EU liability regime for the effective enforcement of rights online. 
Even though the previous chapters revealed that the current injunction regime has failed 
to provide a solid framework and uniform implementations, injunctions cannot be ignored 
in the pursuit of a remedy. This is because injunctions are the enforcement measures 
which are imposed as a result of judicial process. Accordingly, they should be assessed 
for the purposes of this chapter. The current law of injunctions has been shaped through 
the national laws of the MSs as the community law only provides its minimum standards 
and leaves the conditions and procedures to MSs to decide. Therefore, this mechanism 
will now be examined by means of the following question: If a more comprehensive and 
solid framework were to be provided at the EU level, would injunctions prove to be 
effective in tackling online infringements? Moreover, as concluded above, the law of 
injunctive relief is germane to the discourse on intermediaries’ responsibility. The idea 
behind imposing such orders is that the intermediaries are best placed to tackle infringing 
activities. Accordingly, it will also be examined under the ‘more responsibility’ idea to 
see how this idea fits into the current regime and what are the possible impacts of the 
more responsibility approach.  
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A. Compatibility with Tort Law 
 
In the light of the examination undertaken in the previous chapter, injunctions appear to 
be the preferred mechanism by right holders for protecting and enforcing their rights 
online. It does not look like this will change in the near future as it is arguably a successful 
way for right holders to achieve enforcement.580 Nevertheless, the challenge is to answer 
the question of how well the current injunction regime performs in the existing liability 
regime. This is because injunctions are part of the liability regime although the issuance 
of an injunctive relief does not depend on the liability question.581  
In order to do this, the first thing that should be examined is the legal basis of the 
injunctive reliefs under EU law. It appears to hardly fit into tort law. Tort law is about 
‘(re-)distribution of losses and in consequence allocation of risks’.582 It therefore deals 
with the liability question and the liability is simply imposed on the party who the 
wrongdoer is.583 As contributory liability is a matter of tort law, the national courts try to 
determine if the intermediary has involved in the infringement committed it in those 
cases. However, when the application of an injunction is considered, the approach 
undertaken is different. The injunctions can be imposed against an intermediary who is 
the non-infringing party in most of the cases.  There are several reasons for that, and the 
most evident reason is possibly the difficulty of finding the identity or true identity of the 
person/s who is the wrongdoer, who does actually infringe the concerned rights. Also, it 
would be more likely that the right holders have more effective enforcement of their rights 
if they seek after an injunction against intermediaries rather than the individuals itself, 
since the intermediaries are in a better position to prevent the infringements more 
effectively. Finally, this would not impose a financial burden to the right holder who seeks 
the injunction as he/she is only, so far, required to pay the litigation costs not the 
implementation of the injunctive relief. With that respect, it is difficult to say that the 
injunctions fit the tort law mind-set.  
                                                 
580 They especially prove to be popular in the England.  
581 the ECD 2000/31, recital 45.  
582 Walter Van Gerven and Jeremy Lever Pierre Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, 
Supranational and International Tort Law (Hart Publishing 2000), 13. 
583 Or the facilitator of wrongdoing as in the cases of the secondary liability.  
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On this point, Husovec584 states ‘for civil law jurisdictions, strong theoretical foundations 
for this paradigm of injunctions can be found (….), in the system of protection of tangible 
property’ which he refers this as in rem injunctions. Briefly, this Roman law concept is a 
‘separate system of the tangible property protection with its own scope and characteristic 
features’585 which is the basis of the specific injunctive reliefs in some civil law countries. 
The foremost instance is the German law doctrine of Störerhaftung.586 Under English 
law, however, the basis of injunctive reliefs, as applied to intermediaries, can be found587 
in the equity principle which was stated in Norwich Pharmacal588 orders. The order 
granted in this case was the disclosure of certain information about the subjects of the 
infringing activity. According to the principle laid out in this case, such a remedy can be 
granted against a third party who happens to be either in possession of the goods589 that 
the subject of the infringement or in the best position to prevent this infringement given 
her equitable duty in protecting these goods, regardless of the fact that she is not the 
wrongdoer.590 Perez also argues that the English Courts retain their discretionary power 
in the injunctions cases as this remedy stems from equity. 591  
Against this background then, even though the legal foundation of the injunction relief 
differs from one jurisdiction to another, it would not be wrong to conclude that this 
remedy is implemented and applied for the effective protection of the rights concerned. 
Thus, it can be said to be result-oriented. Indeed, it was described by the European 
Commission in the Official Report on the application of the ED as follows;  
“Injunctions against intermediaries are not intended as a penalty against 
them, but are simply based on the fact that such intermediaries (e.g. Internet 
service providers) are in certain cases in the best position to stop or to 
prevent an infringement.”592  
                                                 
584 Husovec ‘Injunctions Against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking’ (2012), 118.  
585 Ibid. 
586 For detailed examination, Ibid. 
587 It should be noted that, now injunctions are granted under the Section 97A of the CPDA which is the 
transposition of the Art 8 (3) of InfoSoc Directive into the English Law.  
588 [1973] UKHL 6 (26 June 1973). 
589 However, Angelopoulos argues that the reasoning behind the extension of this principle to the copyright 
law with regard to the Internet intermediaries is rather unclear. See Angelopoulos ‘European Intermediary 
Liability in Copyright:  A Tort- Based Analysis’ (2016), fn. 692. 
590 Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, [145]-[146]. 
591 See Rafael Garcia Perez, ‘Injunctions in intellectual property cases: what is the power of the courts?’ 
(2016) Intellectual Property Quarterly (1) 87-101. 
592 Commission Staff Working Document: Analysis of the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
the MSs -- accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Social Committee on the application of Directive 2004/48/EC of the European 
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Therefore, the injunctions of EU law should be seen as an auxiliary to the intermediaries’ 
liability regime since they are merely provided for the purpose of more effective 
protection of IP rights online. In that way, the remedy appears as the best available 
mechanism to correspond to the judiciary’s sympathy593 for the idea that intermediaries 
should do something either to prevent or to terminate the infringements committed by 
their users on their services even though they are not liable for them under tort law.594 
However, it must be noted that injunction orders ‘should only correspond to what appears 
to be necessary in order to preserve the rights at issue’595 as French court once astutely 
stated.   
Nevertheless, in practice the application of this remedy appears to have been assigned a 
much greater role than the legislators intended. This is because the mechanism has proven 
to be a relatively easy and cost-effective way for right holders to pursue infringements. 
Accordingly, this has led injunction orders to be the most preferred instrument or even 
become a kind of weapon used by the right holders in protecting their rights online. 
Indeed, as Maele states there is nothing to prevent the courts to grant an injunction which 
would block a hundred or more websites in one judgment.596  
Looking from the right holders’ perspective, injunctive relief is indeed a cost and time 
effective way for them to protect their rights online rather than bringing the liability 
question before the courts. However, examining the matter as whole and especially from 
the intermediaries’ side, it does not appear so straightforward and promising for the 
purposes of the EU legislators. This can be explained by the existing lack of certainty on 
the exact framework of the injunctions which will be examined next.   
 
                                                 
Parliament and the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights COMM 
(2010) 779 final. 
593See Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014); L’Oréal v Ebay, [2009] EWCH 1094, [369] Arnold 
J stated ‘Ebay could and should deal with the problem of infringement by accepting liability and insuring 
against it by means of a premium levied on sellers’.  
594 Husovec called this accountability of the intermediaries. For detailed examination, See Husovec 
‘Injunctions Against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking’ (2012). 
595 Association des producteurs de cinema (APC) et autres c. Auchan Telecom et autres, Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de, 28 November 2013 (Cited from Angelopoulos ‘European Intermediary Liability in Copyright:  
A Tort- Based Analysis’ (2016), 146. 
596 Darren Maele, ‘Cartier: Blocking injunctions given a resounding thumbs up by Court of Appeal’ (2016) 
Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 11 (11) 818-821, 821. 
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B. Striking the Balance? 
 
The current state of the injunctions regime and how it has been applied within the EU 
were examined in the previous chapter. It was established by the CJEU and the Directives 
that the injunctive relief measures must be fair, equitable, effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive. They must strike a balance between competing rights, must not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly and must not create a barrier to legitimate trade. This 
part will not examine these principles in detail. Neither will there be a focus on required 
balance between the fundamental rights. Rather, the examination in this part will provide 
an answer to the thesis main question. In that regard, the main idea behind such measures 
will be the focal point of the examination and this will be done through case law. This is 
aimed to demonstrate whether the injunction orders justify their popularity through the 
eyes of the law and innovation.  
The idea behind injunction relief stems from the cheapest cost avoider theory as the 
intermediaries are considered to be best placed to bring infringing activities to an end.597  
Three characteristics of intermediaries are identified as elements that make them least 
cost avoiders. Those are: ‘(1) an increase in the likelihood that it will be easy to identify 
specific intermediaries for large classes of transactions, (2) a reduction in information 
costs, which makes it easier for the intermediaries to monitor the conduct of end users, 
and (3) increased anonymity, which makes remedies against end users generally less 
effective.’ 598 It is evident that those put them in a better position than right holders in 
dealing with illegal activities. They are in a position to reach the infringer, terminate or 
even prevent the illegality more easily and effectively than a right holder in most of the 
cases. Nevertheless, considering intermediaries as the cheapest cost avoider does not 
necessarily mean that they are the ones who have developed or can develop measures to 
avoid the harm most cheaply599 in every case. Indeed, the wording of Recital 59 ‘in many 
cases such intermediaries are best placed to bring such infringing activities to the end.’ 
implies that the intermediaries are not always best placed to end the infringements. The 
issue is therefore very fact-specific. Accordingly, the question of whether the 
intermediary at issue is in the best position to terminate the infringement should be 
                                                 
597 the InfoSoc Directive 2001/29, recital 59 of and the ED 2004/48, recital 23. 
598 Ronald J Mann and Seth R Belzley ‘The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability’ (2005) William & 
Mary Law Review 47 239-307, 240. 
599 Husovec ‘Accountable, not Liable: Injunctions Against Intermediaries’ (2016), 21. 
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thoroughly examined on a case-by-case basis. However, the present case law indicates 
that the courts do not undertake this examination when they are asked to grant an 
injunction. At such, one can argue that the examination as to whether the intermediary at 
issue is best placed to bring an end to the infringement is actually being done through the 
assessment of the applicability of the injunction. It is evident that it is for the courts to 
assess whether the injunction at issue is compatible with the principles provided by the 
EU and this is the assessment which also determines whether the intermediary is best 
placed to terminate the infringement. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to claim that the courts deal with all these principles 
thoroughly and justly. The difficulty is that the courts in most of the cases rely on the 
evidence provided by right holders, not an examination undertaken themselves. For 
example, the courts’ assessment on whether the injunction sought is effective or whether 
the blocking injunction is the appropriate type of injunction for terminating the illegality 
is done using the evidence submitted by the right holder.600 It is true that the courts are 
not required to carry out such analysis, nor are they competent to do so, but it cannot be 
ignored that this factor increases the likelihood of abuse of the order. For instance, in The 
Football Association Premier League Limited (FAPL) v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd. 
(BSB) and others,601 Arnold J’s assessment on the proportionality of a blocking 
injunction, which was IP address blocking, relied on the evidence provided by the 
claimant stating that the concerned IP addresses were not shared and so, it would not 
result in over-blocking.602 What if this information was wrong and the IP addresses in 
fact were shared?603 Although in this case the learned judge included a safeguard 
provision604 to prevent potential over-blocking by giving permission to the operators of 
the other websites affected by this order to apply to vary the order, this is still important 
to demonstrate how delicate the balance is in these cases.  
Another point is that even if particular intermediary is held to be best placed to offer 
effective protection of the IP right at stake, striking the balance between the parties is still 
                                                 
600 At that point, Husovec proposes that the right holders should be required to undertake cost-benefit 
analysis before seeking an injunction in pursuit of more effective enforcement. For detailed discussion, See 
Ibid 
601 [2013] EWCH 2058 (Ch). 
602 [2013] EWCH 2058 (Ch), [55]. 
603 Alpana Roy and Althaf Marsoof, ‘Blocking injunctions and collateral damage’ (2017) European 
Intellectual Property Review 39(2) 74-78, 75-77. 
604 [2013] EWCH 2058 (Ch), [56]. 
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of utmost importance and it is for the courts to deal with. This is because holding the 
intermediaries accountable does not mean that they should be required to make 
unbearable sacrifices as the CJEU stated in UPC Telekabel.605 Who should bear the costs 
of implementation of an injunction is one of the significant points discussed in the 
doctrine, though perhaps not in depth, under the notion of unbearable sacrifices. The 
current EU regime does not provide much guidance for that matter. In its decision in Mc 
Fadden v Sony Music,606 however, it was held by the CJEU that the right owner’s costs 
of giving formal notice and court costs can also be imposed on the intermediaries along 
with the implementation costs. Yet, the cost issue ultimately is bound to national laws as 
‘conditions and procedures relating to such injunctions’607 are left to the MSs. In the light 
of the case law, so far, the courts have imposed the implementation costs of an injunction 
order on the intermediaries whilst the right holders have only borne the costs of the 
application which are relatively low in comparison.  
Under English law, Arnold J (who dealt with most of the cases regarding injunction orders 
against intermediaries), analogically applied the costs regime of S.97A cases to the trade 
mark case, Cartier 1 without ruling out ‘the possibility of ordering the right holder to pay 
some or all of the implementation costs in an appropriate case’.608 At the appeal, Briggs 
LJ, in his dissenting judgement, pointed out ‘[i]t is only in this appeal (the Cartier I 
case)609 (and only on appeal, in depth) that this issue has been raised for argument’.610 
However, ultimately Arnold J’s decision imposing the implementation costs on the 
intermediaries were upheld and the issue was not left open for further discussion. 
However, the appeal on the cost issue was permitted and the issue came before the 
Supreme Court. As examined in detail the Supreme Court held that the rights holders in 
the injunctions cases should indemnify the ISPs against their reasonable compliance 
costs.611 This is a very important decision of its kind and the first one given in the EU and 
England, so its effect on the current state of injunctions law and on copyright law is keenly 
awaited. However, what can be stated at first sight is that the decision appears to bring 
                                                 
605 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014), [55]. 
606 Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden v Sony Music (15 September 2016), paras 72-79. 
607 the ED, recital 23. 
608 Cartier I [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3915 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3794 (Ch), [240].  
609 Brackets added 
610 Cartier II, [2016] EWCA Civ 658, [210].  
611 Cartier International AG and others (Respondents) v British Telecommunications Plc and another 
(Appellants) [2018] UKSC 28 (13 June 2018). 
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more balance in the injunction cases as well as creating some sort of barrier for the 
application of injunctions as a weapon against intermediaries by the right holders.  
On the similar cost issue, however the French Supreme Court have taken a different 
position and held612 the costs of the injunctions should be left to ISPs and web browsers 
to bear on the ground that ‘despite their non-liability, access and hosting providers are 
legally bound to contribute to the fight against illicit material and, more specifically, 
against the infringement of authors' and neighboring rights’613. Although the Supreme 
Court relied on Recital 59’s wording that intermediaries are best placed to terminate the 
infringements the court’s evaluation of who is best placed appears problematic. Because 
in its appraisal the court relied on the economic status of the parties rather than focusing 
on the infrastructural positions and privileges of the parties in fighting the infringements. 
It was stated in the decision ‘…the financial situation of the unions (claimant), already 
threatened by the infringement, could not be worsened by the costs of the measures 
ordered…’.614 Perhaps, it was not the financial situation of the intermediaries that the EU 
legislator had in mind when considering the intermediaries as being best placed to deal 
with the infringements.  
On the other hand, even if imposition of the implementation costs on the intermediary 
would be justified under the facts of specific cases before the courts, the cumulative 
impact of these orders should not be ignored in pursuit of an answer to the chapter 
question. In fact, as can be seen from the English cases, intermediaries have been subject 
to many injunction orders regarding either copyright or trade mark infringements. Thus, 
especially with regard to the implementation costs, this appears rather too much of a 
financial burden to bear. Although, in these cases, the intermediaries at issue were the 
sector dominating and financially strong intermediaries and as it was argued by the right 
holders that they already had the technology needed for the implementation of such 
orders,615 granting an order on these grounds would likely bring more challenges given 
the strong probability that the right holders may apply for a large number of similar 
                                                 
612 SFR and others v Association of cinema producers and others, Cour Cass, Civ 1, 6 July 2017, No 16-
17.217, 16-18.298,16-18.348,16-18.595, ECLI:FR:CCASS:2017:C100909. Available at 
https://www.courdecassation.fr/jurisprudence_2/premiere_chambre_civile_568/909_6_37275.html 
(French). 
613 Citing from The IPKat Mathilde Pavis, ‘France: cost of blocking injunctions to be borne by internet 
intermediaries’ (The IPKat 1 August 2017) http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2017/08/france-costs-of-
blocking-injunctions-to.html. 
614 Ibid. Brackets added 
615 Cartier I 2014 EWHC 3354 (Ch), [241]. 
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orders. Indeed, in Cartier I right after the defined period616 for the injunction order ended, 
the same order was sought against the same intermediaries in Cartier II.617 Moreover, as 
to copyright, an English court granted a live blocking injunction,618 which requires 
intermediaries to block the infringing content while it is being streamed.619 With respect 
to Cartier II, it may still be argued that the intermediaries have already implemented the 
same injunction, and so already have had the required technology. However, as the live 
blocking injunction case proves, the same intermediaries can be subjected to different 
injunctions which might require different technologies. More remarkably, the impact of 
such continuous orders on the intermediaries who perform as small or medium-sized 
businesses would likely pose a greater threat to their existence.  
Furthermore, an injunction order may have a negative influence on innovation and 
technology.  The CJEU case, Mc Fadden v Sony Music620 is a good example of this. 
Briefly, in this case the CJEU held that an injunction could be imposed on a Wi-Fi 
provider in order to terminate or prevent the copyright infringements committed by the 
users of its services. It was further stated that the measure of securing the Internet 
connection with a password would be proportionate and would strike the balance required 
under the EU principles. However, the AG astutely pointed out the potentially negative 
impact of the concerned measure on innovation and society along with voicing his 
concerns over proportionality, especially in terms of fundamental rights:621 
 “The introduction of a security obligation could potentially undermine the 
business model of undertakings that offer Internet access as an adjunct to their 
other services. Indeed, some such undertakings would no longer be inclined to 
offer that additional service if it necessitated investment and attracted 
regulatory constraints relating to the securing of the network and the 
management of users. Furthermore, some users of the service, such as 
customers of fast-food restaurants or other businesses, would give up using the 
                                                 
616 Which was defined as two years.  
617 See Chapter 4. 
618 The Football Association Premier League Limited (FAPL) v. British Telecommunications (BT) & Others 
[2017] EWHC 480 (Ch). This order was granted for the second half of the Premier League, yet the claimants 
again sought after the same injunction after this test time passed. This order was also granted by Arnold J 
on the same grounds and comprising the full 2017/2018 Premier League season.  
619 For detailed analysis See Alice Blythe, ‘Website blocking orders post-Cartier v B Sky B: an analysis of 
the legal basis for these injunctions and the potential scope of this remedy against other tortious acts’ (2017) 
European Intellectual Property Review 39 (12) 770-777, 775-776; Joel Smith and Laura Deacon, ‘Live 
blocking orders: the next step for the protection of copyright in the online world’ (2017) European 
Intellectual Property Review 39(7) 438-440 (Case Comment).  
620 Case C-484/14 Mc Fadden v Sony Music (15 September 2016).  
621 Case C-484/14 Tobias Mc Fadden v Sony Music Entertainment Germany GmbH (CJEU 16 March 2016), 
Opinion of AG Szpunar, paras 140-147. 
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service if it involved a systematic obligation to identify themselves and enter a 
password.”622  
 
Finally, the injunction measures as well as all these proportionality assessments are 
directly related to the fundamental rights’ debate. As it is previously identified, 
implementation of an injunction effects the fundamental rights of the parties who are 
affected by this measure and providing the balance between those rights is the part of the 
proportionality assessment and is for the courts to be undertaken. It is evident that the 
courts have considered the fundamental rights in injunction cases but perhaps not 
thoroughly. Guadamuz argues that the English Court seemed to have failed to assess the 
injunction order from all aspects especially from fundamental rights’ aspect in Newzbin 
II.623  On the other hand, having had the sunset clauses determining the time period of the 
applicability of an injunction in the cases such FAPL v BSB and Cartier I were crucial in 
providing the balance and preventing the abuse of an order.624 In a similar sense, the 
English Supreme Court’s decision on costs issue in Cartier I should be considered as 
another significant movement in the pursuit of fair balance between the parties.   
With respect to fundamental right, there however exists case, a CJEU case that should not 
be overlooked; the CJEU’s holding in UPC Telekabel625 which approved the 
implementation of the generic injunction order.626 As well as approving such an order 
giving a permission to the intermediary to choose the best available measure to apply, the 
assessment in choosing the best measure that respected the users’ fundamental rights was 
also left to the intermediary by the CJEU. Leaving aside the likelihood of a serious 
damage to the fundamental rights, this discretion hardly fits in the injunctions regime. It 
appears to amount much more than the ‘do something’627 idea behind the injunctions. 
Finally, against the arguments stating that generic injunction orders are possible under 
the Austrian law thus the decision’s influence on the other MSs’ laws might remain 
                                                 
622 Ibid, paras 138-139. 
623 Guadamuz, ‘Developments in Intermediary Liability’ (2014) 329-330 
624 Those time periods were determined as 2 years in these cases. 
625 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). 
626 Although the AG gave a negative answer to this in his opinion by saying that ‘No balance can be said 
to exist in the case of an outcome prohibition not specifying the measures to be taken, which is issued 
against an ISP’ Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014), opinion of AG Cruz Villalón, para 85. 
627 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). 
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limited, it should be noted that the application of the decision in other laws is still a 
possibility by means of an analogy.628  
To conclude, the proportionality assessment undertaken by the courts has potentially 
negative outcomes for the ultimate balance between the parties of the injunction orders 
and hardly fits under the ‘do something’ idea as the case law has an ambiguous framework 
and appears to impose more duties than this notion suggests. Yet, there is one significant 
point that should not be overlooked: injunctions are granted as a result of judicial process.  
 
 
C. Application to Trade Mark 
 
The third sentence of Art.11 ED is applicable to trade mark infringements and the same 
right is provided specifically for copyright issues within Art.8(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
Moreover, as the safe harbour rules are horizontally applicable, copyright and trade mark 
cases have proved to be essential instruments for each other by means of analogical 
assessment. However, the differences between the way that infringements occur and the 
extent of the protection provided for rights holders should not be ignored. Accordingly, 
this must be assessed in order to see whether these differences play a sufficient role in 
considering the applicability of different measures under the existing injunctions regime.   
L’Oréal v Ebay was the first case to deal with a trade mark infringement through a 
question of contributory liability and injunctive relief. For the latter, the referred question 
was limited to the applicability of the injunctions to future infringements. Thus, the 
CJEU’s assessment would provide limited assistance for the question asked in this part 
of the work. The only applicable case to the issue is then the English court’s case of 
Cartier I.629  This case is the first and the only case,630 to the best of the author’s 
                                                 
628 Indeed, even before this case, in 2013, the French Court ordered the intermediaries at issue to implement 
all appropriate measures to prevent the access to certain websites where the copyright infringement 
occurred. In that way, the Court’s wording hints the similar kind of discretion given to the intermediaries 
in Case 314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). Tribunal de grande instance de Paris, Ordonnance de 
refere, 28 novembre 2013, APC et autres/AuchanTelecomet autres. See 
<https://www.whitecase.com/publications/article/french-courts-ordered-block-and-delist-16-streaming-
websites> . 
629 [2014] EWHC 3354 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3915 (Ch); 2014 EWHC 3794 (Ch). See Chapter 4.  
630 Although this case was followed by the Cartier II case, this case dealt with the same request against 
same intermediaries, and the judge heavily relied on the assessment of Arnold J in the Cartier I [2014] 
EWHC 3354 (Ch). See Chapter 4.  
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knowledge, to deal with a request for injunctive relief for a trade mark infringement. Yet, 
this case is still limited in providing guidance as it was a domestic case. As 
aforementioned, under English law there is no counterpart to S.97A, which is the 
transposition of Art.8(3) of InfoSoc Directive, for trade mark. Yet, in this case, the court 
held that English courts had the jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief in the trade mark 
realm on the grounds of both national and EU laws, and this was later upheld by the 
Appeal Court.631 However, what was missed in this case was the assessment over the 
differences between trade mark and copyright infringements and the potential impact on 
the type of injunction sought.  
The first point is the occurrence of infringements on the Internet. Trade mark 
infringement occurs when the mark is ‘used’ without authorisation in the course of trade. 
For copyright infringement to be committed, however, copyrighted material -of course 
without the consent of the copyright holder- must be made available by means of a 
‘communication to the public’. The notion of ‘communication to the public’ appears to 
require greater involvement from the intermediaries’ side.632 The infringing content must 
be made available by means of a ‘communication to the public’. 
On the other hand, existence of copyright protected material online has much greater 
potential to create serious damage for both right holders and society. Because, once the 
illegal content becomes available, it can go ‘viral’ and be accessed and downloaded by 
many people. In contrast, a counterfeit good does not represent such a danger since it 
exists in a physical form.633 Finally, users’ attitude to accessing an illegal copy differs 
from those who buy counterfeit good online. For the latter group, most commonly they 
do not want to buy a counterfeit good so can in fact be seen as victims.634  
When these differences are considered in the light of an injunction order, it would not be 
wrong to conclude that these elements could have an impact on the appraisal of the 
proportionality to some extent. However, this is what seems to be missed in practice, at 
                                                 
631 For the detailed examination on the applicability of the S97A cases to the trade mark matters, See 
Mohamed Ali Althaf Marsoof, ‘Holding Internet Intermediaries Accountable for Infringements of 
Trademark Rights Approaches and Challenges’ (DPhil Thesis King’s College London 2016), 281-318. 
632 Indeed, the CJEU set out rather new test for the assessment of the communication to the public. See 
Chapter 2.  
633 Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’ (2014),529. 
634 Husovec, ‘Injunctions Against Innocent Third Parties: The Case of Website Blocking’ (2012), 118; 
Marsoof, ‘Holding Internet Intermediaries Accountable for Infringements of Trademark Rights Approaches 
and Challenges’ (2016), 281-318. 
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least in the Cartier I case. In this case, Arnold J relied on the evidence submitted in 
copyright cases in determining the effectiveness of a blocking injunction in reducing the 
use of the websites concerned. This was, in fact, about the efficacy of this order in 
preventing infringements rather than terminating them. In that scenario, the blocking 
injunction did not necessarily provide same degree of efficiency as it was assumed for 
copyright infringements.635 On this point Marsoof argues that blocking access to a 
website which sold counterfeit would not have the same impact in preventing similar 
infringements in the future.636 Further, he points out that prevention can only be done by 
removing the counterfeit good from its source.637 Moreover, the difference in the users’ 
attitude in accessing the illegal material would appear to lead to different outcomes for 
the efficacy of the orders since the users most likely appears as victims in trade mark 
cases. Accordingly, this should also be taken into consideration by courts in their 
appraisal.  
Such differences thus appear significant for injunction orders to some extent and so 
should be analysed by the courts whenever applicable. Yet, the matter remains theoretical 
until a court is challenged to undertake such an examination. Even if this happens, the 
court may still reach the same decision and grant the same type of injunction order which 
has most commonly been granted in copyright cases.  
 
D. Discussion 
 
It is evident that intermediaries are the best available vehicles when it comes to prevention 
or termination of infringements committed online. It is also evident that this does not 
mean they should have a great burden imposed on them. The examination undertaken 
above demonstrates that there exists uncertainty over the exact borders of intermediaries’ 
responsibilities by means of injunctive reliefs.638 This appears to arise from the fact that 
the issuance of an injunction order does not depend on the liability question. It seems 
                                                 
635 O’ Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications on ISPs, site 
owners and IPR owners’ (2016), 86. 
636 Marsoof, ‘Holding Internet Intermediaries Accountable for Infringements of Trademark Rights 
Approaches and Challenges’ (2016), 302. 
637 Ibid, 302. 
638 Wilman states that providing uniformity is one of the part of the solution that would ensure the effective 
enforcement. Wilman ‘A decade of private enforcement of intellectual property rights under IPR 
Enforcement Directive 2004/48: where do we stand (and where might we go)?’ (2017), 530. 
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much more germane to the responsibility discourse. Therefore, striking a balance is the 
issue for the courts. On the one hand, there is an aggrieved right holder who is entitled to 
seek such a measure, while on the other hand there is an intermediary who has to bear 
such a burden even though it is not liable for the infringement that is the subject of the 
injunction. This is a very delicate balance to strike. As demonstrated above, the existing 
injunctions regime not only appears to be incomplete but also raises serious concern in 
practice. Therefore, further guidance and more uniformity at EU level appears a must,639 
although this would not be the end of the issue. As the issuance of an injunction order 
heavily depends on the facts of the case and the national laws of the MSs, the issue seems 
unclear.  
It is seen that the injunctive relief is an auxiliary of the intermediaries’ liability which 
invokes the intermediaries to ‘do something’ given their position online. Nevertheless, as 
it is mostly preferred by the right holders, developments are moving in a different 
direction. Hence, along with more certainty, more safeguards or more limitations in 
applying the injunctions640 as it had been done in FAPL v BSB might prove to be of 
assistance. In that way, the limits of the responsibility would be determined to some 
extent.  
Finally, specifically for trade mark liability some points should be stated under the 
examination undertaken in this part. First, the current injunctions regime arguably 
provides instant relief to infringements and so creates the harmonisation although in a 
very limited sense.641 It raises more questions and results in more uncertainties for the 
long term so, cannot be considered a satisfactory assisting instrument in its aim to provide 
fit-for purpose trade mark liability regime if the necessary actions are not initiated. 
Secondly, the potential impact of the divergences between the occurrence of trade mark 
and copyright infringements should not be ignored. This may affect the EU’s stance on 
horizontally applicable rules and lead them to create more trade mark specific rules, but 
this will happen over the long-term if it happens at all.  
 
                                                 
639 Eleonora Rosati, ‘Intermediary IP injunctions in the EU and UK experiences: when less (harmonisation) 
is more?’ (2017) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 12 (4) 338-350. 
640 This can be the requirement of cost- benefit analysis before applying for an injunction as Husovec 
suggests. See Husovec, ‘Accountable, not Liable: Injunctions Against Intermediaries’ (2016). 
641 It should not be ignored that the injunction orders provide limited effect as they target the infringements 
already committed.  
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V.  MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERMEDIARIES? 
 
Injunctions and notice mechanisms are the existing mechanisms of the EU liability regime 
and serve the purpose of effective enforcement and prevention of infringements of IP 
rights online. As the above assessments demonstrate, the suggested notice mechanisms 
assist in reaching this aim whereas the injunctions’ assistance is arguable since they have 
been assigned much greater meaning than the EU legislators intended. However, both 
mechanisms are still of utmost importance for the EU liability regime provided further 
action and required developments are undertaken by the EU legislators to establish clearer 
framework and to provide harmonisation.  
Nevertheless, the latest developments seem to be placing greater weight on rather 
different mechanisms for the intermediaries’ regime although the notice-and-action is still 
considered part of the DSM Strategy. With regard to the Communications published 
pursuant to the DSM Strategy and the harmonisation aim, the EU legislators are now 
considering and discussing the imposition of greater responsibility on the intermediaries. 
On this, the first Communication sets out a duty for the Commission to analyse whether 
there is a need for the imposition of ‘greater responsibility and due diligence on the 
intermediaries in the way that they manage their networks and systems- a duty of care’ 
to tackle illegal content on the Internet.642 Moreover, within the draft Art.13 of the CD, 
such a responsibility was made concrete as the proposed Article requires intermediaries 
which provide storage and access to the public to large amounts of copyright protected 
works to implement effective content recognition technologies by means of an appropriate 
measure to prevent the availability of the illegal content. Beside such legislative duties, 
the Communications also emphasise the importance of voluntary mechanisms that 
intermediaries should implement in tackling infringements online. In the Communication 
dated 25 May 2016, it was stated ‘… principle-based, self-regulatory/co-regulatory 
measures, including industry tools for ensuring application of legal requirements and 
appropriate monitoring mechanisms, can play a role’.643 It then emphasised with regard 
to IP rights that: 
                                                 
642 Communication on ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe’ COMM (2015) 192 final, 12. 
643 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final, 5. 
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 “[t]he Commission will also continue to engage with platforms in setting up 
and applying voluntary cooperation mechanisms aimed at depriving those 
engaging in commercial infringements of intellectual property rights of 
revenue streams emanating from their illegal activities, in line with a follow 
the money approach.”644 
 
Against this background, the imposition of greater responsibility on intermediaries by 
using such new mechanisms should be examined. Moreover, as those measures arise 
through either legislative duties or voluntary measures the examination should be 
undertaken for both and in two parts. Accordingly, the first to be assessed is the duty of 
care as it is considered and proposed as a part of the DSM Strategy developments.   
 
A. The Duty of Care 
 
Although a ‘duty of care’ is not a lately introduced term under EU law, there are many 
uncertainties as to the exact scope of the term and its application within the liability 
regime. It is probably because the duty of care is originally a tort law term as a one of the 
elements of the negligence liability.645 According to that, if the law imposes a duty on a 
person and this person breaches that duty which also causes damage, then the tortfeasor 
will be liable for compensation for the damage under the tort of negligence. The scope of 
this duty under tort law diverges from one MS to another as tort law is not harmonised at 
EU level. Therefore, tort law does not appear to provide much assistance at this point.  
With regard to the intermediaries’ liability regime, the term was firstly introduced within 
Recital 48 of the ECD in which the MSs are entitled ‘to apply duties of care (to the 
intermediaries)646 which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified 
by national law in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities’, yet there 
is no further clarification as to its applicability, nor is it included in any of the Articles of 
the ECD. In the doctrine, however, the Recital is considered applicable for the matters 
related to ‘criminal and public law e.g. aid in investigation of crime or security matters, 
                                                 
644 Ibid, 8. 
645 Van Dam, European Tort Law (2nd ed. 2013), 102. See also Clerk& Lindsell on Torts, (2014). 
646 Brackets added. 
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not as extending to duties under private law e.g. to help prevent copyright infringement- 
since that would negate the point of Article 15 and indeed Art. 14 generally’.647  
Indeed, with respect to the Recital’s compatibility with Art.14, Bagshaw stated his 
concern648 under the following grounds: 1) whether it is applicable to Art.14 given that 
neither Art.14 nor Art.15 include or mention such a duty, and 2) if it is to be applied to 
the hosting providers by means of Art.14, it is unclear how it can be applied to civil law 
cases where the hosting provider’s duty to act is triggered by the awareness. More 
precisely, since the hosting provider is not liable unless it obtains awareness as to the 
illegality, how can this intermediary be able to detect the illegality without having 
acquired the awareness? This might give rise to general monitoring which is prohibited 
under Art.15. Accordingly, it is concluded that Recital 48 can only be considered 
applicable to specific circumstances.649 Moreover, even if the duty is imposed on hosting 
intermediaries but limited to specific circumstances, as Bagshaw astutely states the 
Directive leaves the following question open: What would happen if an intermediary 
breach such a duty?  
It is also clear that the duty of care is now more commonly discussed under the EU 
liability regime, especially for the copyright realm (as a civil law matter) and for hosting 
providers as is proposed in the CD draft. Yet, its compatibility within the ECD is still one 
of the most controversial subjects in the copyright debate since the existing liability 
regime provides very little guidance on the issue and in fact brings more questions. Hence, 
it should be examined. In that regard, the German doctrine of Störerhaftung is the best 
means of demonstrating how such a duty can be applied to Internet related issues and for 
shedding light on the possible outcomes of such a mechanism.  
 
1. The German Störerhaftung (Interferer) Liability and the Duty 
of Care 
 
                                                 
647 Edwards, ‘Role and Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Copyright and Related 
Rights’ (2011), 10.  
648 Roderick Bagshaw, ‘Downloading Torts: An English Introduction to On-Line Torts’ in Henk Snijders 
and Stephen Weatherill, E-Commerce Law National and Transnational Topics and Perspectives (Kluwer 
2003), 59-78, 72-73.  
649 As art 15 permits monitoring for the specific matters. Therefore, these specific cases can be thought as 
the issues for example: where the same users who committed an infringement before, uploaded the same 
infringing content to the hosting site.  
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As the previous chapters demonstrated, whenever the question of whether an intermediary 
is under a duty to seek and prevent the infringement has arisen, the doctrine of 
Störerhaftung has also been discussed. Although the remedy under this liability is an 
injunctive relief and has mostly been discussed in that regard, the application of the 
doctrine is still germane to the analysis undertaken with respect to the duty of care.   
As has been stated throughout the thesis, the Störerhaftung liability is a long-standing 
principle which applies to contributory liability cases. This is because, under this 
principle, an interferer who is not the direct infringer but a wilful contributor to the 
infringement can be held liable for injunctive relief provided that these three elements are 
fulfilled:  
“a wilful adequate causal contribution to the infringing acts of any third 
party; the legal and factual possibility of preventing the resulting direct 
infringements; and the violation of a reasonable duty of care prevent these 
infringements.”650  
 
 Although here it was called a duty of care, a duty to review or duty to investigate has 
been used interchangeably with duty of care in German law. Regardless of the term 
employed, this duty’s scope is determined as ‘whether and to what extent the perpetrator 
of the “disturbance” can be expected to carry out an investigation in the particular 
circumstances of the case’.651 It should again be underlined that this liability is a form of 
strict liability and is limited to injunctive relief, and so cannot be claimed for damages. 
Accordingly, it is not a tort more precisely not a negligence law principle. Moreover, the 
application of negligence as an independent tortious act in trade mark and copyright law 
was rejected by the BGH. Thus, Störerhaftung liability performs as an accessory.652 
Therefore, the liability is applied to both trade mark and copyright infringements that 
occur online, as was assessed in the previous chapters, by means of an auxiliary relief to 
those infringements committed by a third party by using intermediaries’ services. It 
should be recalled with respect to the applicability of a principle that the injunctive relief 
provided under this doctrine was limited to future infringements which are clearly 
                                                 
650 Matthias Leistner Common Principles of Secondary Liability, Common Principles of European 
Intellectual Property Law, (Ansgar Ohly 2012) 117-146, 124.  
651 I ZR 304/01 (Ger), 2006 E.C.C. 9, [2005] E.T.M.R 25 (Eng) para 40 (2). 
652 Leistner Common Principles of Secondary Liability, Common Principles of European Intellectual 
Property Law (2012) 127-128; Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The 
Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU’ (2014), 535-536. 
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recognisable, of a same character and committed by the same users in the seminal Internet 
Auction653 cases. The assessment should now focus on the notion of duty of care as an 
element of this liability since the previous chapters dealt with this liability thoroughly and 
mostly from an injunctive relief aspect.  
What can be taken from the current case law regarding the duty of care as applied in 
German law -where the intermediary is regarded as having a duty of care- can be 
summarised as follows: 1) the intermediary is under a duty to prevent the infringements 
yet this duty is confined to future infringements by the same user and of the same 
character; 2) the intermediary’s duty is also confined within the reasonableness threshold, 
meaning that the intermediary can only be expected and required to take steps to prevent 
the infringement when it is not burdensome, is technically possible and does not 
jeopardise its business model, and this is assessed on a case-by-case basis; and 3) this 
duty is held to be consistent with Art.14 and 15 of the ECD.654  
In the light of these principles, imposing duties on intermediaries to take action to prevent 
an infringement as an ex-post examination and injunction indeed appears consistent with 
the EU acquis (as far as it does not amount to general monitoring) and strikes an 
appropriate balance as well as being effective. However, where this doctrine appears as 
the most appropriate indicator of the possible outcomes of the imposition of a duty of care 
is the application of this liability in case law and to newly developed technologies. This 
can be best illustrated by two copyright cases brought against Rapidshare, a digital storage 
service which also provides access to content and enables the user to download it: Atari 
v Rapidshare AG655 and GEMA v Rapidshare656.  
As examined earlier, in the first case it was decided by the Appeal Court that installation 
of a word filtering system was the reasonable and appropriate preventive measure that 
should be implemented by Rapidshare -as it was found liable as Störer-  to prevent the 
                                                 
653 Case I ZR 304/01 (Ger); Case I ZR 35/04 (Ger); Case I ZR 73/05 (Ger). Bornkamm ‘E-Commerce 
Directive vs. IP Rights Enforcement: Legal Balance Achieved?’ (2007). 
654 These principles are mainly established in the Internet Auction cases by the BGH.  
655 I ZR 18/11 Unreported July 12, 2012 (Ger.) (Alone in the Dark).  Analysis of the case from Kur 
‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’ (2014), 525-540 and e Gartner and s Jauch, ‘GEMA v RapidShare: German Federal 
Supreme Court extends monitoring obligations for online file hosting providers’ (2014). 
656 I ZR 80/12, 15 August 2013, (Ger) (File- Hosting Services) Analysis of the case from Kur ‘Secondary 
Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU’ 
(2014) and Gartner and Jauch, ‘GEMA v RapidShare: German Federal Supreme Court extends monitoring 
obligations for online file hosting providers’ (2014).  
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re-occurrence of the infringing content in the future. However, in the latter case what was 
considered reasonable under a duty to investigate was an extensive monitoring obligation 
which involves an investigation ‘…through search engines such as Google, Facebook or 
Twitter using appropriately formulated searches and possibly also with the assistance of 
so-called webcrawlers, whether indications can be found as to further illegal links to its 
service with regard to the relevant works.’657 These two cases are the most appropriate 
instances to demonstrate how malleable the scope of the duty of care and the 
reasonableness threshold are. Although these monitoring and filtering duties were in 
theory granted for future infringements committed by the same party or of the same 
character, these mechanisms did not specifically function in a way that the court thought 
and expected when granting such an order. Under the second case scenario, the 
intermediary should monitor the activity of all its users to prevent the re-occurrence of 
the illegal content uploaded either by the same person notified or by another user. In that 
way, monitoring would appear as general monitoring in practice. It is therefore clear from 
the current case law of the EU that such mechanisms pose a serious threat to the 
fundamental rights specifically the fundamental rights of the users and may violate the 
general monitoring prohibition under Art.15 ECD.658 It should be reminded that the 
German Court did not seek a reference from the CJEU on that basis, so it is not clear that 
whether such obligation is in consistent with the Art. 15 or not. 
With specific regard to these cases, it can be concluded that even under a long-standing 
principle as Störerhaftung, the exact scope of the duties that can be imposed on the 
intermediaries appears uncertain, and this uncertainty presents a potential threat to the 
fundamental rights and the appropriate balance required under the EU liability regime. 
Moreover, the interplay between property law and tort law with respect to this duty 
remains unclear under the German law even though it has been applied considerably long.  
As far as the duty of care as stated in the DSM Strategy is concerned, it should however 
be noted that the only material available is the draft of the CD -which will be examined 
                                                 
657 Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: The Situation in Germany and 
Throughout the EU’ (2014), 539. 
658 On the one hand it was claimed that it did not violate the Art. 15 since the monitoring was granted for 
the investigation of a same person or for a same type of the illegal content, hence specific monitoring 
obligation. On the other hand, however, it was claimed that by virtue of two SABAM cases, this type of 
monitoring cannot be considered as specific monitoring obligation hence it violates the art 15. The author 
also opines the latter view. See also Kur ‘Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet: 
The Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU’ (2014), 539. 
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in the next part- with respect to its possible framework and the application to civil law 
matters which does not appear to bear a close resemblance to the German doctrine. 
Henceforth, the German doctrine’s assistance may be limited659 but it will still be of 
assistance and guidance for EU policy in general as it hints at the potential shortcomings 
in the application of such a mechanism. 
 
2. Draft Article 13 of the Copyright Directive Proposal 
 
Although the main focus of this thesis is trade mark, the CD proposal cannot be ignored 
in pursuit of the aim of the thesis. With regard to duty of care as applicable to IP law 
matters, this draft Directive is the only material available to assess the notion, though it 
concerns copyright. However, it should be noted that the Directive will not be examined 
in detail, only the provisions related to the duty of care discourse are to be dealt with. In 
that regard, Art.13 and Recital 38 of the Directive will be the focus of the analysis.   
Under Art.13,660 an ISSP which stores and provides the public access to large amounts of 
works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users has two alternative duties imposed 
on it:661 1) to take measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with 
rightholders for the use of their content or other subject matter, or 2) to take measures to 
prevent the availability of works or other subject-matter identified by rightholders. The 
Article further states that ‘those measures, such as the use of effective content recognition 
technologies, shall be appropriate and proportionate’. In Recital 38, it is further 
elaborated that the first obligation is only applicable if the intermediary is not eligible for 
the liability exemption provided in Art.14 of the ECD whereas the same intermediary is 
obliged the take the second measure regardless of its immunity from liability under 
Art.14.   
What is proposed in this Article as well as its interpretative tool Recital 38 has attracted 
criticism from some academics.662 Alongside the vagueness of its wording, its 
compatibility with Arts.14 and 15 of the ECD is the most commonly raised concern in 
                                                 
659 As it is a domestic law principle and there is no clarity on what the EU means by the duty of care.  
660 Proposal of ‘a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ COMM (2016) 593.  
661 For the purpose of closing the value gap. 
662 Stalla-Bourdillon et al., ‘Open Letter to the European Commission- On the Importance of Preserving 
the Consistency and Integrity of the EU Acquis Relating to Content Monitoring within the Information 
Society’ (2017). 
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academia. With respect to Art.14 of the ECD, although few of the inconsistencies have 
been discussed,663 what is important for the thesis is the existing lack of clarity over the 
question of what will happen if the intermediary fails to implement the required measures. 
The fact that the proposed Directive does not include an answer is not ideal for the existing 
liability regime. Nevertheless, as this is included in the proposal as an obligation for 
intermediaries, it would not be wrong to assume that this Article implies some liability 
for an intermediary who does not fulfil this obligation. Given the lack of further insight, 
Art.14 ECD appears to be the only legal instrument that can be considered in seeking the 
answer.  
Art.14 imposes a duty to act on the hosting intermediary only when it acquires the 
awareness as to the illegality that has occurred on their platform. Therefore, the measure 
undertaken in that regard is an ex-post obligation. However, what is imposed under Art.13 
of the CD draft is the implementation of ex-ante measures.664 Therefore, these two 
obligations appear not to be aligned with each other. This is because, under the current 
negligence-based liability regime provided in the ECD, the hosting provider’s liability 
depends on its negligent behaviour, ie its failure to take the appropriate measure in 
tackling the illegal content whenever it acquires the awareness as to the illegality which 
happens after receiving the notice in most cases. Yet, under the proposed Art.13 the same 
hosting provider is obliged to implement the specified measure regardless of a knowledge 
element. Thereby, how can the liability of hosting providers for failing to take appropriate 
measures as required in the proposed CD be aligned with the liability regulated in Art.14 
of the ECD in which the intermediary is required to take the appropriate measures and act 
only when it acquires the awareness? This seems to have presented inconsistencies with 
the current negligent-based liability regime if the proposal stands as it is. 
Fortunately, the proposal has not been accepted as it is and has sent back to the Parliament 
for the review. Following this, the proposal has been reviewed and the new amended 
version of the Directive is approved by the Parliament in September 2018. However, the 
above-mentioned concerns raised in the academia cannot be said to have been ironed out 
                                                 
663 See Angelopoulos, ‘Study On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (2017); Rendas, ‘Form and Substance in the Value Gap Proposal’ 
(2017). 
664 Although deployment of ex-ante measures is not prohibited under the EU regime, the proposed Article 
13 seems to indicate great responsible to the hosting providers which might lead to the general monitoring 
which is prohibited under the art 15 of the ECD.  
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since the newly accepted draft makes no more than small changes which are mostly made 
on the wording of the concerned Article 13.665 
Starting with its wording, the amended version of Art.13 does not comprise one of the 
mostly criticised part of wording ie.‘information society service providers that store and 
provide to the public access to large amounts of works’ other than its title. However, it is 
difficult to conclude that taking this part from Article and inserting in its title would make 
any difference and would eliminate the ambiguity that may arise. As previously stated, 
use of the wording ‘large amounts of work’ gives a rise to the confusion as to what should 
be understood from storing or providing large amounts of work. Accordingly, having had 
the same wording in the title does not iron out the prospect of ambiguity. 
After stating in its title that Article would be applicable to online content sharing service 
providers storing and giving access to large amounts of works and other subject matter 
uploaded by their users, amended version of Article 13 (1) reads as follows: 
“Without prejudice to Article 3(1) and (2) of Directive 2001/29/EC, online 
content sharing service providers perform an act of communication to the 
public. They shall therefore conclude fair and appropriate licensing agreements 
with right holders.” 
 
In the light of these, article now clearly states that online content sharing service providers 
(not information society providers as originally proposed) storing and giving access to 
large amounts of works and other subject-material uploaded by their users perform an act 
of communication to public and it imposes that these providers must conclude fair 
licensing agreements with the right owners. Henceforth, these service providers are under 
an obligation to make licencing agreements. Further to this, Art.13(2)(a) indicates that 
the online content providers who do not wish to conclude the licencing agreements should 
still ensure that the unauthorised content is not made available on their platform. In other 
words, the amended version stipulates that the online content providers who give public 
an access to large amount of works should either conclude licencing agreements with 
right owners or they should take necessary measures in order to prevent the availability 
of the unauthorised content on their platforms. Therefore, the burden of tackling the 
                                                 
665 For adopted text <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-
2018-0337+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>  
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unauthorised content on the Internet is left on these intermediaries by means of 
responsibilities.  
Perhaps, to make the matter worse, new version of Article does not provide further insight 
on how these providers are expected to identify, remove and prevent the unauthorised 
content or what those measures can or should be. It is an improvement that the 
problematic part of a first draft of Article which indicated the implementation of content 
recognition technologies as a measure has been omitted but it is difficult to say that 
amended version has ironed out the prospects of ambiguity and concerns. Although the 
amended Article underlines the importance of the availability of effective and expeditious 
compliant as well as redress mechanisms for the purpose of protecting the fundamental 
rights of the parties that can be affected by the use of the preventative measures, further 
insight has not been provided on that. Leaving the matter of protecting fundamental rights 
of the parties as well as providing necessary redress mechanisms to service providers 
would most likely bring the question of transparency unless these service providers are 
required to publish their transparency reports. Otherwise the questions of how these 
mechanisms are working and if they are effective and sufficient would be left 
unanswered. Besides, implementation of different measures by different service providers 
would lead in fragmentation in the absence of further insight given on the application of 
Article and the duty imposed on it. This, imposing the burden of taking preventive 
measures on the service providers, could also mean a competitive disadvantage for the 
small or medium sized service providers who cannot afford to implements rather 
expensive measures. 
Besides those, there is a prospect of another issue: Article’s compatibility with Art.15 of 
the ECD.  Firstly, it is evident that the Article represents the EU’s tendency on the idea 
that the intermediaries are the ones who should bear more responsibility and take 
measures to prevent illegal content appearing on their services. If these measures were 
applied by means of extensive and active monitoring which they have the potential of it, 
this might amount to a general monitoring which is prohibited under Art.15. Indeed, such 
filtering mechanism was held to be incompatible with Art. 15 by the CJEU in SABAM v 
Netlog.666 Moreover, it is evident from the case law that this kind of technology poses a 
                                                 
666 Case C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012). 
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serious threat to the fundamental rights of users.667 Although, the proposal underlines the 
protection of the fundamental rights of the parties while applying the measures, it does 
not provide further information on the extent of the measures that can be applied by 
intermediaries which are under the duty of taking preventative measures to prevent the 
availability of an unauthorised content. As a result, service provider may choose to 
implement extensive and active monitoring which could amount to general monitoring. 
It would therefore not be wrong to conclude that the amended Article has not eliminated 
the concerns raised for the first draft of Article. There is still ambiguity on the exact 
framework of the principles that are established.   
Finally, by considering and elaborating the proposed Article in relation to the 
Störerhaftung liability, some significant points should be made for the sake of 
comparison. With regard to the Störerhaftung liability, the duty to monitor is imposed for 
future infringements by means of an ex-post measure and as a result of judicial process, 
whereas the proposed Art.13 indicates the implementation of measures by means of an 
ex-ante measure. Yet, it is evident from the above examination that even this ex-post 
measure which was approved by the Court itself may appear as amounting to general 
monitoring and as harming the appropriate balance between the fundamental rights of the 
parties. Against this fact then, the obligation proposed in Art.13 represents rather a greater 
risk for the intermediary liability regime and the fundamental rights, although the 
Article668 emphasises the importance of the safeguards and states that it is another 
obligation for intermediaries to take (but does not provide further insight). Therefore, the 
proposed Article does not appear to have its own answers for the possible negative 
outcomes that such an obligation may result in. In fact, it brings more questions and 
concerns for the intermediary liability regime.669 Finally, what would happen if this 
obligation was not to fulfilled by an intermediary and the interplay between this obligation 
                                                 
667 Angelopoulos states in that regard ‘the new Proposal is thus also incompatible with the permissive 
German interpretation of Article 15 ECD, as it omits even this procedural safeguard.’ Angelopoulos, 
‘Study On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital 
Single Market’ (2017), 37. 
668 Art. 13(2): ‘Member States shall ensure that the service providers referred in paragraph 1 put in place 
complaints and redress mechanisms that are available to users in case of disputes over the application of 
the measures referred to in paragraph 1.’ Amended version also requires the implementation of safeguards. 
See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2018-
0337+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN>. 
669 See Martin Senftleben et al. ‘The recommendations on measures to safeguard fundamental rights and 
the open internet in the framework of the EU copyright reform’ (2018) European Intellectual Property 
Review 40 (3) 149-163. 
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and Art.14 of the ECD are the questions that more likely affect the uniformity or even the 
horizontal applicability of the liability regime.  
 
 
B.  “More Responsibility” and Trade Mark Law 
 
Finally, the duty of care notion should be assessed from a trade mark perspective even 
though there is no express mention of trade mark specific action within the DSM Strategy. 
Since the imposition of more responsibility on the intermediaries is stated as a part of EU 
policy for tackling illegal content online for different rights (ie defamation, and 
copyright), this discussion is, thus germane to trade mark law, too.  
Starting with the CJEU’s case law, in L’Oréal v Ebay,670 which dealt with contributory 
trade mark infringement committed via an online auction site Ebay, the Court delineated 
that the awareness -as required in Art.14 of ECD-  should be assessed based on the 
‘diligent economic operator’671 criterion. Although further insight was not provided for 
its appraisal, this criterion indicates the responsibility of an intermediary to some extent. 
In addition, as the previous chapter revealed, the underlying tort law principles of the MSs 
which are applicable to contributory trade mark liability appear to be of little assistance 
in dealing with the challenges that the Internet poses. This is most likely because Arnold 
J in the domestic case of L’Oréal v Ebay672 stated that Ebay was the one who could and 
should deal with the problem of infringement as it had created a new form of trade. It 
further suggested that the joint tortfeasors doctrine of England should be considered 
according to the nature of the Internet as it is new context. In that respect, is the imposition 
of more responsibility necessary or can it be the appropriate remedy for the trade mark 
realm? 
At first glance, it is difficult to give a positive answer to that question given the serious 
concerns that arise from the proposed CD. Indeed, on the grounds that the EU policy 
                                                 
670 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v Ebay [2011] ECR I-06011.  
671 Ibid, para 120 ‘In the last-mentioned respect, it is sufficient, in order for the provider of an information 
society service to be denied entitlement to the exemption from liability provided for in Article 14 of Directive 
2000/31, for it to have been aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic 
operator should have identified the illegality in question and acted in accordance with Article 14(1)(b) of 
Directive 2000/31.’ 
672 [2009] EWCH 1094, [369]. 
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pertaining to the intermediary regime applies horizontally and these two IP rights have a 
close resemblance and are taken into consideration by the courts for analogical 
application, the proposed Art.13 of the CD would set the best precedent for trade mark if 
such a duty is to be seriously considered within trade mark context by the EU legislators. 
Along with the aforementioned negative outcomes that can be drawn from the Article, a 
further question arises: Would the fundamental differences between trade mark and 
copyright play any significant role in the preferred type of preventing measures to be 
implemented?  
It is indeed, as concluded in the previous parts of the chapter, the difference between these 
two rights appears to have an impact on the effectiveness of some preventive mechanisms 
such as blocking injunctions. For the implementation of effective content technologies, 
the same conclusion can be drawn on the same grounds. The draft Art.13 of CD requires 
from service provider to implement the adequate technologies by means of preventative 
measure and, as stated, these technologies basically operate on an extensive monitoring 
and filtering basis. It is clear that the copyright infringements that occur online have no 
parallel in trade mark law given that distributing infringing copyright content is easier in 
comparison to trade mark. Thus, the effectiveness of such a mechanism in preventing the 
occurrence of counterfeit goods would appear to be relatively low. This is because in most 
cases the identification of a good, ie it is genuine or not, requires expertise about the 
concerned good. Therefore, the probability of false positives is most likely to be high in 
number for trade mark cases. Accordingly, the fundamental rights would more likely be 
threatened.  
Moreover, there is another fact which may have an impact on the effectiveness of such a 
mechanism: an intermediary does not have the possession of the counterfeit good. 
Accordingly, it cannot terminate the real existence of the good unless it has possession. 
What it can do at most is to terminate the subscription of its user who uploaded this 
content to its platform. Therefore, implementation of such comprehensive monitoring 
technologies appears not to provide the necessary assistance in pursuit of tackling illegal 
content for the trade mark realm. It also poses a serious threat to the fundamental rights.  
 
C. Voluntary Measures 
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Under current intermediary liability law, aside from the duty of care as a means of 
bringing to bear more responsibility on intermediaries, intermediaries’ responsibility is 
also discussed through the voluntary measures which can be self-regulatory or co-
regulatory. As stated before, the DSM Strategy emphasises the importance of such 
measures in enhancing more uniform and clearer rules for effective enforcement. More 
importantly, Communication on Tackling Illegal Content Online673 focuses on indicating 
the responsibilities of intermediaries in the fight against illegal content online. In this 
Communication, the steps that should be taken by the intermediaries for 1) detecting and 
notifying, 2) removing and 3) preventing the re-appearance of the illegal content are 
stated by means of voluntary measures and regarded ‘as part of the 
(intermediaries)responsibility which flows from their central role in society’.674 What is 
asked from the intermediaries is, briefly, to take the appropriate actions suggested in the 
Communication against the infringing content to ensure the protection of fundamental 
rights and due process.  
In fact, investing and implementing self-regulatory measures in the course of their trade 
is the highly preferred and known initiative for intermediaries, especially for large-sized 
businesses like Google.675 They do this either to deal with the illegality that may occur in 
their services or as part of their responsibility for being in a central role in society.676 In 
that sense, intermediaries, besides the obligations imposed on them by law, are expected 
to take appropriate measures in the fight against matters which are directly related to 
public policy such as terrorism and, child abuse. However, the Communication also 
considers intermediaries to be in a socially responsible position for IP related matters with 
specific regard to copyright. It is true that the negative impacts of mass copyright 
infringement and counterfeit products on society and the economy are the facts that 
cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, regarding intermediaries being responsible for these and 
requiring them to take action by means of self-regulatory voluntary measures does not 
                                                 
673 Communication on ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online Towards an Enhanced Responsibility of Online 
Platforms’ COMM (2017) 555. 
674 Ibid, 2. Brackets added. 
675 Yannapoulos states that voluntary actions taken by YouTube ‘has shown positive results in the case of 
copyright eg. for the posting of content on YouTube. However, the potential of self-regulatory measures 
may have been overestimated and does not cover any demands for compulsory measures to be taken by the 
intermediaries, which may be enforced only by means of hard-law or co-regulation.’ Yannopoulos ‘The 
Immunity of Internet Intermediaries Reconsidered?’ (2017), 51. 
676 Yannapoulos also states ‘a degree of reconciliation between authorities and intermediaries would be 
required, the latter being those who control access to the Internet as a medium. It is, hence far more 
important to create confidence and social responsibility in a similar manner anticipated by the users from 
other players of the computer industry…’ Ibid, 53-54. 
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appear to be a straightforward solution. This is because promotion of such measures in 
tackling illegal content online is not only related to the question of whether the 
intermediaries should have such a great burden imposed or whether their position brings 
with it such social responsibility. It is more precisely about the question of the protection 
of the rights and appointing intermediaries (private companies) as the principal players 
for fighting illegality and providing effective protection.677 
As was pointed out with regard to the CJEU’s decision in UPC Telekabel,678 leaving an 
intermediary to decide the appropriate measure to be implemented and apply as a blocking 
injunction and also asking it to ensure the rights of freedom of information of its users are 
too much discretion to give an intermediary without ensuring the rights of the parties, due 
process and fair balance. The EU’s tendency to encourage voluntary measures represents 
the same threats but with a small yet significant difference: the UPC Telekabel order was 
a result of a judicial process, whereas the decisions undertaken with respect to the self-
regulatory measures are part of a non-judicial process. As Frosio679 astutely states that 
the latter makes intermediaries ‘…prone to serve governmental purposes under murky, 
privately-enforced standard, rather than transparent obligations’. This is because with 
respect to the self-regulatory measures, the intermediaries will be the ones who control 
the process of identifying, detecting, removing and preventing the illegal content in the 
light of the terms decided by themselves, not by public bodies or judges.680 It is obvious 
that their enforcement standards will be in consistent with the law, but the fact that the 
decision is eventually for them to take as to the matters that may violate the rights 
enshrined under the law, for instance, removal of a content claimed as infringing. As a 
result of a non-judicial process, the negative impact of such decision on the user’s 
freedom of expression therefore would be potentially high.   
Indeed, according to the Synopsis Report of public consultation on the Regulatory 
Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy,681 
                                                 
677 Belli and Sappa, ‘The Intermediary Conundrum Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-Police or Both?’ (2017) 183-
198. 
678 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014). 
679 Frosio ‘Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility’ (2017), 15. 
680 Horten ‘Content Responsibility: The looming cloud of uncertainty for internet intermediaries’ (2016), 
16. 
681 Full Report on the results of the public consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy, 25 May 2016, p 19. Available at 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/full-report-results-public-consultation-regulatory-
environment-platforms-online-intermediaries>. 
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numerous respondents pointed out the technical impossibility of such systems with 
specific regard to difficulties in distinguishing legal from illegal content which might 
result in the interference on the users’ fundamental rights. Although the intermediaries’ 
decision in that regard can be challenged before the courts, the law’s first aim is always 
to provide the required assurances to protect the rights of the parties and to strike the 
delicate balance before the court process. These can be done with an obligation to 
implement necessary safeguards and redress mechanisms. This is indeed emphasised and 
suggested by the EU legislators in almost every Communication for such initiatives. Yet, 
unfortunately, these Communications failed to provide the necessary guidance for 
intermediaries on transparency, uniformity and clarity while implementing safeguards or 
operating redress mechanisms. The previous chapters demonstrated that lack of 
transparency is the last thing the EU intermediary liability regime needs.682 
Moreover, the implementation of self-regulatory enforcement measures may not be the 
desired option for the intermediaries either. Indeed, the transparency and clarity in the 
intermediary liability regime are what the intermediaries need and seek. This is because 
implementing the required measures in alignment with the law is also in their interest. 
Furthermore, self-regulatory measures may have a negative influence on the digital 
innovation and competitiveness of the market. As was raised as a concern in the Synopsis 
Report of public consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy,683 estimating the accurate financial costs 
of the implementation and operation of these measures can be quite difficult for 
intermediaries. This was stated as a factor that may hold them back from investing.684 
Moreover, the associated costs may appear as a financial burden especially for new start-
ups and small-sized intermediaries. This puts these intermediaries at a competitive 
disadvantage to other intermediaries and ultimately influences the digital innovation in a 
negative way.  
Besides, implementing voluntary measures as self-regulation happens through the 
implementation of the enforcements mechanisms in terms and conditions and by means 
of a contractual relationship between the users and the intermediary. Actually, the current 
NTD system appears as one of this kind mechanism. As there is no statutorily established 
                                                 
682  Belli and Sappa, ‘The Intermediary Conundrum Cyber-Regulators, Cyber-Police or Both?’ (2017), 197. 
683 Full Report on the results of the public consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms, Online 
Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy, 25 May 2016, p 18. 
684 Ibid. 
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system, thus intermediaries implemented notice mechanism as a part of their voluntary 
own initiative. This means that each intermediary would have a freedom to implement an 
enforcement measure to apply in the case of an infringement as a result of its freedom of 
contract. It is evident that having different contractual terms and binding of them would 
not bring the required uniformity that is aimed with the DSM Strategy. 
On the other hand, however, voluntary measures have proved to be effective to some 
extent especially when they are employed as a policy option or legally-mandated 
obligations or by means of a private agreement or initiative. Legislation requires the 
implementation of the GRS, such as the French HADOPI law which is a good example 
of the implementation of such measures as a legally-mandated obligation, although the 
effectiveness of GRS is arguable. The Canadian notice-and-notice system as provided in 
the Canadian Copyright Act is another good illustration showing that the self-regulatory 
initiatives can prove to be of assistance in providing effective enforcement. This is 
because the Canadian notice-and-notice mechanism was a self-regulatory initiative before 
it was included in the Copyright Act. That is to say, a purely voluntary enforcement 
scheme has now become part of Canadian copyright law and policy.  
 
There also exist such agreements initiated for trade mark. The EU’s Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU)685 is a multi-stake dialogue between brand owners and Internet 
platforms that aims ‘to establish a code of practice in the fight against the sale of 
counterfeit goods over the internet and to enhance collaboration between the signatories 
including and in addition to Notice and Take-Down procedures’ but it is limited to each 
signatory and the European Economic Area. It is not a binding agreement and does not 
close the legislatory process. Instead it aims to create a more uniform enforcement 
process, namely an NTD mechanism, that deals with the sale of counterfeit goods.686 In 
the report published by the EU Commission in 2013, it was concluded that ‘the approach 
adopted by the MoU works, but also highlights the need for Internet Platforms and Rights 
Owners to remain alert and vigilant.’687 Accordingly, in 2016, further action to 
                                                 
685 Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet, May 4, 2011. 
Available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_04052011_en.pdf> 
686 For further examination See Dinwoodie ‘Secondary Liability for Online Trademark Infringement: The 
International Landscape’ (2014), 467-470. 
687 Commissions’ Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
Functioning of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet COM 
(2013) 209. 
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implement a new MOU on the online sale of counterfeit goods was undertaken by the EU 
and it was opened for signature.688 In that sense, the MOU does not appear to be a 
temporary initiative for the signatories and the EU. Although its true impact over the 
enforcement of trade mark rights can only be evaluated with empirical evidence, in the 
light of the Commission’s report and having taken further action to implement a new 
MOU, it would not be wrong to conclude that the MOU has proven to be successful.  
 
In addition to these examples, the ‘follow the money’ approach, as a voluntary cooperation 
mechanism, is also stated to be part of the DSM Strategy in ‘depriving those engaging in 
commercial infringements of intellectual property rights of the revenue streams 
emanating from their illegal activities.’689 This voluntary practice has mostly been 
adopted and applied in the US.690 In brief, this type of enforcement aims to minimise the 
funding for IP infringement by working with the payment processors such as Mastercard, 
Visa or Paypal. In the light of the further actions undertaken under the DSM Strategy, it 
is understood that the follow the money system is considered to be implemented through 
a multi-stake dialogue, namely as a new MOU.  
 
Overall, all these developments demonstrate that the EU policy now considers the self-
regulatory measures as an important player for effective enforcement. This policy change 
can be seen as part of a rather bigger shift in the intermediary liability regime; a shift 
towards an intermediary responsibility from an intermediary liability. However, it is 
evident from the above appraisal that, merely depending on voluntary measures in pursuit 
to an effective enforcement and uniform rules would seemingly not provide the relief for 
EU liability regime but would bring more questions. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that the promotion and implementation of such measures should not be considered any 
further under the intermediary liability regime. The examination undertaken in this part 
demonstrates that self-regulatory measures have some power in tackling illegal content. 
The process that made Canadian legislators include the notice-and-notice mechanism in 
                                                 
688 See <https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/enforcement_en> 
689 Communication on ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for 
Europe’ COMM (2016) 288 final, 8. 
690 Frosio, ‘Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility’ (2017), 
29. Also See O’ Doherty, ‘Online trade mark and copyright infringement injunctions: implications on ISPs, 
site owners and IPR owners’ (2016), 88. 
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the Copyright Act is the best illustration of this. Voluntary measures therefore appear as 
another significant player in establishing uniform and effective enforcement mechanisms 
as well as enhancing the awareness in the intermediaries’ world when they operate as 
auxiliary mechanisms.  
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
After determining that the current approach adopted for shaping online trade mark 
liability (ie the immunity regime) does not provide a satisfactorily working framework 
for the challenges that arise, this chapter focused on the ultimate aim of the thesis; that of 
pursuing a remedy for the existing challenges and shortcomings of the regime. The 
previous chapters revealed that the uniformity that the EU regime mainly strives for as 
this would bring transparency, efficiency and consistency in the application of the rules 
as much as possible throughout the EU. As such it is the main purpose of establishing the 
DSM. To this end, the chapter asked the following question: ‘Can a remedy be found 
within current EU law governing online contributory trade mark liability without a 
radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework?’.  
Offering a solution for the existing challenges has also been the aim of the EU. A series 
of Communications were published for the purpose of establishing a fit-for purpose 
regulatory environment as well as a more balanced and predictable liability regime for 
platforms and intermediaries. More importantly, in pursuing this aim, the EU policy 
seems to have inclined towards the adaptation of a different approach. As has been 
assessed above, the EU’s current approach seems to be focused on two significant points; 
intermediaries’ responsibility and the implementation of sector-specific initiatives. The 
responsibility of intermediaries was considered in these Communications, either by 
suggesting new mechanisms (ie the imposition of duty of care or implementation of 
voluntary measures) or by simply emphasising the intermediaries’ position in tackling the 
illegal content online, whereas the sector-specific approach became apparent with the 
proposal of the CD. These initiatives have therefore been examined to see whether they 
would fit into the existing regime and to what extent they would provide a remedy to 
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ongoing challenges. Besides this, existing mechanisms, ie injunctions and the NTD 
system, have been assessed in pursuit of finding an answer to the chapter’s question. 
Considering the above examination, it can be concluded that the mechanisms considered 
have the power to deal with the infringing activities and provide harmonisation. However, 
as demonstrated, they appear to provide a different level of assistance in that respect. 
Moreover, some bring more challenges especially for fundamental rights and in terms of 
striking a balance between the parties. Indeed, some of the variants of notice-and-action 
mechanisms namely notice-and-stay down, notice-and-disconnection and NTD as 
implemented in the EU bear out this concern, although the others proved to be working. 
In a similar sense, injunctions pose the same risk in that they do not appear to provide the 
required and satisfactory level of assistance unless further clarification is provided by the 
EU legislators. For newly considered mechanisms, ie duty of care and voluntary 
mechanisms, the same uncertainty arises as an issue which affects their preference over 
existing mechanisms.  
Overall, as an answer to the question asked in this chapter, the analysis concludes that the 
solution can indeed be found within current EU law governing online contributory trade 
mark liability without a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework. It would 
follow that instead of implementing new mechanisms, namely duty of care or voluntary 
measures, the existing mechanisms, ie the NTD and injunctions, could prove to be of 
greater assistance in dealing with the challenges that arise from online trade mark 
infringements. Accordingly, these mechanisms would make the existing regime more 
aligned with the Internet technologies. More specifically, it is found that the notice-and-
notice and notice-and-judicial takedown mechanisms are the best mechanisms to be 
implemented for trade mark, yet their effectiveness should be ensured. The existing NTD 
and injunction mechanisms are not regarded as the best unless further harmonisation and 
safeguards are provided especially with respect to fundamental rights. Finally, the 
implementation of assistance of voluntary measures as an auxiliary to the main 
mechanisms is underlined. In the light of these, the ultimate examination that aims to 
delineate the most appropriate mechanism will be undertaken in the next chapter as a 
proposal of the thesis.  
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I. WHICH MECHANISM WOULD WORK BEST AS A REMEDY? 
 
We now proceed to the main proposal of the thesis in pursuit of developing the law of 
online contributory trade mark liability. So far, it has been demonstrated that the 
uniformity and further clarification are what the existing law of contributory trade mark 
liability mainly strives for. In the search of a solution that would provide more harmonised 
and clearer rules, the mechanisms that have already implemented and applied within the 
intermediaries’ liability regime (notice-and-action mechanisms and injunctions) together 
with the mechanisms that have not yet been implemented into law but considered by the 
EU legislators for the purposes of creating the DSM and providing more concrete law 
framework (imposition of duty of care, voluntary measures) have been examined. That 
examination has most significantly proved that the solution can indeed be found within 
the current law without a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework.  
However, it is also demonstrated that each mechanism’s contribution to the existing law 
as a remedy would be at different level. Henceforth, the previous chapter concluded that 
within the above-mentioned mechanisms notice-and-notice and notice-and-judicial 
takedown mechanisms are the best working ones as they prove to strike the fair balance 
between the parties. Having said that it is also concluded these mechanisms lack 
effectiveness in terms of providing an effective solution for the challenges that arise. Yet, 
what is sought in this thesis and precisely in this chapter is a solution that would fulfil all 
the following goals: providing a harmonisation, striking the balance between the 
fundamental rights of the parties and ensuring the effectiveness.  In that way, chosen 
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mechanism should contribute to harmonisation. But, it cannot be considered complete 
and effective unless it ensures the fair balance between the parties. 
In the pursuit of these goals, this thesis ultimately proposes the implementation of a 
notice-and-notice mechanism as a solution. Yet, what is proposed here is not the notice-
and-notice mechanism as it is currently applied in Canada. The proposed system is 
different than the system applies in Canadian copyright law. To remind it, the Canadian 
notice-and-notice system limits the intermediary’s involvement in the process to simply 
forwarding the notices issued by the parties. Therefore, the issue of take down is left to 
the parties to decide, not to an intermediary. The chosen mechanism in this thesis is 
founded on the same basis but it elaborates the system further. However, before 
explaining the sytem, its working principle and how it should be implemented, reasons of 
why this mechanism is proposed and why the other alternatives have been ruled out 
should be explained.  
First, all mechanisms have been considered within the previous chapters should be 
examined with respect to harmonisation and uniformity purposes. The imposition of a 
duty of care and the implementation of voluntary measures as enforcement mechanisms 
should be ruled out as they do not appear feasible for harmonisation purposes although 
they are considered within the DSM Strategy for this purpose.   
The notion of duty of care is a new concept for the online world and its framework is not 
clear. It is therefore difficult to suggest that the implementation of the mechanism would 
bring more harmonisation, if only not bring more questions. Art.13 of the proposed CD 
and the German doctrine of Störerhaftung are the most suitable candidates to demonstrate 
the possible impacts of the imposition of such duty on intermediaries, although Art.13 
has not yet come into force. On the other hand, it is evident that these two legal 
instruments differ from each other on the point that duty imposed under the Störerhaftung 
doctrine is an ex-post measure whereas Art.13 imposes ex-ante duty on the 
intermediaries. As it is not clear that how the duty of care would be implemented within 
the law, the above two are assistive to establish and demonstrate the possible impact of 
the mechanism from different aspects.  
The amended version of Art.13 stipulates that the online content sharing service providers 
which give access to large amounts of work should either conclude licencing agreements 
with the right owners or take the necessary measures to prevent the availability of the 
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unauthorised content on their platform. The previous chapter concluded that the latter 
would mean the implementation of ex-ante measures which might led in general 
monitoring which is prohibited within the ECD. Moreover, the proposed Article may give 
rise to ambiguous applications given the lack of further insight on the precise scope of 
Article and the duty imposed in. Article, as it is, does not explain what these measures 
should be. This would mean that different measures may be implemented by different 
service providers who fall into the scope of Article. This would most likely create a 
regime of divergent applications.  
In fact, the application of the doctrine of Störerhaftung has proven that even the duty of 
care as applied in German law suffers from divergent applications despite it is applied as 
an ex-post measure and as a result of judicial process. The two Rapidshare cases 
demonstrated how malleable the boundaries of the duty of care can be in practice and 
how the German courts have struggled in applying this long-standing doctrine to newly 
evolved technologies. Such ambiguity and perhaps a fragmentation are the last things that 
the EU legislators and the law desire.   
There is danger of creating a more fragmented regime, which is also evident in the 
promotion of the voluntarily implemented enforcement measures. When those measures 
are implemented as self-regulation, enforcement processes undertaken by the 
intermediaries against the content providers would only be bound by the intermediary’s 
own terms which are non-negotiable. Users of the service should agree on these terms 
which are previously prepared by an intermediary when signing up in order to use the 
service. Therefore, they do not have any input on the terms. It is true that those terms 
should and would be in consistent with the law. But other than that, the framework of 
those measures is determined by each intermediary within the limits of their freedom of 
contract. This would most likely  result in the creation of fragmented privately-enforced 
standards given the variations in the service provided by the intermediaries.691 As 
previously examined, the Multatuli Project,692 in which the NTD procedures of ten 
different ISPs of Netherland were considered, demonstrated the divergence between the 
                                                 
691 Clement Salung Petersen and Thomas Riis ‘Private enforcement of IP law by internet service providers: 
notice and action procedures’ in Thomas Riis, User Generated Law. Re-Constructing Intellectual Property 
Law in a Knowledge Society (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2016) 228-251, 236.  
692 Sjoera Nas, ‘The Multatuli Project ISP Notice & take down’ (2004) (Multatuli project) <https://www-
old.bof.nl/docs/researchpaperSANE.pdf> 
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concerned ISPs as to take down requests since the research revealed that the timeframe 
for the removal of the content varied from three hours to ten days.693  
Besides this fragmentation, in most of the cases privately enforced measures suffer from 
lack of transparency. In one study undertaken by the OECD in 2011,694 it was indicated 
that there is a lack of transparency on the elements of the NTD procedures of the 
intermediaries such as the number of the notices or counter-notices filed, the estimated 
costs of complying with the procedures to service providers or right owners. The lack of 
information as to how the procedure is implemented and applied by intermediaries and 
all necessary numbers and statistics related to the procedures would result in the difficulty 
in examining the actual implications and effectiveness of the procedures as well as in 
striking the fair balance between the fundamental rights of the parties. In the light of these 
then the implementation of the voluntary measures is also ruled out. 
At that point, it should be underlined that the existing NTD mechanisms which are 
implemented in practice by means of fulfilling the requirements of the immunity provided 
in Art.14 of ECD applies as voluntary self-regulatory procedures since the Directive 
leaves the matter to the domestic laws of the MSs to be decided and puts the 
intermediaries in the centre of the process. In that sense, the prospects of fragmentation 
and lack of transparency become valid for the existing NTD mechanism as well. 
Turning to the injunctions, it has been demonstrated in the previous chapters that this 
mechanism is of significant importance as an enforcement mechanism for the liability 
regime as it tackles infringements as a result of judicial process. The role of the judiciary 
in injunction cases is an important element in regulating intermediaries’ liability since in 
those cases the judiciary has the power to offer a solution for the issues that are brought 
before it. The cost issue brought before the English Supreme Court in the Cartier I is the 
best example of this.695 It is because the Supreme Court’s holding that  the 
implementation costs of the blocking injunction can be imposed on the rights owners can 
be read as an instrument to deter the right owners to use injunction orders as a weapon 
against intermediaries.   
                                                 
693 For detailed analysis See Chapter 5 
694 OECD, The Role of Internet Intermediaries in Advancing Public Policy Objectives (OECD Publishing 
2011), 146. 
695 Cartier I, [2018] UKSC 28. See Chapter 4 
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However, for the purpose of harmonisation, injunctive reliefs’ assistance remains limited 
since the injunctions cannot be applied unless the request is brought before the courts and 
they target infringements that have already taken place. Thus, any movement undertaken 
in establishing solid framework would provide more clarity and uniformity in terms of 
creating a norm for intermediaries’ responsibilities, yet its impact would be limited with 
the fact that injunctions can only be granted in judicial process.  
On the other hand, the notice mechanism in general appears to be the best candidate to 
provide the harmonisation on the ground that the notice is the element of the immunity 
regime established within the EU. In other words, the notice regime is directly related to 
the intermediary question as it is an element in deciding the immunity of hosting 
intermediaries. In that regard, every action undertaken in providing a concrete notice 
system would have its impact on the liability regime. This would follow that clearly 
provided rules as to the notice mechanism would be expected to bring transparency and 
uniformity to the liability regime to some extent. This is probably because notice-and-
action mechanisms are still considered in the DSM Strategy for the purpose of creating a 
single market.  
Having said that not all variations of the notice mechanism appear to provide the 
anticipated transparency and uniformity. Indeed, the NTD mechanism as is currently 
applied in the EU lacks the required clarity and uniformity. This is because the NTD 
mechanism is implemented as a self-regulatory mechanism by the intermediaries. In that 
regard, any further movement undertaken by the EU legislators with respect to the NTD 
mechanism would not mean more than a guidance for MSs domestic laws as procedures 
of the NTD are firstly left to MSs and eventually to intermediaries to decide in their terms 
and conditions. Therefore, this mechanism does not fulfil the goal of harmonisation 
although the notice mechanisms appear to be the best candidates for harmonisation. 
Following this, the notice-and-stay down and notice-and-disconnection mechanisms also 
appear to fail to provide more uniformity that is expected from notice mechanisms in 
general. What is in common with respect to these three mechanisms is the intermediary’s 
involvement in the process. Intermediary is the one who decides the taking down or the 
one who undertakes more proactive measures to prevent the occurrence of an 
infringement. Therefore, the way of working of these mechanisms would still be bound 
by the intermediaries’ own terms. This underlines the importance of leaving the 
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intermediaries out of the decision process of enforcement even for the purposes of 
harmonisation.  
More importantly, intermediaries’ involvement in the decision process cannot be justified 
from the fundamental rights’ aspect, as well. In that regard, it is also difficult to conclude 
that the notice mechanisms as applied in practice strike the fair balance between 
fundamental rights with some exceptions. Starting with the NTD mechanism as 
implemented within the ECD, it is evident that the mechanism is far from providing fair 
balance as it leaves the discretion of taking down the content to intermediaries. Here, the 
protection of the rights to freedom of information of users and freedom of expression of 
content providers is left to intermediaries as they are the ones who take down the content 
against a notice issued by rights holder. Moreover, as it is applied within the EU, the NTD 
system is a part of a private enforcement. As there is not any requirement of counter-
notice as a safeguard, the mechanism also has a negative impact on the procedural 
fundamental rights of the content providers ie the rights enshrined within Art 47 of the 
Charter.  
The DMCA version of NTD system entitles content providers to issue a counter-notice 
yet it does not leave the intermediary out of taking down process. It still is the 
intermediary who decides the take down. The fact that the intermediary is under a duty to 
notify the content provider about the allegation of an infringement made by right holder 
does not appear to work as a strong safe-guard mechanism as the content provider is 
notified after taking down the content. This is considered as equivalent to a temporary 
restraining order which is given extra-judicially and based on the right owners’ allegation 
of infringement.696 Thus, the counter-notice as provided in the DMCA cannot be regarded 
as an element ensuring the protection of fundamental rights of the content providers, as 
this right to fair trial is given to content provider not for the trial, just after the trial.  
On similar grounds, the notice-and-stay down and notice-and-disconnection mechanisms 
have to be ruled out. These mechanisms encourage intermediaries to implement more 
pro-active measures in order to prevent the reappearance of an infringement as well as 
leaving the discretion of taking an action to them. Implementing and applying such 
measures can easily result in censorship (over-removal) which would interfere the 
                                                 
696 Jennifer M Urban and Laura Quilter, ‘Efficient Process or “Chilling Effect?” Takedown Notices under 
Section 512 of the Digital Millennium’ (2006) Act 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Technology Law 
Journal 621-693, 639.  
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freedom of expression and information of the users. However, with respect to the French 
version of notice-and-disconnection mechanism (GRS) one significant element should 
not be overlooked.697 In this no longer applicable GRS, intermediaries’ duties within the 
process were limited with detecting and informing the administrative authority which was 
called HADOPI. The decision of taking an action and which type of sanction should be 
awarded were left to these administrative agencies. This can be considered as a safeguard 
for fundamental rights, accordingly a step towards a more balanced regime. However, it 
should not be ignored that such administrative agencies are a non-judicial public 
authority. So that the HADOPI law can be construed as a law that ‘resulted in a specific 
procedure bypassing the legal guarantees granted under the judicial procedure’.698  
In contrast, the notice-and-judicial take down mechanism ensures the legal security as 
taking down of the content can only happen with a court order. Thus, the balancing act is 
done by the court as happens in the injunction cases, so the concerns raised for the other 
types of notice mechanisms are abolished by offering optimum guarantees of judicial 
process. Nevertheless, this mechanism is still ruled out as a remedy on the ground that 
the implementation of this system within the existing regime would be impractical since 
every take down request should be brought before the court. This would create a big 
burden for the courts in terms of the workload as it would not be possible to deal with the 
numerous take down requests. 
All of these findings leave us with the notice-and-notice system in which the 
intermediary’s involvement in dealing with the dispute and take down request are 
eliminated and the issue is left to the parties to decide. As has been underlined throughout 
the thesis, the most concerning element of the existing regime is the discretion given to 
intermediaries in dealing with an infringing content, more precisely their judge-like 
position in the taking down or blocking acts with regard to Art. 14. In that sense, this 
mechanism appears more practical than the notice-and-judicial take down as well as being 
feasible but with one exception: effectiveness. The Canadian system does not provide any 
answer to how the aim of tackling infringements can be achieved with it, neither does it 
establish a system for this. Ensuring an effective enforcement mechanism is as important 
as creating a system that eliminates the supremacy of one private party and ensures the 
                                                 
697 See Chapter 5. III. D.4 
698 Heritiana Ranaivoson and Anne-Catherine Lorrain, ‘Graduated response beyond the copyright balance: 
why and how the French HADOPI takes consumers as targets’ (2012) Digital Policy, Regulation and 
Governance 14 (6) 34-44, 41. 
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fair balance. Thus, this thesis proposes an implementation of a notice-and-notice 
mechanism within the EU with the creation of a uniform dispute resolution body (DRB) 
which can provide effectiveness, certainty and assurance while tackling infringement 
issues. It is submitted that this would provide further harmonisation as well as it would 
foster the protection of fundamental rights of the parties.  
 
II. HOW SHOULD IT BE IMPLEMENTED? 
 
Here, the first thing needs to be answered is how should this mechanism work? The hint 
is actually in its name: notice-and-notice. This indicates that system is founded on the 
exchange of the notices and it is intermediaries’ duty to forward the notices between the 
right owner and content provider. More precisely, the proposed mechanism simply works 
in the following way (See Figure 1 on the following page): When an intermediary receives 
the notice issued by a rights holder requesting taking down the content or blocking the 
access, it checks the notice whether it contains all the elements. If the notice does not 
contain all the required elements in it, intermediary does not act further. However, if the 
notice fulfils the requirements, then it is forwarded to the provider of the allegedly 
infringing content by that intermediary. At that stage, the proposed system entitles the 
content provider a right to issue a counter-notice. If the content provider chooses to issue 
a counter-notice, this counter-notice must also be valid meaning that it must contain all 
the required elements in it. When the counter- notice is issued against the right holder via 
an intermediary, it is again the intermediary’s duty to check the notice against the 
requirements and then forward it to the right holder if it fulfils the all requirements.   
Most significant aspect of the above mechanism is that an intermediary does not involve 
in the dispute further than checking and forwarding the notices. Having said that, 
proposed system requires from intermediary to take down the content in one specific case: 
when content provider does not issue a counter-notice, or the counter-notice issued does 
not contain the required elements in it. It must be underlined that except from this, the 
intermediaries’ duty is limited to provide the correspondence between the right owner 
and content provider by forwarding the notices to each other. Therefore, the main dispute 
which is the illegality of the content is not for an intermediary to decide as it is applied 
under the existing NTD system. At that point, encouraging Alternative Dispute 
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Resolution (ADR) via the creation of a uniform DRB for the resolution of the dispute is 
proposed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Working principle of the notice-and-action mechanism  
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Issues a notice to an intermediary 
RIGHT HOLDER 
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(END) 
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      Checks the counter-notice 
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This is the main working principle of the mechanism proposed here. As it can be seen, 
the most significant feature of the mechanism is leaving the intermediaries out of the 
decision process. As it has been underlined before, active involvement by the 
intermediaries in the appraisal of illegality of a content and their discretion in taking down 
the content are the most criticised elements of the existing NTD system. It is demonstrated 
that giving such discretion to intermediaries as private parties in resolving the dispute 
between content providers and right owners does not only fail to assure the legal security, 
it also harms the balance between the fundamental rights of the parties. The fundamental 
rights that could be affected within the NTD process are identified as: right holders’ right 
to property, content providers’ right to freedom of expression and protection of data and 
privacy, intermediaries’ right to conduct business and last but not least the fundamental 
procedural rights enshrined for the both parties such as right to fair trial or effective 
remedy.  
The proposed mechanism is therefore aimed firstly and most significantly to eliminate 
the involvement of an intermediary in the process as well as to provide an effective system 
which establish uniform rules. It is why intermediary’s involvement is limited to the act 
of providing the communication between the parties by simply forwarding the notices 
issues and no discretion given to them by means of resolving the dispute or taking down 
the allegedly infringing content. Further to that the creation of a uniform DRB by means 
of an ADR is proposed as a platform for parties to bring their disputes to be resolved. 
This would also lead to a balanced system which protects the fundamental rights of the 
parties. The act of balancing is not undertaken by an intermediary under the proposed 
mechanism. Dispute will be considered and resolved with ADR process so that all parties 
are given a right to bring and discuss their claims. 
However, for the aim of a satisfactorily working mechanism, the system should establish 
more than that and it must readily have its answers within the system. In that regard, 
notice and its elements should be the first thing to be focused on and established. It is 
evident that it is essential to specify what should be included in the notice. Although these 
are the procedural requirements, they are also the elements which would provide the 
transparency and foster the protection of the fundamental rights of the parties. Besides, 
determining the elements of the notice is a method of preventing the issuance of 
groundless notices in other words abuse of the system. Although the issuance of a notice 
does not result in taking down the allegedly infringing content under the proposed 
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mechanism, the system can still be a subject of abuse. One can issue a notice hoping not 
to receive a counter-notice or to receive an invalid one. As stated, in the default of a 
counter-notice or a valid counter-notice, intermediary takes down the content. Bearing 
this in mind, the elements that would protect the system against possible abuse should 
also be determined.   
As the he DMCA statutorily establishes the elements that a valid notice should contain, 
it can be of an assistance on this matter.699  
 
A. What Should Be Contained in a Notice? 
The following elements are proposed as the minimum requirements that a notification 
must consist of:  
• Signature of the issuer of the notification on a written notification,  
• Clear specification of the infringing content and provision of evidences related to 
a claim,  
• Verifiable contact details of the issuer of the notification ie full name, telephone 
number, verified address etc.,  
• A statement indicating the accuracy of the information provided.  
In the light of these above-mentioned requirements determined as the minimum 
standards, when rights owner issues a notice, the notice must include the sufficient 
information as to the infringing content and the claim. Here, the proof of an ownership of 
the mark may be requested to be included in the notice. In fact, some intermediaries have 
already implemented a system that works as database where a rights holder provides the 
related information as to its right proving that it is the owner.700 An implementation of 
such a system can be asked from intermediaries with that respect. 
In addition to this, the issuer of a notice should provide verifiable contact address. Failing 
to do this would result in an issuance of an invalid notification. Thus, the requirement of 
a verifiable address is one of the elements that would assist to prevent the abuse of the 
                                                 
699 See Chapter 5.III. B 
700 Chinese e-commerce site Alibaba created an IP Protection Platform where the rights owners can upload 
the related documents as to their rights in the database when creating a profile. These documents are saved 
in database and can be used as a proof whenever the claim of infringement is lodged by right owners, See 
<https://ipp.alibabagroup.com/index.htm?language=en_US>  
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system. With the same regard, notification must include the signature of rights owner as 
well as clear statement indicating the accuracy of the information provided. Although 
these proposed elements are very similar to what the DMCA establishes, on the matter of 
preventing abuse of notices the DMCA requires from an issuer of the notice to state its 
good faith regarding to the take down request and a statement under the penalty of perjury 
from the issuer of counter notice.701  
However, the proposed system does not include such requirements. It is because, the 
notion of good faith is bound by the different interpretations under national laws of MSs, 
but more importantly defining its framework and assessing it would be rather challenging. 
Nevertheless, the proposed system should still provide a safeguard against the cases of 
abuse which would also provide more balanced and effective mechanism. Type of the 
sanction is to be applied against the abuse of the system for example providing false or 
misleading information should be determined within the framework of the scheme. 
However, it is submitted that the determination of the sanction should be left to national 
laws of the MSs since determining one single type might not be compatible with every 
MSs’ national laws. Yet, it is important that the type of penalty chosen should be clearly 
stated within the relevant law.  
Further to that, it is proposed that intermediaries might be required to create a template 
of notice for its users to fill when sending the notices. Accordingly, this template may 
include a statement indicating the accuracy of the information provided as well as the 
statement accepting the liability under the specified sanction. It should be noted for the 
sake of clarity that the type of sanction is not to be determined by intermediaries. This 
should be specified in the relevant legal piece that is provided under national law. Finally, 
it should be stated that the chosen type of the sanction would also be valid for the issuer 
of counter-notices when these notices consist of misleading or false information.  
These are the minimum requirements that a notification must include, and it is 
intermediaries’ duty to check them when the notice is received. This would follow that if 
the notice does not have the above stated elements, intermediary will not forward to 
notice. However, there is one significant point needs to be underlined. The proposed 
system stipulates that not having provided these elements in the counter-notice would 
result in taking down the content. 
                                                 
701 The DMCA, S 512 (3) (a)- (g).  
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It is evident that the counter-notice is a significant element in striking the balance between 
the parties’ fundamental rights since it entitles content providers to a right to defend 
themselves namely a right to a fair trial. In that sense, one can argue that the immediate 
take down proposed here would be inconsistent to strike that balance. However, the 
proposal of immediate take down can be justified with the intention behind the selling of 
counterfeit goods. It is difficult to argue that the sellers of counterfeit products are the 
victims of their actions. In most of the cases, sellers benefited from the features of the 
protected mark and earns a revenue from these transactions. The anonymity and the 
convenience that the Internet offers are the most significant elements to make these 
activities possible and more straightforward in the online world. This would follow that 
the content providers of allegedly infringing content would not want to reveal their 
identity or lose their anonymity. Therefore, they would not send any counter-notice unless 
they genuinely feel that the allegations are wrong. A counterfeit seller would not want to 
reveal its identity if it knows that the content is indeed infringing. Therefore, in the 
absence of a counter-notice or the issuance of a counter-notice that does not consist of 
required elements, the content should be taken down by an intermediary to ensure the 
effectiveness of the mechanism.  
 
B. Time Frame for the Issuance of a Notice 
The determination of the time frame for sending a notice is another safeguard and an 
element to ensure the effectiveness. Art. 14 of the ECD stipulates that an intermediary 
must act expeditiously when it receives a notice or obtains an awareness as to the 
infringing nature of a content. However, it does not provide further explanation and clarity 
on the exact limits of the expeditiousness notion. It should be fair to say that the time 
provided to a content owner to issue a counter-notice and to an intermediary to act should 
be sufficient for both the content provider to issue a counter-notice the intermediary to 
check and act in order to ensure the effectiveness of the system.  
In that sense, it is submitted that the time allowed for an intermediary to check the notice 
issued by a right owner and then to forward to the alleged content provider should be 2 
or 3 working days in order to ensure the speed of the process. This time period should be 
sufficient for an intermediary to check if the notice contains all the details required as the 
intermediaries have been doing this and they have mostly implemented the necessary 
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systems for that. The same 2 or 3 working days time frame should also be set out for an 
intermediary to forward the counter notice to a right holder. 
However, the time allowed to an issuer of a counter-notice, more precisely to a content 
provider should be longer than that. This is because, the time provided should be adequate 
for content provider to understand the claim and establish its counter-claim together with 
the evidences if there is any. Here, it is submitted that 4 working days should be provided 
to content provider in order to issue a counter-notice.  
Even though these time frames can be set out differently by the EU legislators, there is 
one thing that should not be ignored: these time frames should clearly be set out and 
applied as a uniform rule within the EU. 
 
C. Ensuring the Effectiveness of the System and the Establishment of a 
Uniform DRB 
So far, the proposal has established the working way of the notice-and-notice system as 
well as its elements. This proposal assures that intermediary’s involvement in the process 
is limited to checking the notices and forwarding to the parties of the dispute. By leaving 
intermediary out of the decision process together with entitling content provider a right 
to issue a counter-notice are the safeguards proposed for the protection of fundamental 
rights of the parties. However, as it stands, the system does not address the question of 
who will examine the claims of the parties. This is, as demonstrated earlier, a significant 
matter to be dealt with and a significant element in striking the balance between 
fundamental rights as well as in establishing an effectively working system. It has been 
demonstrated that injunctions appear as the only mechanism ensuring the legal assurance. 
Yet, it is also concluded that the contribution of this mechanism in resolving the 
challenges that arise remain limited since the application of an injunction is not possible 
without legal process.  
In the light of these, the proposed notice-and-notice mechanisms must address the 
question of who should deal with the dispute between the parties. The answer of this 
question should fulfil the aims of establishing a solid, an effectively working and a result-
oriented system. In that regard, the establishment of a uniform DRB which would be 
based on the ADR process is proposed here.  
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The ADR process is not foreign to EU law. One of the example is created within the 
Regulation 524/2013 on Online Dispute Resolution (ODR Regulation).702 This regulation 
establishes the pan-EU ODR platform for consumers to bring their claims arising from e-
commerce ie from online purchases of goods and services and here the dispute is resolved 
through a chosen ADR body. According to that, a consumer who would like to process 
its claim lodges this claim on this pan-EU ODR platform for the resolution of the dispute 
under an ADR process. Through this platform provided, consumer electronically lodges 
all the details of itself and the claim and can choose the DRB. Once the trader of the 
concerned e-commerce activity agrees the use of a chosen body, then the dispute is dealt 
with under this process by a chosen body. The Regulation determines all the necessary 
time frames for that.  
What is significant and can be inspired for the notice-and-notice mechanism proposed 
here is the fact that such ODR platform is used as a platform for facilitating the 
communication between the parties and the dispute is assessed under an ADR process. 
Such an ADR process appears as feasible and sensible for the counterfeit selling and 
taking down the content. This is because, such process would work faster than the judicial 
process while leaving the intermediary out of the process and bringing the two actual 
parties of the claim together to resolve the dispute between them. Although it is evident 
that this is a non-judicial proceeding and the parties could still bring their cases before 
the court, from the fundamental rights’ aspect a mechanism which provides safeguards to 
parties and leaves the intermediary out of the decision process would be the preferred and 
best working one.  
It must be pointed out that such dispute resolution service has also been in the application 
with respect to IP rights namely for the domain name disputes. Yet here, with respect to 
the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)703 prepared by World 
Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), uniform dispute resolution system as an initiative is 
established by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and 
has been referred to numerous disputes. This system provides an ADR system for the 
disputes over domain name ownership as an alternative to the court proceeding. 
                                                 
702 Regulation 524/2013 of 21 May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR) OJ L 165/1. 
703 <https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/help/dndr/udrp-en> 
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According to its policy, the dispute that arises from the abuse of domain name704 is 
administered by authorised dispute resolution service providers. When the dispute is filed 
through, the chosen dispute resolution service provider appoints the Administrative Panel 
which consists of the experts in the areas of domain name issues, trade mark law, e-
commerce etc. and the panel decides the issue within 60 days. Therefore, the dispute is 
most likely to be resolved faster than the court process. However, what is most significant 
with respect to this system is its scope since it provides an internationally applicable 
single mechanism for resolving a domain name dispute regardless of where the registrar 
of the domain name holder or the complainant are located. This is quite significant 
considering how challenging is to tackle the issues that arises from the Internet on an 
international basis and can be inspiring for the mechanism that is sought in this chapter. 
But, perhaps for something at EU level, not on the international base.  
Reverting to the proposed mechanism, what is submitted here is sort of a mixture of the 
above-mentioned systems. In the way of working the notice-and-notice mechanism, the 
intermediaries are positioned as a medium to facilitate the exchange of the notices and 
the claims. Thus, creating an additional pan-EU ODR like platform in order to provide 
such communication would be time consuming and wasting of the resources. As 
intermediaries provide the communication between the parties by forwarding the notices 
right owner to content provider or vice versa, they can also be asked to provide some 
basic and necessary information as to the prospects of ADR process that the parties may 
choose to follow in order to resolve the dispute on the contents’ legitimacy.  
This would work in the following way: When the first notice is received, an intermediary 
not only forwards this notice, but also provides the related information as to the ADR 
process to a content provider. This information will inform the content provider about the 
prospects of possible process, more precisely it will explain that right owner may bring 
its claim before a DRB if content provider contests the claim of illegality and issues a 
valid counter-notice. If it does so, their dispute will be moved to that platform. Following 
this if the dispute is concluded in favour of a right owner, the content provider will bear 
                                                 
704 Art 4(a) of the UDRP Policy explains what types of disputes that can be as follows: ‘i) your domain 
name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has 
rights; and ii) you have no rights or legitimate interest in respect of the domain name; and iii) your domain 
name has been registered and being used in bad faith.’ 
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the costs related to the dispute. Otherwise the costs of bringing the issue before the DRB 
is for right owners to bear.  
 In a similar way, when the valid counter-notice is issued, an intermediary sends this 
notice to a right owner and informs it about the DRB. Bearing its working mechanism in 
mind, thesis proposes the creation of pan-EU DRB as UDPR that will deal with the issues 
that arise from online counterfeit selling.  
 
D. Implementation of the Proposed System within EU Law 
Now, it is to be determined that how the proposed system should be implemented within 
EU law. With respect to what is proposed, the first thing to be done should be the 
alignment of the system within the immunity regime, specifically with Art. 14 of the ECD. 
This is because Art.14 provides an immunity to hosting provider on the condition of 
specific actions to be taken by it which are taking down the illegal content from its 
platform or blocking an access to the content.  
However, the proposed mechanism establishes that intermediary’s principal duty is to 
forward the notices to the content providers and right owners. Intermediary’s act of taking 
down the content is limited to the one specific case explained above. Therefore, the 
existing system should be changed in a way that clearly indicates that the intermediary’s 
duty is to send the notices to parties with an exception of the one case and intermediary 
will not be liable from this.  
Nevertheless, the inclusion of the proposed system may not be as straightforward as it is 
desired provided that the ECD’s immunity regime is established horizontally meaning 
that it applies to all substantive rights. Therefore, any change to the ECD would mean the 
change on the principles that apply to all these rights. However, what is proposed here 
only considers and deals with the specific trade mark infringement, although the proposed 
system may also be of an assistant for other rights especially copyright, but this is outside 
of the thesis scope. Therefore, Art.14 and its recitals should be amended to indicate that 
hosting intermediaries’ immunity from liability that arise from trade mark infringement 
committed by counterfeit selling on their platform depends on their acts of exchanging 
the notices between the parties and also taking of the content only when the counter-
notice is not issued or is not valid.  
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Along with that, a new directive dealing with the notice and its elements should be 
implemented by the EU legislators. This directive should clearly establish the elements 
of the notice and counter-notice as well as the time frames as proposed above. Here, the 
implementation of a directive is proposed because a directive would provide the required 
liberty705 to the MSs in order to implement the some of the elements of the mechanism in 
accordance with their national laws for instance the type of the sanction that will be 
applied to the cases of the abuse.  
Finally, another legislative reform should be undertaken for the creation of a pan-EU 
DRB. The most important aspect of this is to identify the type of the legislation that should 
be implemented. As the thesis proposes the establishment of a uniform body, it also 
proposes that this should be done through with the enactment of a new EU regulation 
which will be directly applicable within the domestic laws of the MSs and have general 
application within the EU.706 It is evident that this would ensure the uniformity sought by 
the creation of such system.  
 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
It has been established in the previous chapters that the uniformity and further 
clarification are what the existing law of contributory trade mark liability mainly strives 
for. More significantly it is demonstrated that a remedy that would provide a relief to the 
shortcomings of the existing regime is indeed possible without a radical overhaul of the 
existing regulatory framework. In that regard, this chapter sought for this remedy by 
means of an enforcement mechanism. In the light of the identified shortcomings of the 
existing law, goal of the chapter is set for finding a remedy that is striking the fair balance 
between the fundamental rights of the parties, that is being effective in tackling 
infringements and last but not least that is providing further harmonisation within the EU.  
Taking all these elements into consideration, it is concluded and submitted that the 
implementation of notice-and-notice system with creating a uniform DRB for parties to 
bring and discuss their claims that arises from online counterfeit selling would provide 
                                                 
705 See p 25. 
706 See fn 71. 
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the best remedy for contributory trade mark liability online. It is demonstrated that the 
notice-and-notice mechanism as proposed provides the necessary safeguards as it 
principally limits the intermediaries’ involvement in the process by facilitating the 
communication between the parties with exchanging their notices and entitles content 
provider to a right to issue a counter-notice. This ensures the protection of the 
fundamental rights of all the parties while the creation of a uniform DRB provides the 
effectiveness of the mechanism and the uniformity.  
Briefly, the proposed mechanism would work in the following way: When the right 
holders’ notification claiming the infringing nature of the specific content and requesting 
the take down of the content is received, service provider firstly assesses this notification 
whether it has all the required elements in it. In that respect, the following elements are 
submitted as the minimum requirements that a notification must consist of:  
• Signature of the issuer of the notification on a written notification,  
• Clear specification of the infringing content and provision of evidences related to 
a claim,  
• Verifiable contact details of the issuer of the notification ie full name, telephone 
number, verified address etc.,  
• A statement indicating the accuracy of the information provided.  
If the notice is included in these elements, it is sent to a provider of the allegedly infringing 
content by an intermediary. The content provider may issue a counter-notice at that stage 
and challenge the claims of the right owner. This notification must also contain all the 
required elements in it and its assessment is again undertaken by an intermediary. 
Intermediary’s involvement in the process is limited to check and forward the notices 
within the allotted time. With respect to the time frames, it is submitted as a 
recommendation that 2 or 3 working days should be provided for an intermediary to check 
the notice issues and to forward it. While 4 working days is submitted as an adequate time 
frame to be given to provider of the content to understand the claim of right owner and 
establish its claim with the necessary evidences.  
It must be underlined that after forwarding the valid counter-notice to a right owner, 
intermediary will not be any longer involved in the process. Following this, a right owner 
has an option to seek its claim via ADR process. For that, the establishment of a uniform 
DRB is proposed. The dispute between the parties is proposed to be resolved by this body. 
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If the take down is decided, the intermediary is to be informed about that decision and it 
will be under a duty to act according to this decision. Otherwise, the intermediary’s take 
down action is limited to one specific cases: when the counter-notice is not issued at all 
or the counter-notice issued is not valid.  
In the light of these, the Chapter also dealt with the question of how this the proposed 
mechanism should be implemented within the EU. In that respect, it is submitted that the 
amendment on Art.14 ECD should be made for the system to be working. Moreover, a 
new directive dealing with the notification and its elements should be implemented. 
Finally, the creation of proposed DRB should be done by implementing a new regulation.    
As a very final matter, it should be noted here that the injunctions appear to be another 
mechanism which can work to shape the contributory trade mark liability online. This is 
because the notice mechanism is only applicable for hosting intermediaries while 
injunctions can be applied against all types of service providers. Indeed, the current state 
of the injunctions law demonstrates that this mechanism is more readily available for 
access providers. It is therefore submitted that the injunctions could also prove to be 
effective for the trade mark regime if the required transparency and uniformity is provided 
at the EU level on the ground that the injunction orders are a result of a judicial process. 
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I. THE FOCUS OF THE THESIS  
 
The focus of the analysis undertaken within this work is the law of online contributory 
trade mark liability of the EU. It is because the liability of online worlds’ most important 
players, the internet intermediaries is mostly questioned under the law of contributory 
liability. They have been the most important players of the online world as a consequence 
of their position in the Internet infrastructure. This popularity, however, has brought a 
great deal of controversy from a legal perspective, although the contributory liability is 
not a new type of liability and it has long been dealt with under tort law.  
Assessing intermediaries’ involvement in the infringing activities committed by third 
parties namely their contributory liability has appeared as a new challenge for the courts 
because the online world differs greatly from the offline world. Therefore, addressing this 
rather new issue and regulating intermediaries have become a part of legal policy. This is 
significant because intermediaries and the technologies implements by them are the major 
contributors of the innovation, economy and society. Henceforth, regulating 
intermediaries by imposing a high burden on them as means of responsibilities or 
imposing a blanket liability or by granting a blanket immunity to them for the 
infringements committed by their users on their platform would directly impact the 
innovation, the economy and the society. If a high burden by means of responsibilities or 
a blanket liability is imposed on them, this would result in an interference on the freedom 
on the Internet as well as a negative effect on innovation. In a similar sense, granting a 
blanket immunity to intermediaries may trigger more infringing activities to be 
committed online since the intermediaries would not be under a threat of being liable for 
the infringements committed on their platforms.  
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The EU legislators, however, have adopted an intermediate approach in regulating the 
online world. In that regard, safe harbour rules that provide an immunity to intermediaries 
are established with the ECD. According to this Directive, intermediaries can be granted 
immunity from the liability that arises from its users’ infringing activities but depending 
on the specific conditions set out in the Directive. Those rules apply to the infringing 
activities that arise from all types of substantive rights whereas the immunity is granted 
only for the specific services provided by intermediaries, ie mere conduit, caching and 
hosting. The conditions set forth for the immunity from liability are provided differently 
and are depended upon the type of service that an intermediary provides. This is because 
intermediaries’ involvement in the provision of these three services is at different levels. 
What is intended by this is to distinguish the passive intermediary from the active one, 
and accordingly providing an immunity to the former.  
However, the most significant feature of the EU’s immunity regime is that the immunity 
rules are provided by means of an additional protection to intermediaries. This means that 
not satisfying the requirements of the immunity does not automatically trigger the 
liability. It follows that the liability should also be assessed and this will be the national 
courts of the MSs’ duty in the light of their domestic tort law rules governing the issue 
which generally is tort law rules. Henceforth, EU law applicable to the issue appears two-
tiered. In other words, online contributory liability law is shaped and established by both 
immunity and national tort law rules of the MSs. More remarkably, the immunity rules 
apply in the same way to all types of substantive rights (criminal or civil law rights) as a 
consequence of the horizontal approach adopted within the ECD. Thus, it was inevitable 
to ask whether this is indeed the effective and accurate approach in dealing with 
contributory trade mark liability issues that arise online.  
Trade mark and the specific type of trade mark infringement namely an infringement that 
arises from online counterfeit selling are the focus of the thesis because trade mark has 
been one of the least considered rights within EU law both legislatively and judicially, 
although the damage that the online counterfeit selling on the rights protected by trade 
mark and on the economy is a fact. Indeed, the CJEU and the domestic courts of the MSs 
have not had a good deal of opportunity to consider the issue of contributory liability that 
arises online from trade mark aspect. Moreover, the EU legislators appear to have lacked 
the interest in trade marks. The latest developments initiated within the EU for the purpose 
of establishing the DSM, providing more uniformity and tackling illegal content online 
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do not expressly consider or mention trade mark law or trade mark-specific issues. This 
however should not be understood as suggesting that trade mark law does not require 
special attention or that the existing law works satisfactorily for online issues. This rather 
indicates that the law of trade mark has been neglected by the EU legislators.  
Against this background, this thesis asked: ‘To what extent does the current state of the 
law of contributory trade mark liability that governs online issues prove to be satisfactory 
in dealing with the ongoing and emerging issues that the Internet brings?’. In order to 
answer this question, the thesis is built on  three main bases: 1) establishing the current 
state of online contributory trade mark liability; 2) identifying ongoing and emerging 
issues that arise and reassessing the law in the light of the new initiatives undertaken by 
the EU; and 3) seeking a remedy for the issues where the law falls short in dealing with 
them. Accordingly, each chapter asked its own question in pursuit of fulfilling the main 
aim of the thesis.   
 
II. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
 
In pursuit of the answer to the main question of the thesis, a brief insight on the discourse 
on Internet intermediaries was provided in Chapter 2. The appraisal undertaken in this 
chapter considered the rights other than trade mark. Those rights were: copyright, privacy 
and the RTBF, and finally fundamental rights. This examination was significant for 
defining the general framework of the intermediaries’ liability as well as for 
demonstrating the general stance of EU law from different rights’ aspects. Those three 
rights were chosen because of their supremacy in the liability regime and their influence 
in shaping the regime in general. Indeed, as the chapter demonstrated, copyright and data 
protection have been the most considered and reviewed areas of law by the EU legislators 
for the purpose of further action. Similarly, the fundamental rights have been the 
significant element of the intermediaries’ liability issue since the courts have been 
challenged to strike a balance between the fundamental rights.  
Thus, the chapter asked the following questions: ‘How is the immunity regime applied to 
rights other than trade mark?’ and ‘To what extent would those implementations assist 
in establishing contributory trade mark liability?’  The examination undertaken in this 
chapter was pertinent to trade mark because the immunity rules apply horizontally. So 
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that, both the interpretations of the rules provided by the CJEU’s and the EU legislators 
from the aspects of different rights should be of assistance for trade mark law yet, as the 
chapter asked, to what extent this assistance would be?  
Copyright was the first right examined as it is the most prominent and analogous right to 
trade mark. This examination demonstrated that the current copyright case law of the EU 
has mostly focused on the injunctions. Considering those cases, it can be concluded that 
the CJEU has provided an insight on the injunctions regime to some extent. More notably, 
those decisions appeared to be consistent with EU law perhaps except UPC Telekabel707. 
The chapter demonstrated that in Scarlet v SABAM708 and SABAM v Netlog709,  the CJEU 
assessed the applicability of an injunction order in conjunction with the relevant EU 
instruments, namely the ED,710 the ECD711 and the Charter712. Accordingly, the 
injunctions that were required the implementation and application of rather extensive 
monitoring or filtering measures were held to be inconsistent with the principles of the 
EU regime on the grounds that it would amount to a general obligation which is prohibited 
within Art.15 of the ECD. Moreover, the balancing exercise on the fundamental rights 
was undertaken and held that such obligation would not strike the balance between the 
fundamental rights of the parties enshrined under the Charter. These are the principles 
that will apply to all the injunction cases, so would to the cases concerning the application 
pf an injunction against an infringement of trade mark.  
Moreover, the appraisal on copyright revealed another significant outcome for the 
liability regime. It was demonstrated that the latest developments considering copyright 
seem to have indicated a potential change to the EU’s intermediaries’ policy. This policy 
change appears to have adopted a more right-specific and problem-driven approach, 
perhaps an approach indicating a shift on the focus from liability discourse to a 
responsibility discourse. The draft of the CD proposes rather new and extensive 
responsibilities on the intermediaries without offering certainty and leaving the question 
of how it can fit into the ECD’s immunity regime unaddressed. These developments and 
                                                 
707 Case C-314/12 UPC Telekabel (27 March 2014) 
708 Case C-70/10 Scarlet v SABAM [2011] ECR I-11959 
709 C-360/10 SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012) 
710 Council Directive 2004/48/EC of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] 
OJ L 195/16. 
711 Council Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, 
in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1. 
712 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 212/C 326/02. 
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their applications within the immunity regime are therefore significant for the immunity 
regime in general as it might result in a change of the EU’s policy and its horizontal 
approach, and perhaps pave the way for trade mark specific regulation.   
Following this, the examination undertaken on privacy and RTBF demonstrated that 
intermediaries’ liability has been differently shaped when those rights are at stake. Indeed, 
there is a right-specific Regulation, GDPR, applicable for the data protection. Along with 
bringing some questions as to the applicability of immunity rules of the ECD to the case 
dealing with the data protection and the interaction between the GDPR and the ECD, the 
GDPR construes the intermediaries and their role in the protection of the data differently 
than the ECD. As the chapter’s appraisal on two different cases (Google France713 and 
Google Spain714) concerning same intermediary Google demonstrated that a same 
intermediary can be subject to different obligations depending on its service at stake. This 
proves the difficulty in establishing the uniform liability regime given that the rights have 
different underlying policies.  
Finally, the intermediaries’ liability issue is examined from the fundamental rights’ 
aspect. In that sense, the fundamental rights of the parties that might be at stake in online 
infringement case are identified as follows: the right holders’ right to protection of 
property, service providers’ right to conduct business and freedom of expression, the 
users of the services’ right to freedom of expression and information as well as the right 
to protection of personal data and privacy and finally the fundamental rights enshrine the 
procedural fairness such as right to access to justice, right to fair trial and effective 
remedy. It was demonstrated that, striking the fair balance between the fundamental rights 
of the parties is an important element in regulating the law of intermediary liability and 
providing an effective enforcement.  
Besides, the examination undertaken in this part hinted the prospects of a controversy 
from another aspect. This time the divergences had not arisen as a conclusion of divergent 
policies surrounding the rights. It is demonstrated that this time it was the different courts 
which indicate this possible controversy, namely the CJEU and the ECtHR, following the 
ECtHR’s decision in Delfi v Estonia715. In that case, the ECtHR found that the NTD and 
filtering systems concerned in the case as inadequate in protecting the fundamental rights 
                                                 
713 Joined Cases C-236/06 -C-236/08 Google France [2010] ECR I-02417. 
714 Case C-131/12 Google Spain (13 May 2014). 
715 App. no. 64569/09. 
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online against the availability of the defamatory comments online. Although the court 
took more aligned approach in MTE v Hungary,716 and decided such systems were 
adequate to protect the freedom of expression against the comments which are not 
defamatory, the test applied in this case still appeared to raise different questions. Overall, 
the examination of that part underlined the importance of the balancing act for the 
purposes of providing balanced regime as well as effective enforcement. 
In the light of these findings, the chapter eventually concluded that the EU’s immunity 
regime has been shaped under a right-specific, problem-driven approach although it is 
provided horizontally. Thus, the assistance of the above-examined rights in the pursuit of 
a remedy for contributory trade mark liability would be limited except copyright. This is 
because copyright is the most analogous right to trade mark. Indeed, the courts have been 
applying the principles of these two IP rights interchangeably by means of an analogical 
approach. Ultimately, seeking trade mark-specific rules appears feasible and copyright 
should be of assistance for this purpose as part of an analogical approach.  
After concluding this, the examination turned to trade mark law in Chapter 3. This chapter 
aimed to undertake the first of three main assessments that the thesis is built on: 
establishing the current state of contributory trade mark liability. In that regard the ECD’s 
immunity regime as well as the ED’s applicable principles have been thoroughly 
examined together with the CJEU’s case law. The chapter asked the following questions: 
‘Is the EU law’s immunity regime the appropriate approach to deal with online 
infringements and establish a contributory trade mark liability regime online? More 
importantly, does this regime have the answers to the challenges that the Internet brings 
or may bring in the future?’ 
It was firstly concluded that the assessment undertaken in this chapter would not be 
sufficient to give a comprehensive answer to the first question without examining national 
courts’ implementation of the rules as well as their tort law rules. In that regard, the 
ultimate answer to this question was left to be answered in the next chapter. However, 
existing chapter’s findings were not limited to this. The assessment has assisted to 
determine the framework of the current EU law applicable to the issue. In that respect, 
uniformly applied rules of the EU’s immunity regime were identified. Those briefly are: 
                                                 
716 App. No 22947/13. 
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the prohibition of general monitoring, the minimum standards that should be applied to 
the injunctions, and the general framework of the awareness test to be applied in assessing 
hosting intermediaries’ immunity. However, what the chapter has proved was that the 
harmonisation which is aimed to be provided with the establishment of an immunity 
regime remains limited. It concluded that EU law has failed to fulfil its objective of 
harmonisation in a bigger scale as it only establishes the general principles but has not 
provided the necessary further guidance on the application of those principles. It appears 
that the CJEU has also failed to do that as well as failing to undertake trade mark specific 
considerations in the cases related to trade mark.  
In pursuit of establishing the current state of contributory trade mark liability, Chapter 4 
examined the national courts’ implementations of the rules into their national laws and 
their domestic tort law rules governing the issue. This analysis was undertaken as a 
continuation of the previous chapter’s assessment. This is because, under EU law national 
laws of MSs governing the issue as well as the immunity regime established within the 
EU acquis are the rules applicable to the contributory liability matter. As the immunity 
regime has been examined in the previous chapter, this chapter took an assessment on tort 
law rules of two MSs (England and Germany) and asked: ‘How is the immunity regime 
applied at the national level’ and ‘To what extent do these applications contribute to the 
harmonisation?’  
These questions are aimed to complete the previous chapter’s objective since it 
considered the missing part in establishing the current law of online contributory trade 
mark liability. In doing so and answering its question, the chapter focused on two different 
MSs’ laws. Those MSs are England and Germany and chosen on the ground that they are 
the representatives of two major legal traditions. England is a common law country 
whereas Germany is a civil law one. This difference is a significant element of the 
assessment since the liability is governed by tort law rules at the national law level and 
tort laws of these countries are shaped very differently. Therefore, the appraisal should 
be very indicative in demonstrating the extent to which these applications contribute to 
the harmonisation. 
It was concluded that despite the presence of the general principles established at the EU 
level, the national courts’ appraisals have primarily focused on their national laws. Their 
case law has hardly provided an insight on how the immunity rules should be 
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implemented, construed and applied within their national laws. The assessments of the 
courts had been instead based on their national law. This outcome was significant but 
perhaps not unforeseen given the fact that the liability question is primarily dealt with 
under the national laws of the MSs. This chapter has proved that there exists a 
fragmentation. This accordingly underlines the lack of uniformity within the EU and its 
importance. Furthermore, the analysis revealed another outcome. It demonstrated the 
courts’ struggle in dealing with contributory liability question within this new context, 
the Internet. Having said that it was also evident that the courts have considered the 
Internet and its differences in applying traditional tort law rules, but they appeared to have 
failed to pay sufficient attention to the Internet’s specific nature.  
In the light of these findings, the chapter concluded that under the two-tiered system of 
the EU, establishing uniformly applicable rules for the issues of online contributory trade 
mark liability is a challenging task. It would follow that the EU’s approach towards 
intermediaries’ regime which establishes an immunity regime in pursuit of harmonisation 
has not proved to be an appropriate and satisfactory to tackle the contributory trade mark 
liability that arises online. It is concluded that this approach brings divergence in 
application while providing uniformity but in a very limited sense. 
Therefore, Chapter 5 was aimed to find the remedy for the existing challenges that arise 
online as well as providing a more effective and solid framework for the law of 
contributory trade mark liability. The analysis was based on the following question: ‘Can 
a remedy be found within current EU law governing online contributory trade mark 
liability without a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework?’. 
The examination has firstly mapped out the current law of online contributory trade mark 
liability in the light of the findings of the previous chapters and identified the existing 
challenges that arise. This is because the examinations undertaken in the previous 
Chapters had not only focused on trade mark on the grounds that the immunity regime is 
horizontally applicable and the case law mostly focused on copyright not trade mark. 
Thus, what those applications have meant for trade mark was also examined in that 
chapter. It was found that trade mark law suffers from the same problems identified for 
the EU immunity regime in general:  lack of uniformity and further guidance. Besides, it 
was concluded that there is a lack of trade mark specific considerations. It has further 
proven that even in the cases that consider trade mark, the courts failed to pay specific 
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attention to the specifics of trade mark law which might require different 
implementations. For example, the CJEU shed light on the application of the awareness 
test in L’Oréal v Ebay, yet did not consider this test in the light of the trade mark 
infringement committed in the case.   
After mapping out the current law by identifying the existing issues in the trade mark 
realm, the chapter re-evaluated the law in the light of the latest developments undertaken 
by the EU in order to find the remedy to those challenges. These developments are 
undertaken in pursuit of establishing the DSM, tackling online infringements and 
providing more harmonisation within the EU. The focus of the EU legislators has been 
mainly on sector-specific and problem-driven approaches. In that respect, implementation 
of the notice-and-action mechanisms, imposition of a duty of care and promotion of 
voluntary measures are considered by the EU to deal with the existing issues. Henceforth, 
those mechanisms together with the existing mechanisms of EU law, ie NTD and 
injunctions were examined in this chapter to see how they would fit into trade mark law 
and if they would provide the remedy that was sought. After examining those mechanisms 
thoroughly, it was concluded that most of them have the power to deal with the infringing 
activities and provide harmonisation. Yet, they provide different levels of assistance. 
Indeed, it was concluded that the notice-and-notice and notice-and-judicial takedown 
mechanisms appear as the best possible mechanisms to be implemented within trade mark 
law from fundamental rights’ aspect. But, it was also concluded that these mechanisms 
do not appear effective in tackling infringements. In a similar sense, the injunctions’ 
applicability as a remedy is underlined on the ground that it ensures the protection of 
fundamental rights and assures the legal certainty. However, it was ultimately concluded 
that injunctions’ assistance is auxiliary as they cannot be applied unless the request is 
brought before the courts.  
In contrast, it has proven that the existing NTD fails to strike the balance between the 
parties as it puts the intermediaries at the centre of the decision process and does not 
provide any safeguard to content providers. In a similar sense, the implementation and 
promotion of voluntary measures raise similar concerns on the protection of the 
fundamental rights of the parties despite demonstrating that some variations of voluntary 
measures have proved to be convenient to deal with the infringements online.  Ultimately, 
as an answer to the question asked here, the analysis demonstrated that a remedy could 
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indeed be found within current EU law governing online contributory trade mark liability 
without a radical overhaul of the existing regulatory framework. 
In the light of these findings, the most important job was left to the Chapter 6: finding the 
most appropriate mechanism to be implemented as a remedy.  
 
 
III. THE PROPOSAL OF THE THESIS 
 
The proposal of the thesis was submitted in Chapter 6. It is proposed that the best working 
remedy for online trade mark contributory liability law is the implementation of a notice-
and-notice mechanism together with establishing a uniform DRB for the resolution of the 
issues that arise from the online counterfeit selling. This mechanism was chosen on the 
following grounds: 1) the notice mechanism is the one of the significant elements of the 
immunity regime established within the ECD, even though those mechanisms have been 
implemented as part of intermediaries’ policy and as a self-regulatory initiative; 2) the 
mechanism proposed respects the fundamental rights of the parties and ensures the 
protection of these by limiting intermediaries’ involvement in the process, by providing 
the right to counter-notice to a content provider and by clearly establishing the elements 
of notice mechanism; 3) it also provides the effectiveness which is found to be lacking in 
the notice-and-notice system as applied in Canada and notice-and-judicial take down 
mechanisms by establishing a uniform DRB to deal with the issue of taking down under 
the ADR process.   
After identifying this mechanism as the most feasible solution for trade mark realm to 
provide the harmonisation and transparency, the chapter undertook an examination of 
how it should be implemented within trade mark law.  
The way of working of the proposed notice-and-notice mechanism is submitted as 
following. When a right owner issues a notice, service provider checks the notice against 
all the requirements established within the relevant legislation.  If it contains all the 
required elements, this notice is forwarded to the provider of an allegedly infringing 
content by an intermediary within the allotted time. Here the system entitles content 
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providers a right to issue a counter-notice within the determined time frame. The counter-
notice is also bound by the requirements established for the notice issues by right owner.  
If the counter-notice is issued, intermediaries’ duty is again to assess the counter-notice 
against the elements established in the legislation. If the counter-notice contains all the 
requirements elements in it, intermediary forwards it to the right owner. It is significant 
that the intermediaries’ activity and the involvement in the process do not go further than 
forwarding these notifications. The danger of private enforcement is therefore abolished 
in this proposed mechanism as taking the intermediary out of the taking down process. 
Yet, it should be reminded that an intermediary is still under a duty to take down the 
content if the counter-notice is not received or the counter-notice is not a valid one.  
After establishing its basic working system, the elements of the mechanism which provide 
more effective and uniformly applied mechanism are established. With that respect, the 
first thing determined was the elements of the notice. It is established that the signature 
of the issuer of the notification on a written notification, a clear specification of the 
infringing content and provision of evidences related to a claim, verifiable contact details 
of the issuer of the notification ie full name, telephone number, verified address etc. and 
a statement indicating the accuracy of the information are the minimum elements that 
should be included in the notice. These elements are required for both notice and counter-
notice.  
It is also submitted that the system should also deal with the cases of abuse of notification 
for instance when the false or misleading information is provided in the notice. Here, it is 
proposed that the type of sanction to be applied against such abuse should be clearly 
determined by the legislators. Yet, the determination of the type of the sanction should be 
left to the national laws of the MSs since appointing one single type of penalty might not 
be compatible with every MSs’ national laws. 
Besides, the time frames for the issuance of notices are determined. It is underlined that 
the time provided to a content provider to issue a counter-notice as well as to an 
intermediary to check and forward the notices must be adequate for these parties to act in 
the required way. In that sense, it is proposed that 2 or 3 working days should be specified 
for intermediaries to check and forward the notices whereas content providers should be 
allowed to have longer time in order to establish their claim and issue a counter-notice. 
In that regard, 4 working days time frame is proposed. However, it should be noted that 
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these are proposed as a recommendation meaning that they can be set out differently by 
the legislator as long as they are clearly set out.  
What is proposed so far focuses on fostering the fundamental rights and ensuring their 
protection. Leaving intermediaries out of the decision process of taking down as well as 
entitling content providers a right to issue a counter-notice are the elements that would 
assist in balancing the parties’ fundamental rights. However, the question of who will 
deal with the dispute between the right owner and content provider remained unanswered.  
Thesis has considered this question and proposes the creation of a uniform DRB as a body 
of ADR to deal with the issue. In that regard, it is submitted that this body should be 
established to deal with the specific issue considered within the thesis. So that, if a right 
owner chooses to pursue its claim after receiving the counter-notice, then this would be 
the way to be followed. It, however, must be stated that the judicial process would always 
be an option for the parties to bring their cases. It is submitted that the establishment of 
such a pan-EU DRB would provide the effectiveness that is found lacking in the similar 
mechanisms implemented in practice as well as contributing to the harmonisation that the 
EU legislator seeks for and aims to create under the DSM Strategy.  
Finally, thesis deals with the question of how should these changes be implemented 
within the EU law? It is evident that the current immunity regime established within the 
ECD, specifically Art.14 depends on the activities of taking down or blocking access 
undertaken by hosting intermediaries whilst the proposed system requires from hosting 
intermediaries to check and forward the notifications but not to examine and take down 
the content. This suggests that Art.14 should be amended and be aligned with the 
proposed system as a principal matter in order to have effectively working mechanism. 
Since Art.14 of the ECD applies to all substantive rights, it is submitted that the 
amendment should be done in a way to indicate that this would be only applicable to the 
trade marks and the infringements that arise from the online counterfeit selling. 
Along with this development, the enactment of a new EU directive and a regulation is 
proposed in order to give the proposed mechanism its desired effect and to establish a 
solid system. A directive is proposed as a best mechanism to establish the principles 
concerning the notice such as elements of the notice, time frames and the specification of 
a type of sanction to be applied the cases of abuse on the ground that a directive would 
provide the required liberty to the MSs in implementing these principles in accordance 
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with their domestic laws. However, for the creation of a uniform DRB, the enactment of 
a new EU regulation is proposed since this would be the instrument to ensure the 
uniformity needed and aimed with the creation of such system. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The implementation of the notice-and-notice consisting of the above-mentioned 
principles and the establishment of a uniform DRB are what is proposed as a remedy to 
online contributory trade mark liability law. However, some important points should be 
underlined here as closing remarks. First, it should be underlined that the proposal of this 
work should not be understood as being a clear-cut remedy which would provide all the 
necessary remedy for the law. Due to EU law’s tiered formation and the Internet’s 
infrastructure, relying on one single instrument as an ultimate remedy would not be 
sensible. The solution for EU law rather requires a combined approach, meaning that 
making traditionally established rules more aligned with the Internet’s specifics in order 
to account for practical reality. That is why the importance of injunctive relief and the 
role of the judiciary in those cases are also emphasised. In the light of these, what is aimed 
at with the proposal of the thesis is hopefully to provide assistance in establishing a more 
harmonised, clear and solid framework for contributory trade mark law that would work 
sufficiently well for the challenges that arise online. Having a clear framework is not only 
significant in dealing with the existing challenges, this is also significant for the prospects 
of emerging technologies such as 3D painting and artificial intelligence. The law should 
be clear and provide satisfactory guidance for the courts when they face new types of 
trade mark infringements that arise from these new technologies. Liability questions will 
arise from these technologies, for example: what would be the liability of the 
manufacturers or suppliers of 3D printing machines when a trade mark protected good is 
3D printed and sold, or the liability of intermediaries when their users sell such goods on 
their platforms? The answers to these questions should be readily available within the 
existing law. In fact, it is unknown yet that what type of questions and issues will arise 
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with respect to artificial intelligence.717 As such, the law should be capable of dealing 
with the existing questions in order to be keep pace with future prospects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
717 For analysis from copyright aspect See Guadamuz, ‘Do androids dream of electric copyright? 
Comparative analysis of originality in artificial intelligence generated works.’ (2017) Intellectual Property 
Quarterly 2 169-186. 
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